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Abstract 
 
Explaining incidents as systems is a fast growing area of safety scientific research. The 
misleading conception of naturalistic human communication in terms of ‘objective 
information’ remains a pervasive influence on systemic explanation of incidents, 
despite over a decade of methodological developments in the area. Currently, 
interested stakeholders are offered with few alternatives for analysing how information 
systems emerge naturally, and contribute towards the structuring of incident situations. 
Extant methods are also yet to be widely adopted by the practitioner community, and a 
research-practice gap has formed. 
In this PhD research, a new method of systemic incident analysis is developed, to 
counterbalance against the extant methods being developed in the area. The new 
method draws on insights from both Distributed Cognition, and linguistics research, in 
order to present a distributed means of doing systemic incident analysis. The new 
method de-objectifies the notion of information, to support analysis of how 
information ‘flow’ is constitutive of the formation of distributed cognitive systems. In 
embedding an intersubjective component into the core method design, we aim to 
increase the likelihood of systematic learning from incident situations. The incident 
analyst is required to explicitly relate past explanations of incident situations, in detail, 
to data and hypotheses from new incident situations. 
To increase the potential for theorists in the area to better account for the demands of 
incident analysis as practiced, data, insights, and method are contributed towards the 
bridges been built between research and practice. We first develop additional 
understanding of the practice of incident analysts from the patient safety background. 
Next, we provide a second new method of analysis, to allow research scrutiny of the 
empirical phenomena of using systemic incident analysis methods. This second 
method considers the detailed relationship: from the theory of the systemic incident 
analysis method into its practice as part of real incident investigation. This provides a 
new research instrument, for systematically examining how systemic incident analysis 
methods may afford or constrain elements of their practice. 
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Abbreviations, acronyms, and technical terms 
 
CAST – Causal Analysis based on STAMP  
FRAM – Functional Resonance Analysis Method 
Investigative hypothesis (or hypotheses for the plural form) 
This is a generic technical term, used to highlight the inherently uncertain nature of structures 
resulting from analysis of incidents. These structures are inclusive of the internal conceptual 
structures of incident analysts developed during incident analysis (not directly observable), as 
well as the external conceptual structures that are developed (seen in the form of published 
incident analyses for example). 
Natural information system(s) 
This is a technical term used to refer to the natural representation co-ordination systems that 
are formed through various acts of communication. For example, a small natural information 
system emerges through the writing and reading of an arbitrary document. Here, the co-
ordination of states of representation occurs between one or more writers, the document itself 
as a participant in the interaction, and one or more readers of the document. A second example, 
in terms of more culturally-standardised norms for representation, is in the case of writing and 
reading a mathematical equation. Here strong cultural norms 
1
 have developed over time, to 
support consistent flow of (mathematical) information between mathematical equation writers 
and readers. Distributed Cognition provides us with a generalised focus on propagating states 
of representation. The Information Safety Method presented in Chapter 3 leverages its 
Distributed Cognition heritage, to provide a general analysis method with which to describe 
and understand any natural information representation co-ordination system. In theory, the 
Information Safety Method may be utilised to support analysis of any system of 
representation. The system of MEWS reading representations, and the system forming around 
representations of a doctor’s interpretation of a patient x-ray in Chapter 4 provide further 
examples. There, MEWS reading information ‘flows’ through the system participants, by 
virtue of taken for granted assumptions for representation and interpretation (analogous to 
norms of mathematical representation construction and interpretation). In contrast, how a 
doctor’s interpretation of the x-ray ‘flows around’ is arguably relatively less constrained and 
normalised, by a priori assumptions about how such representations are to be constructed and 
interpreted (e.g., based on written or electronic natural language representations). 
                                                          
 
1
 ‘Culture’ in the anthropological sense of the word, as the sum total of ways of living built up 
by a group of human beings and passed on from one generation to another. 
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Representation 
This is a technical concept from Distributed Cognition, as a general way to refer to both 
structures ‘in the head’, as well as those ‘out there in the world’ (cf. Hutchins 2001). The 
investigative hypotheses defined above are seen as one instance of such structures, for the 
purposes of this thesis. These investigative hypotheses are developed as part of the process of 
analysing incident situations to achieve understanding or explanation. 
RCA – Root Cause Analysis. 
Safety Function 
A term used to uniquely refer to the particular probabilistic characterisation of causation, 
presented for use as part of the Information Safety Method. 
STAMP – Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (this is the underlying 
conceptual model of incident situations being operationalised through CAST, see above) 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter: 
 Briefly summarises the outcomes of the literature review conducted in 
Chapter 2 
 Identifies the research gaps motivating the need for the thesis work 
 Provides a clear statement of the aims and objectives of the thesis 
 Gives a brief overview of the thesis structure, and what to expect in each 
chapter 
The need to understand and account for safety incidents has existed for centuries. 
Before the 19th century, preventing incidents was predominantly a practical activity 
(Hale and Hovden 1998). Such human endeavours have evolved over the years, into an 
area of contemporary study known under the rubric of Safety Science. At present, its 
scientific foundations are multiple, diverse, and fragmented. As yet, few established 
normative criteria for evaluating scientific validity exists for safety scientific research 
(Le Coze et al. 2014). 
As noted by Le Coze et al. (2014), ongoing developments are taking place across all 
three major strands of safety scientific research: in the form of methodological, 
theoretical, and empirical contributions to the field. In particular, a topic of research 
receiving increasing interest in recent years is systemic incident analysis. Under this 
emerging subfield, incidents are understood and explained thorough treating them as 
systems. In this subfield, incident situations are characterised in terms of how 
individual parts relate to the whole (system).  
In the subfield of systemic incident analysis, a number of major ways of 
conceptualising incident situations in terms of systems exist. In the general systemic 
incident analysis literature, incident situations are analysed as: 
1) systems of social-technical influence, decision making, and 
communication channels (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000, 2002). 
Under this conception, communication channels are conceived to be 
Chapter 1 
18 
 
the means by which content (objects) may be transmitted between 
sources and destinations across society.   
2) systems of socio-technical hazard control (Leveson 2002, 2011). 
Under this conception, ‘Control commands’ for communicating safety 
constraints for controlling hazards are potentially exerted through 
reference channels for communication (as part of organisations and 
society); Similarly, the efficacy of the hazard control commands is 
monitored through the transmission of information as objects through 
the measuring channel corresponding to each reference channel. 
3) a system of work functions, and variability propagation (Hollnagel 
2012). Under this conception, the incident analyst is encouraged to 
analyse how information acts both as a resource to be inputted into 
work functions and activities, and also acts as an output resulting from 
these work functions and activities. Information (objects) can also be 
used up as part of resources needed for organised work, or as part of 
the conditions for executing the work. 
As substantiated through the detailed literature review (Chapter 2), all three of these 
major methods of systemic incident analysis sustain the illusion of ‘objective 
information’ – which may be passed as an object between members of society and 
organisations. In terms of systemic incident analysis methods in patient safety, little 
concrete guidance is provided in depth for the incident analyst seeking to understand 
how natural information systems form. In patient safety, incident situations are usually 
conceptualised in terms of systems of causes (Parker 2007, Wu et al. 2008). 
Since conceiving naturalistic human communication in terms of ‘objective information’ 
is deeply misleading (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), an interactive, contextual, method of 
analysing how information systems naturally form during incident situations is needed. 
Such a new method would act to offset the misleading dominant illusion of ‘objective 
information transmission’ during incident situations, currently present in the field of 
systemic incident analysis. 
While safety scientists continue to develop new methods of systemic incident analysis, 
these conceptual innovations are of limited practical impact unless they are at some 
point used to analyse and learn from real incident situations as part of real incident 
investigation (Underwood 2013). For systemic incident analysis researchers, this is 
Chapter 1 
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currently a major unresolved concern (Underwood 2013). The literature review 
conducted in Chapter 2 supports this view. Further research is needed in order to start 
to bridge the gap between systemic incident analysis methods in theory, and their 
usage and utilisation in practice. 
1.1   Research aims and objectives 
To address the two gaps identified above, the aims of this PhD research project are 
twofold: 
A. To develop a new method to offset the misleading dominant illusion of 
‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations, currently 
present in the field of systemic incident analysis. And to demonstrate this new 
method of systemic incident analysis through application to the analysis of a 
diversity of recent patient safety incident situations. 
B. To start to bridge the gap between systemic incident analysis methods in theory, 
and their usage and utilisation in practice. This is done through examination of 
empirical data on contemporary safety incident analysis and investigation 
practice; as well as through empirical analysis of the move from systemic 
incident analysis methods in theory, into their practice as part of real incident 
investigation. 
The specific project objectives are: 
Objective 1 (to address aim A, Chapter 3) 
To develop a new method of systemic incident analysis based on Distributed Cognition 
ideas and its worldview, called the Information Safety Method. This new incident 
analysis method is based on the Distributed Cognition focus on propagation of 
representation states, for example, through the act of a doctor writing a prescription 
chart, propagation of prescription information occurs through the coordination of at 
least two representation states (across the doctor and prescription chart). As part of the 
new analysis method, two new concepts are proposed based on the Distributed 
Cognition worldview: the incident analyst is prompted to assess for correct 
representation, and consistent coordination of representation states during incident 
situations. For example, if there is a spelling mistake in writing the prescription, 
incorrect representation can be said to have occurred for the representation in the form 
Chapter 1 
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of the prescription chart; relatedly, if the doctor had in mind the right prescription, yet 
still wrote the wrong prescription down, an inconsistent coordination of prescription 
representations can be said to have occurred between the (incorrect) representation in 
the form of the prescription chart, and the (correct) representation of the right 
prescription information the doctor had in mind. 
Through doing this, we are able to systematically analyse how information ‘flow’ is 
constitutive of the formation of distributed cognitive systems. The incident analysis is 
conducted through identifying the systemically interactive, emergent, and naturally 
fallible acts of communicative representation during the incident situation. Such 
systems are continually being formed daily, regardless of the robustness and success of 
the communicative acts and interactions constituting these emergent systems. 
Communication during incident situations is understood as a direct function of the 
communication context, irrespective of the degree of success or failure in attempting 
communication. 
The new analysis method developed here embodies a strong interpretation of 
Distributed Cognition concepts (cf. Pea 1993, Moore and Rocklin 1998). The new 
method is based on a disbelief of the possibility of cognition residing solely in people, 
and the flow of objective information between them in communicating (Lakoff and 
Johnson 2003). Instead, the incident analyst is prompted to focus on interactive co-
ordination, as the sole and only means of empirically evidencing any of the 
communicative and cognitive aspects of incident situations. 
The new method also seeks to improve the likelihood of actual learning from incidents, 
through treating incident analysis as a distributed cognitive process; of ongoing 
incident analyst and data triangulation (cf. Rothbauer 2008); to explicit reflect the 
heavily qualitative nature of systemic incident analysis, as both conceived and 
practiced. Like existing methods of systemic incident analysis, the new method of 
systemic incident analysis is intended to be generalised and generative in nature, to 
play a part in enriching constructive discourse about incident situations regardless of 
the particular safety domain in question. 
The new method represents an advance in theory, through codifying Distributed 
Cognition ideas for the specific empirical purposes of systemic incident analysis. This 
follows through on the recognised promise of Distributed Cognition based safety 
explanations (cf. Busby and Hughes 2003, Sweeney 2009), for explaining problems of 
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communication during contingent incident situations. The Information Safety Method 
also advances safety science methodology, through contributing a new method of 
systemic incident analysis. 
Objective 2 (to address aim A, Chapter 4) 
To conduct a study of the new method of systemic incident analysis, in order to 
investigate whether the Information Safety Method does what it is supposed to do. A 
controlled empirical study was conducted, to explore the empirical consequences 
following from using the new method of incident analysis. Five diverse and relevant 
patient safety incident situations were independently selected by practicing patient 
safety incident investigators. These situations were then analysed using the 
Information Safety Method. The empirical study suggests that the method: 
1) can help the incident analyst better understand how communicative 
fragilities develop as natural information systems form during incident 
situations, 
2) and can support the active sharing of knowledge across individual incident 
analysis situations.  
Various safety implications not identified through the prior incident analysis and 
investigation were also consistently uncovered during this study, relating to the 
particular incident situations analysed. 
As indicated by Branford (2007), whether methods perform as intended is a suitable 
validation criterion for validating incident analysis methods. The current study 
indicates that the Information Safety Method can indeed do what it is supposed to do – 
which is to help illuminate how distributed cognitive systems form during incident 
situations through attempts at communicative interaction. 
Objective 3 (to address aim B, Chapter 5) 
In order to better understand contemporary incident analysis practice, we explore the 
degree to which systemic incident analysis is in fact practiced as part of patient safety 
incident investigation. In-depth interviews with two patient safety incident 
investigators were held to better understand their practice. The safety incident 
investigators provided detailed insight into their analysis concepts, methods, process, 
and the constraints of their work practice. The study findings obtained suggest that 
mixed rationales are in operation in patient safety incident investigation practice. In 
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conducting their analysis work, the two incident investigators draw on both the belief 
that there is a single, ultimate cause to be uncovered, alongside the conflicting belief 
that such a single cause is impossible to determine practically. In addition, the idea that 
incidents occur due to many causes seems to be accepted only in part, as part of their 
practice. As with previous empirical research in the area, a complex mix of ideational 
and practical concerns and pressures seem to drive the conduct of patient safety 
incident analysis and investigation. In this particular study, five concepts significantly 
driving incident analysis and investigation practice are identified. 
Objective 4 (to address aim B, Chapter 6) 
To develop a new research method which can give detailed insight into how chosen 
systemic incident analysis methods relate to incident analysis practice, as part of real 
incident investigation. Here, we do not provide a second method for analysing incident 
situations; but provide a method of understanding how systemic incident analysis 
methods are utilised in practice. We examine the detailed relationship between the 
theoretical and practical aspects of doing systemic incident analysis. The new method 
is used to identify the constraints and affordances of each systemic incident analysis 
method, when it is utilised as part of individual real incident investigations in practice. 
Through doing such analysis, we may better understand how particular systemic 
incident analysis methods supported particular incident investigations, and the 
strengths and limitations of the chosen analysis method. 
Objective 5 (to address aim B, Chapter 7) 
To investigate the empirical implications of the new research method mentioned in 
Objective 4, the author acted both as researcher and practitioner. In the capacity of 
practitioner, the author conducted systemic incident analysis through ‘wearing the 
shoes’ of a small scale incident investigator. In the capacity of safety science 
researcher, the author designed this study to include independent replication of the use 
of the new research method, by another researcher not otherwise involved (in addition 
to the author’s own analysis using the new research method).  
Empirical data was thus examined in this study, of how the research theory moved into 
practice, for an established method of systemic incident analysis (ISMP Canada 2006). 
The incident analysis method used, and critically examined, was drawn as an exemplar 
from the pool of existing systemic incident analysis tools in patient safety. The detailed 
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primary account of both the method and its practice, together, formed the empirical 
data critically examined and analysed using the new research method. 
This study shows that the new research method can be applied in practice productively. 
Taken as a whole, the study also suggests that upon detailed research examination, 
even a relatively simple and well-developed systemic incident analysis method raises 
substantial methodological challenges, when used and enacted in practice by a junior 
safety scientific researcher. 
1.2   Thesis overview 
This thesis consists of eight chapters in total. They are outlined as follows. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter has introduced systemic incident analysis as a subfield of safety scientific 
research. We have identified the two main gaps motivating the work of the following 
chapters. First, we identified a need to develop a new method to offset the misleading 
dominant illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations, 
currently present in the field of systemic incident analysis. Secondly, we identified a 
need to start to bridge the gap between systemic incident analysis methods in theory, 
and their usage and utilisation in practice. This motivates the aim and objectives of the 
thesis work.   
Chapter 2: Literature review 
This chapter creates the substantive background for the thesis. We first set out the 
foundational assumptions on which the research project is based. Specific topics 
relevant to the research are then reviewed. Topics reviewed include: 
 major developments in theoretical systemic incident analysis research, 
 core precepts of Distributed Cognition, 
 research on learning from incidents, and 
 emerging evidence on the gap between systemic incident analysis research and 
incident analysis practice. 
Through this review, we identify a need to develop a new method to offset the 
misleading dominant illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ during incident 
situations, and the need to start to bridge the gap between systemic incident analysis 
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methods in theory, and their usage and utilisation in practice. These two needs are 
addressed through the subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 3: A new method of systemic incident analysis (1st methodological and 
theory contribution)  
This chapter develops the first of two new analysis methods contributed by the thesis. 
Here, we develop a new method of systemic incident analysis based on Distributed 
Cognition precepts, called the Information Safety Method. This new incident 
analysis method integrates the Distributed Cognition focus on propagation of 
representation states, with notions of correctness and consistency. The new method is 
illustrated with a concrete running example throughout this chapter, drawn from one of 
the two concrete incident situations analysed as part of preliminary trials of the new 
method. Like existing methods of systemic incident analysis, the new method 
developed in this chapter is intended to be generalised and generative in nature, to play 
a part in enriching constructive discourse about incident situations regardless of the 
specific safety domain in question. 
Chapter 4: Analysing five patient safety incident situations using the Information 
Safety Method (1st empirical study and contribution) 
This chapter follows directly from the methodological development work reported in 
Chapter 3, taking place after the development of the new incident analysis method, and 
its preliminary study. In particular, here we investigate whether the Information Safety 
Method does what it is supposed to do, through a subsequent controlled empirical 
study using incident data from five diverse and relevant patient safety incident 
situations. These incident situations were independently selected by practicing patient 
safety incident investigators using predefined inclusion criteria, as relevant to the 
analytical purposes of the Information Safety Method. Based on the resulting analysis 
of the five incident situations, we discuss some broader implications for improving the 
robustness of systems of information coordination and representation using the 
Information Safety Method. 
Chapter 5: Concepts significantly driving incident analysis and investigation 
practice (2nd empirical study and contribution) 
This chapter explore the extent to which systemic incident analysis research is in fact 
practiced in patient safety incident investigation, to contribute towards resolution of 
the lack of systemic incident analysis as part of incident investigation practice. In-
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depth interviews with two patient safety incident investigators were held, to better 
understand the concepts significantly driving their practice. Through using semi-
structured interviewing with thematic data analysis, five significant concepts are 
identified to drive their incident analysis and investigation practice. 
Chapter 6: A new method for relating incident analysis research theory to its 
practice (2nd methodological and theory contribution) 
This chapter develops a new way of understanding how chosen systemic incident 
analysis methods relate to incident analysis practice, as part of real incident 
investigation. Here, we do not seek to analyse incident situations, but seek to provide a 
new empirical research method for advancing our understanding of how systemic 
incident analysis methods are utilised in practice. The new research method is based on 
the dual established notions of constraint and affordance. It offers a way to scrutinise 
the relationship between 1) the theoretical aspects of methods of systemic incident 
analysis, and 2) their empirical practice as part of real incident investigation. The new 
method developed in this chapter is called the Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
Chapter 7: Exploring the implications of the Systematic Reanalysis Method (3rd 
empirical study and contribution) 
This chapter follows directly from the methodological development work reported in 
Chapter 6. In the capacity of safety science researcher, the author designed this study 
to include independent replication of the use of the Systemic Reanalysis Method by 
another researcher not otherwise involved. The primary account of incident 
investigation used as data, was obtained through the author’s practice of systemic 
incident analysis, through ‘wearing the shoes’ of a small scale incident investigator. 
The detailed primary account of both the chosen method and its practice, together, 
formed the empirical data critically examined and analysed using the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method. 
This study shows that the Systematic Reanalysis Method, developed in Chapter 6, can 
be applied in practice productively. Taken as a whole, the study also suggests that 
upon detailed research examination, even a relatively simple and well-developed 
systemic incident analysis method raises substantial methodological challenges. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions & Future work 
This chapter highlights the contributions of the thesis to safety scientific research. The 
concluding chapter of the thesis returns to the context reviewed in Chapter 2, to 
summarise how the thesis has contributed method, theory, and empirical findings to 
the science of systemic incident analysis. Based on this work, and experience gained 
through the research investigations of the last few years, some recommendations for 
future work are presented for further consideration in this final chapter.  
1.3   Ethical approval 
For the two empirical studies presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, the research was 
approved by the Queen Mary Joint Research Management Office (ReDA Ref: 009200). 
For the interview study of Chapter 5, a standard university information/consent sheet 
was adapted, provided to, and signed by the two participating incident investigators. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature review 
 
This chapter: 
 Clearly states the theoretical foundations informing the research 
 Reviews the literature relating to systemic incident analysis and learning 
from incidents, and provides a basic introduction to Distributed Cognition 
 Identifies the research gap motivating Aim A of the project: to develop and 
explore a new method to offset the misleading dominant illusion of 
‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations (see chapters 
3, 4) 
 Reviews the emerging empirical evidence on the gap between systemic 
incident analysis research and practice 
 Identifies the research gap motivating Aim B of the project: to make a start 
in bridging the gap between systemic incident analysis methods in theory, 
and their usage and utilisation in practice (see chapters 5, 6, 7) 
2.1   Introduction 
In this chapter, we contextualise the thesis through reviewing the extant literature. We 
begin by setting out and illustrating four foundational assumptions underpinning the 
primary work presented in the subsequent chapters. We then examine the latest major 
developments in systemic incident analysis research: through reviewing both basic 
principles of systemic methods in patient safety, as well as from the wider systemic 
incident analysis literature. 
In patient safety, systemic analysis is predominantly done through explaining incidents 
as resulting from systems of causes and contributory factors; as an adaptation of basic 
principles from the RCA family (White 2009, Besnard and Hollnagel 2014). Two 
exemplars of ‘systemic Root Cause Analysis’ are reviewed in detail for illustration, in 
the current chapter. In the wider research literature however, incidents have been 
framed quite differently, based on more divergent lines of theoretical thinking. 
AcciMap (e.g., Rasmussen and Svedung 2000), CAST (e.g., Leveson 2011), and 
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FRAM (e.g., Hollnagel 2012) currently dominate the wider systemic incident analysis 
literature. These three major alternatives for systemic explanation are reviewed in turn, 
to evidence how the ‘information as object’ illusion is apparent from their language, 
terminology, and presentation to the prospective user. Since conceiving naturalistic 
human communication in terms of ‘objective information’ is deeply misleading 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), a new alternative method of analysing how information 
systems naturally form during incident situations is needed. Developing a new method 
to offset the ‘objective information’ illusion, is one major aim of the thesis (Chapter 3).  
The next part of the chapter then goes on to review basic principles of Distributed 
Cognition. This established theory about cognition provides the basis for the new 
analysis method developed in Chapter 3. The Distributed Cognition worldview also 
provides the starting point for the second of the two new methods developed by this 
thesis. It is designed to support empirical examination of how systemic incident 
analysis methods are followed as part of practice (Chapter 6). It supports 
understanding, through analysis, of how codified representations of systemic incident 
analysis methods (i.e., manuals representing the particular method) demonstrably 
shape and transform their enactment as part of real incident investigation (Chapter 7).  
In the third part of this chapter, we review literature on learning from incidents. We 
start by examining simplified conceptual models proposed by researchers in the area, 
which attempt to distil the process of learning from incidents into a set of general and 
commonly reoccurring steps. We then turn to the older field of organisational learning, 
and find that the dynamic, adaptive, and intersubjective nature of learning emerges as a 
common thread. Dynamic, adaptive, and intersubjective processes of cognition (such 
as learning) lie at the heart of the Distributed Cognition worldview (Osbeck and 
Nersessian 2014). These aspects are consonant with the wide diversity of natural 
factors known to potentially hinder organised learning from incidents in practice. The 
new analysis method developed in Chapter 3 explicitly embraces the dynamic and 
intersubjective aspects of adaptive development of possible incident explanations. 
Such an approach may therefore help mitigate against some of the variable natural 
factors, where they serve only to hinder rather than enhance the quality of organised 
learning achieved. This is done through ongoing calibration and triangulation of the 
developing explanations (chapters 3, 4). 
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Finally, we turn our attention to emerging evidence on the gap between systemic 
incident analysis research and practice. We review empirical literature on the nature 
and extent of this research-practice gap. Underwood’s (2013) initial examination of 
this issue provides our high-level overview. His initial map of the nature of this gap is 
supplemented by additional relevant literature specifically from patient safety. 
Together, this extant literature indicates a substantive gap between systemic incident 
analysis research, and existing incident analysis practice. A deeper understanding of 
how theoretical research in this area relates to existing practice is therefore needed. 
And provides the basic motivation for the work presented in the later part of the thesis: 
which seeks to advance knowledge and practice with respect to the current gap 
between systemic incident analysis research and practice (chapters 5, 6, 7). In 
particular, the method developed in Chapter 6 provides us with a way to generate 
detailed and substantiated understandings, of how systemic incident analysis methods 
are interpreted and followed in practice. 
2.2   Theoretical foundations  
Perrow’s (1984) provocative thought experiment provides our point of departure for 
the thesis project. The five theoretical foundations on which the thesis work rests are 
illustrated and explained in this section, using examples drawn from Perrow’s concrete 
incident scenario (where relevant). Diverse safety scientific conversations and 
contestations are ongoing around whether reality is singular or multiple; and around 
related issues of how we can come to know such realities with certainty. The 
theoretical foundations of the thesis are therefore explicitly declared, at the outset of 
our review of extant literature. The following illustrated explanations are intended to 
help position the subsequently narrative more clearly, within its parent domain of 
safety scientific research.  
The incident situation he presents is arguably simple in nature; however, we make use 
of this simple scenario as a means to concretely ground the following foundational and 
abstract discussions. As we will see, the issues raised are both general in nature, and of 
relevance regardless of the severity and scope of the particular incidental situation 
being considered. We add numbers in curly brackets to the body of the quotation from 
Perrow, to allow reference to particular parts of his thought experiment. 
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Perrow’s ‘A Day in the Life’ incident scenario 
“ {1.1}You stay home from work or school because you have an important job 
interview downtown this morning that you have finally negotiated. {1.2}Your friend 
or spouse has already left when you make breakfast, but unfortunately he or 
she has left the glass coffeepot on the stove with the light on. {1.3}The coffee has 
boiled dry and the glass pot has cracked. {1.4}Coffee is an addiction for you, so 
you rummage about in the closet until you find an old drip coffeemaker. {1.5}Then 
you wait for the water to boil, watching the clock, and after a quick cup dash out 
the door. {1.6}When you get to your car you find that in your haste you have left 
your car keys (and the apartment keys) in the apartment. {1.7}That’s okay, 
because there is a spare apartment key hidden in the hallway for just such 
emergencies. (This is a safety device, a redundancy, incidentally.) {1.8}But then 
you remember that you gave a friend the key the other night because he had 
some books to pick up, and, planning ahead, you knew you would not be home 
when he came. (That finishes that redundant pathway, as engineers call it.) 
     {2.1}Well, it is getting late, but there is always the neighbor’s car. {2.2}The 
neighbor is a nice old gent who drives his car about once a month and keeps it 
in good condition. {2.3}You knock on the door, your tale ready. {2.4}But he tells you 
that it just so happened that the generator went out last week and the man is 
coming this afternoon to pick it up and fix it. {2.5}Another “backup” system has 
failed you, this time through no connection with your behavior at all (uncoupled 
or independent events, in this case, since the key and the generator are rarely 
connected). {2.6}Well, there is always the bus. {2.7}But not always. {2.8}The nice old 
gent has been listening to the radio and tells you the threatened lock-out of the 
drivers by the bus company has indeed occurred. {2.9}The drivers refuse to drive 
what they claim are unsafe buses, and incidentally want more money as well. (A 
safety system has foiled you, of all things.) {2.10}You call a cab from your 
neighbor's apartment, but none can be had because of the bus strike. (These 
two events, the bus strike and the lack of cabs, are tightly connected, 
dependent events, or tightly coupled events, as we shall call them, since one 
triggers the other.) 
     {3.1}You call the interviewer’s secretary and say, “It’s just too crazy to try to 
explain, but all sorts of things happened this morning and I can’t make the 
interview with Mrs. Thompson. Can we reschedule it?” {3.2}And you say to 
yourself, next week I am going to line up two cars and a cab and make the 
morning coffee myself. {3.3}The secretary answers “Sure,” but says to himself, 
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“This person is obviously unreliable; now this after pushing for weeks for an 
interview with Thompson.” {3.4}He makes a note to that effect on the record and 
searches for the most inconvenient time imaginable for next week, one that Mrs. 
Thompson might have to cancel. ” 
(Perrow 1984, p5) 
2.2.1  The many contributors to incident situations 
In contemporary safety science research, a basic starting assumption is that incident 
situations are a consequence of much more than a single ‘main cause’ 2. Instead, any 
incident situation is assumed to result from conjunctions of its multiple aspects (Stoop 
1995). Specific examples of this basic view include both James Reason’s ‘Swiss 
cheese’ metaphor (e.g., Reason 2000, Reason et al. 2006), and Mackie’s (1965) INUS 
conditions. These and other theoretical contributions to safety science provide many 
further examples, where the monocausal assumption of a single main cause is rejected 
as a basis for analysis. In attempting to explain Perrow’s example through rejecting the 
monocausal assumption, the fact that the person missed the job interview with Mrs. 
Thompson {1.1, 3.1} can be explained through the following potential causes, 
including:   
1) the lock-out of the drivers by their bus company {2.8},  
2) the fact that coffee is an addiction for you {1.4}, 
3) that you gave your spare apartment key to your friend the other night {1.8},  
      (and so on ...) 
This assumption that incident situations develop as a result of multiple contributors 
seems self-evident in principle, as a basis for analytical understanding and explanation. 
However, the many contributors to incident situations remain a difficult starting 
assumption, for every relevant safety stakeholder to accept fully and act on in practice. 
We will see primary evidence of these difficulties later, in examining the findings from 
research interviews to understand more about conducting incident analysis as part of 
patient safety incident investigation (Chapter 5). 
                                                          
 
2 Reference to ‘causes’ may go under a variety of different names and definitions, such as 
‘contributory factors’ or ‘barriers’ in the patient safety literature for example. 
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2.2.2  Natural fallibilities and biases in investigative reasoning 
Previous research across a diversity of investigators and disciplines suggests that 
investigative reasoning in practice can often fall far short of the ideals purported (cf. 
Mahoney 1977, Reason 1990, Miles and Huberman 1994, Esser 1998, Nickerson 1998, 
Johnson 2003a, Kahneman 2003, Reiman and Rollenhagen 2011, Manuele 2014). This 
previous research therefore provides the warrant, for assuming that the reasoning of 
any investigator can be naturally biased or fallible – even despite deliberate efforts at 
‘objective’, impartial, inference.  
An illustration of some of the natural fallibilities and biases in investigative reasoning 
can be seen in Perrow’s example: due to the differing knowledge bases, and 
perspectives of the people involved in this case. Here, Mrs. Thompson’s secretary 
made a snap judgement about the candidate interviewee’s character, based on 
incomplete knowledge of the full context leading up to the interviewee’s phone call to 
postpone {3.3, 3.4}. As the reader of the whole scenario, we have more ‘impartial’ and 
complete knowledge of its situational aspects, which helps to clarify the mismatch 
between the individual perspectives and knowledge involved. For each of the two 
people involved in the scenario however, their own behaviour and responses are not 
unreasonable (e.g., the interviewee making the phone call to postpone, and the 
secretary responding by deliberately searching for the most inconvenient time due to a 
lack of full understanding of the interviewee’s particular situation). When various 
organisational factors and other pressures of working life are also introduced or 
recognised (e.g., Lundberg et al. 2010, Drupsteen and Hasle 2014), investigative 
reasoning is likely to be often quite imperfect: with lots of room for improvement in 
more fully accounting for the perspectives of all of the participants involved in the 
incident situation.  
It is currently impossible to conclusively demonstrate that ‘complete knowledge’ of 
what caused an incident has been achieved (cf. Branford 2007, Harms-Ringdahl 2013). 
Particularly given the more ill-defined and ill-bounded elements relating to 
management, sociality, and organisation, accounted for in systemic understanding and 
explanation of incident situations. No incident analysis (systemic or otherwise) is 
likely to be indisputably perfect. All are open to potential improvement, at least in 
principle. 
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2.2.3  Non-subversive efforts in incident participation, and incident analysis  
When interpreting interview data about investigative analysis of incident situations, we 
assume that both the incident participants, and incident analyst(s) are genuinely trying 
to do the best they can in the context of their particular working situations. The 
practices known through such interviews would need to be interpreted quite differently, 
if the potential for subversive efforts was assumed as a basis for empirical research. 
One major aim of theoretical work in the safety sciences is to ultimately develop ways 
to help relevant organisations attempt safety improvements, and hopefully reduce the 
likelihood of future incidents. It seems then sensible to conduct research investigations 
into systemic incident analysis on the basis of differing assumptions, compared to 
those of investigations based on adversarial disciplinary or criminal hearing. In 
assuming non-subversive efforts throughout the occurrence of incident situations, and 
their analysis (often done as part of incident investigation), we are likely to maximise 
constructive participant cooperation and involvement to support organised learning (cf. 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute et al. 2012). This forms the third theoretical 
foundation of the thesis work. 
2.2.4  Inherent uncertainties in practicing incident analysis 
The process of incident analysis is but one part of the broader incident investigation 
work (Hendrick and Benner 1987). Investigation of incidents is non-linear in practice, 
cognitively demanding, and distributed throughout the broader process of incident 
investigation (ESReDA 2009). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show two approximations of how 
incident investigation is conducted, from both a practitioner (ESReDA 2009), and 
more academic perspective (Johnson 2003a), respectively. Whereas Figure 2.1 
highlights the non-trivial role of initial analyst knowledge in informing the course of 
an incident investigation, Figure 2.2 highlights the role of detection and reporting 
during latter parts of the process. 
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Figure 2.1: A perspective of incident investigation process according to ESReDA 
(adapted from ESReDA, Figure 7, 2009). The work-flow arrows of the original have 
been simplified here. 
 
Figure 2.2: A perspective of incident investigation process according to Johnson 
(adapted from Johnson, Figure 5.1, 2003a). Here ‘an occurrence’ refers to an incident 
situation having been detected. 
These figures show that a large part of an investigation is iterative across multiple 
phases: for example when collecting ‘facts’ about an incident (Loops E1, E3, J1), and 
when making inferences based on the incident data collected (i.e., all of the five loops 
highlighted in Figures 2.1 and 2.2). In conducting such iterative sense making, analysts 
may decide that their incident understanding is sufficient, and move on to the post-
analysis phases shown in each of the two figures. Alternatively, more data regarding 
the incident situation may be deemed necessary, to enrich the analyst’s existing 
understanding of the incident situation (e.g., Loop E3). Such cycles of gathering data 
and sense making, helps the investigators to generate and refine investigative 
hypotheses, in a similar way to how qualitative analysts routinely deal with empirical 
data (cf. Miles and Huberman 1994, Figure 1.4). Like the hypotheses developed during 
qualitative data analysis, the investigative hypotheses developed during incident 
analysis are also inherently uncertain in nature. For this thesis, the dialogue between 
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ideas and evidence is conducted under the following rationale, where an investigation 
is done to diagnose: 
“unknown situations through an iterative reasoning cycle in which a 
temporary and conditional adaptation of the hypothesis under 
investigation takes place. One way of looking at the investigation is that it 
is about reducing uncertainty about what happened, why it happened and 
what should be done about it by applying the knowledge available to the 
investigator(s) based on the evidence obtained during the investigation.”  
(ESReDA 2009) 
As suggested by the consensus statement above, the interpretative ideas resulting from 
investigative reasoning, and their reporting, are both ultimately revisable. Published 
reports of analysis of incidents often use language suggesting the presentation of ‘hard’ 
factual knowledge. The reality of practicing analysis of incidents is much more 
uncertain however, as reported by practicing incident investigators (e.g., ESReDA 
2009, Clinical Human Factors Group 2012). Our investigative hypotheses about the 
relevant structuring of incident situations are indeed just ‘best-efforts’: at alternative 
understandings, explanations, and illumination of selected aspects of a highly complex 
and ill-defined empirical phenomena. Such reasoning structures aim to derive order, in 
the face of an often far from complete picture of what is known, supported by the 
background knowledge and expertise of particular incident analysts and investigators. 
This background can be highly diverse and variable, depending on the particular issue 
of concern, and aspects of the incident situation pertaining to the concern. The validity 
of these representations, on which to base subsequent action, is therefore inherently 
uncertain to some degree, regardless of what theories and methods are used to support 
the incident analysis done.  
As warranted by Distributed Cognition theory, we use the term representation in this 
thesis to include all of the representation structures generated during incident analysis. 
These representational structures include both structures ‘in the head’, as well as those 
available for independent inspection by others (e.g., the various ideas about why the 
incident happened, which may or may not be written down). Such internal and external 
structures are therefore both included, in discussing the investigative hypotheses 
developed during/through incident analysis. A firm basis in natural language is often 
the representation of choice for both recording ‘incident data’, and presenting 
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investigative hypotheses to others for review. The non-legislated, loosely consensual, 
and dynamically evolving nature of natural language (Pinker 2014) may thus act as an 
additional contributor, to the natural uncertainties of incident analysis process. 
Despite their inherent drawbacks as sources of ‘factual’ evidence, reports of incident 
investigations are nevertheless commonly used as a source of incident data for testing 
analysis methods (Benner 2013). This is the approach taken later in this thesis, when 
empirically exploring some of the implications of the new method of systemic incident 
analysis we develop in Chapter 3. 
2.3   Latest major developments in theoretical Systemic Incident 
Analysis research 
2.3.1  A system of causes as the unit of incident analysis 
In the nascent area of patient safety research and practice (Vincent and Hewett 2013), 
variations on Root Cause Analysis (RCA) principles are the most popularly promoted 
kind of approach (Parker 2007, Wu et al. 2008). While details vary, the following six 
aspects reoccur across most RCA based analysis methods (Hollnagel and Speziali 
2008): 
Aspect 1: Determine sequence of events, 
Aspect 2: Define causal factors, 
Aspect 3: Analyse each causal factor’s root causes, 
Aspect 4: Analyse each root cause’s generic causes, 
Aspect 5: Develop and evaluate corrective actions, 
Aspect 6: Report and implement corrective actions. 
Many existing incident analysis proposals in patient safety elaborate on these six 
common aspects. In some, there is a clear focus on constructing systems of causes as 
the unit of analysis. Two particularly comprehensive examples of such systemic Root 
Cause Analysis, are the London Protocol (Taylor-Adams and Vincent 2004a, 2004b), 
and the Canadian Incident Analysis Framework (Canadian Patient Safety Institute 
et al. 2012). The London Protocol suggests that systems of causes are to be 
constructed through first identifying a number of proximal ‘care delivery problems’, 
followed by the more distal factors contributing to each care delivery problem (Figure 
2.3).  
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Figure 2.3: Six kinds of potential latent causes for a care delivery problem. Adapted 
from Taylor-Adams and Vincent (2004b, Figure 5). 
Somewhat similarly, a so called ‘constellation diagram’ is proposed as part of the 
Canadian Incident Analysis Framework, which provides an alternative data coding 
scheme to support the construction of systems of causes (Figure 2.4). These aspects of 
the two methods correspond to Aspects 2 through to 4, as described by Hollnagel and 
Speziali (2008) above. 
In patient safety, the main difference between individual RCA variants is usually in 
terms of the specific typologies of causes proposed, for supporting the incident analyst. 
The role of these typologies also vary, in helping analysts generate concrete systems of 
causes as pertaining to the specific incident situation. For example, the London 
Protocol mediates identification of latent causes through the abstract construct of care 
delivery problems (Figure 2.3). A different typology is proposed as part of the 
Canadian Incident Analysis Framework. The typology there is mediated more 
directly, through the construct of (adverse) incident outcome (Figure 2.4). In either 
case, the construct of ‘cause’ is left very loosely defined, facilitating flexible 
interpretation and construction of such systems of causes in principle. While details 
vary, the general aim of such methods is to move the thinking of the incident analyst 
towards conceptualising incident situations in a fully multifactorial fashion, as 
explained earlier in Section 2.2.1, and away from the ‘single main cause’ 
conceptualisation common to everyday causal thinking (at odds with contemporary 
safety scientific thinking). 
A single 
care 
delivery 
problem
Task Team
Organisational
and Management
Patient Individual Environment
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Figure 2.4: A so-called ‘generic constellation diagram’. Arrows represent perceived 
causal links into increasingly distal parts of the incident and ‘system’. Adapted from 
Canadian Patient Safety Institute et al. (2012, Appendix H). 
The abstract typologies shown in Figures 2.3 and 2.4 may be sometimes broken down 
further, to help the incident analyst as part of the provisions of the method. Table 2.1 
presents one such example from the London Protocol. The more detailed prompts for 
use are shown down the right hand column of this table; the left hand column 
corresponds approximately to the six ‘cause categories’ shown in Figure 2.3. In this 
case, the prompts shown in Table 2.1 were proposed following an informed synthesis 
(Vincent et al. 1998) – of both the ‘resident pathogen’ metaphor of Reason (1990), 
alongside aspects from the human factors literature. 
 
 
 
FINDING
FINDING
FINDING
FINDING
FINDING
FINDING
FINDING
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
OTHER
TASK
EQUIPMENT
WORK 
ENVIRONMENT
CARE TEAM
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PATIENT
INCIDENT 
OUTCOME
FACTOR
FACTOR FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
FACTOR
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FINDING
FACTOR
FACTOR
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Table 2.1: A proposed framework of contributory factors influencing clinical practice. 
Adapted from Taylor-Adams and Vincent (2004b, Table 1). Prompts obviously to do 
with issues around information/communication are highlighted in bold here. 
Different types of 
contributory factors to 
consider in analysis 
More detailed breakdown of each major prompt 
(e.g., a patient factor relating to patient condition) 
Patient factors Condition (complexity and seriousness), 
Language and communication, 
Personality and social factors. 
Task and technology 
factors 
Task design and clarity of structure, 
Availability and use of protocols, 
Availability and accuracy of test results, 
Decision-making aids. 
Individual (staff) factors Knowledge and skills, 
Competence, 
Physical and mental health. 
Team factors Verbal communication, 
Written communication, 
Supervision and seeking help, 
Team structure (congruence, consistency, leadership 
etc). 
Work environmental factors Staffing levels and skills mix, 
Workload and shift patterns, 
Design, availability and maintenance of equipment, 
Administrative and managerial support, 
Environment, 
Physical. 
Organisation and 
management factors 
Financial resources and constraints, 
Organisational structure, 
Policy, standards and goals, 
Safety culture and priorities. 
Institutional context factors Economic and regulatory context, 
National health service executive, 
Links with external organisations. 
While abstract typologies are routinely used across many patient safety RCA methods, 
few go beyond the presentation of taxonomic hierarchies (cf. Table 2.1, Snijders et al. 
2009, Taitz et al. 2010, Lawton et al. 2012). As illustrated here, RCA based analysis 
methods in patient safety do not usually support explicit analysis, of how natural 
systems of information representation form. 
2.3.2  Systems of social-technical influence, decision making, and communication 
channels as the unit of incident analysis 
As part of a broader proactive approach to socio-technical risk management, the 
AcciMap method was proposed by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000, 2002). AcciMap 
Chapter 2 
40 
 
is intended to encourage deeper analysis of the broader influences that may have 
prepared, and shaped the socio-technical landscape – both prior to, and subsequent to 
the ‘critical event’ of an incident situation 3. Predicated on the starting assumption that 
risk management is basically a control problem, AcciMap construction facilitates 
explicit understanding of the distributed system of influence, decision-making, and 
communication paths aspects of an incident situation. Despite its popularity amongst 
safety researchers, practical guidance for how to go about constructing the four 
AcciMap representations we overview below is only available at a fairly minimal level 
of detail. While not central to the contributions of this thesis, Branford (2007) provides 
more in-depth discussion of difficulties in inter-analyst replicability, as well as 
advantages due to the flexibility of the original AcciMap method. 
Four different forms of diagrammatic representations form the core of the AcciMap 
method – as defined by Rasmussen and Svedung (2000, 2002): 
(1) A single AcciMap: 
represents the patterns of socio-technical influence facilitating the particular 
incident situation. In particular, a substantive focus of these influence 
graphs is to explicitly show how particular decision makers, and decision 
bodies across society help to both set-up, as well as manage the 
consequences following the ‘critical event’ of an incident. An illustrative 
example is shown in Figure 2.5. An individual AcciMap corresponds to the 
specifics from an individual incident situation. 
(2) A Generic AcciMap: 
is based on multiple individual AcciMaps, a kind of representative ‘mega 
AcciMap’ can be generated. This generic AcciMap looks somewhat similar 
to individual AcciMaps, but embodies more abstract generalisation across 
individual incident scenarios. How this generalising move ought to be done 
is not well-defined in the method’s reference documents (see Rasmussen 
and Svedung 2000, 2002). Nevertheless, this second graphical 
                                                          
 
3
 In patient safety terms, such a ‘critical event’ could be an amputation of the wrong leg for 
example. This ‘critical event’ construct is subtly yet significantly different from the ‘incident 
outcome’ construct shown in Figure 2.4; in the fact that the critical event of the incident 
outcome is but one of many ‘events’ occurring throughout the development, progression, and 
possible resolution of an incident situation beyond the ‘incident outcome’. 
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representation seems to function as a generalised summary, of salient 
commonalities across the many single AcciMaps corresponding to 
individual incident situations. Through such generic representation, the idea 
is to obtain inductive and normative aggregation, of the analytical 
knowledge embodied by individual AcciMaps. 
(3) An ActorMap: 
is based on the analytical knowledge represented through the Generic 
AcciMap. This diagram explicitly focuses on the ‘organisational 
actors/bodies’ embodied in Generic AcciMaps. 
(4) An InfoFlowMap: 
is a graph (in the mathematical sense), showing the normal information 
channels between the participating ‘actors’ represented in the ActorMap. 
An InfoFlowMap is produced based on ‘filling in’ some of the possible 
channels of communication between participating ‘actors’. Figure 2.6 shows 
an example, illustrating how information flows along the normal 
communication channels between actors, from a previously identified 
ActorMap. 
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Figure 2.5: An AcciMap of the social-technical decision making landscape in which this transport incident situation developed, prior to the ‘critical 
event’ of a tank rupture (bottom right hand side). Similar graphical representation of the events and interactions after the ‘critical event’ of this 
incident is not included here, but proceeds in basically the same fashion. Adapted from Rasmussen and Svedung (2000, Figure 3.3A). 
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In Figure 2.5, square edged boxes represent identified ‘consequences’ of various sorts 
(e.g., TDG regulations is a consequence of national transport policy). Round edged 
boxes represent various preconditions of the situation evaluated no further in this 
particular AcciMap analysis. Arrows in this figure are supposed to denote the 
‘influence’ relationships amongst the elements they connect together. The filled pink 
boxes represent various decisions, functions, tasks and/or actions that could have been 
done differently, and are thus potentially sensitive to improvement for safer work 
operation in the future. 
 
Figure 2.6:  Part of an illustrative InfoFlowMap for a generic company headquarter. 
Adapted from Svedung and Rasmussen (2002, Figure 9). 
The AcciMap method seems to stem from an ‘incident as harmful energy/hazard 
release’ metaphor (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000, Section 5 and Figure 7.9; see 
Kjellen 2002 for more detailed review of this kind of incident conceptualisation). 
Graphical representations like that of Figure 2.5 encourage analysis of the broader 
socio-technical ‘influences’ which could perhaps be intervened on, to help prevent the 
(metaphorical) release of (adverse) energy/hazards. As part of his broader 
contributions to safety scientific research (Le Coze 2015), AcciMap reflects 
Rasmussen’s commitment to encourage deeper appreciation of the ‘vertical’ linkages 
and influences relating to incident development and occurrence, across the major 
traditional ‘silos’ of academic research and disciplines (Figure 2.7; cf. the ‘system 
levels’ in Figure 2.5). In particular, the AcciMap emphasis is on the need to 
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investigate the influences across each and every one of these horizontal ‘levels’ of 
society, in dealing with the inherently multi-disciplinary problem of risk management 
(and incident analysis by implication). 
 
Figure 2.7: The approximate correspondence between various research disciplines, and 
different levels of societal control (adapted from Rasmussen 1997, Figure 1).  
For the purposes of this thesis, the point to note here is that AcciMaps encourage a 
‘channel-based’ conception of how information flows through society and 
organisations too (e.g., see Figure 2.6). Further discussions, diagrams, and method 
presentation relating to ‘content of communication’, throughout Section 7 of 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2000), provide further evidence for this interpretation of 
AcciMap method. The perspective naturally necessitates the conceptualisation of 
‘information objects’ – as the ‘content’ which flows through channels ‘in’ 
organisations and society. In this fashion, the ‘information as object’ illusion is being 
sustained, as part of the theoretical basis of the AcciMap method. 
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2.3.3  Systems of socio-technical hazard control as the unit of incident analysis 
Further developing Rasmussen and Svedung’s (2000) analytical emphasis on societal 
control, Leveson (2002, 2011) proposes the Causal Analysis based on STAMP 
(CAST) method, as a way to operationalise her Systems-Theoretic Accident Model 
and Processes (STAMP) incident model to support incident analysis. The hypothesis 
motivating STAMP (and CAST by implication), is that ‘systems theory’ is a useful 
way to analyse incidents (Leveson 2004). More specifically, CAST analyses are 
conducted under the assumption that incidents happen due to a lack of appropriate 
constraints on the various interactions that occurred (Leveson 2011, p67). They are 
thus attributable to the particular safety control structure which may or may not have 
been in place at the time. 
Leveson (2011) proposes the following 9 main steps to do, in conducting a CAST 
incident analysis. Further generic details about how to ‘do CAST’, is not well-defined 
beyond the level of detail presented here: 
CAST step 1: Identify the system(s) and hazard(s) involved in the loss. 
CAST step 2: Identify the system safety constraints and system 
requirements associated with the hazards. 
CAST step 3: Document the safety control structure in place to control each 
hazard and enforce the safety constraints. This structure includes the roles 
and responsibilities of each component in the structure, as well as the 
controls provided or created to execute their responsibilities, and the 
relevant feedback provided to them to help them do this. This structure may 
be completed in parallel with the later steps. 
CAST step 4: Determine the proximate events leading to the loss (of the 
incident). 
CAST step 5: Analyse the loss at the physical system level. Identify the 
contribution of each of the following to the incident events:  
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 - physical and operational controls, 
 - physical failures, 
 - dysfunctional interactions, 
 - communication and coordination flaws, and 
 - unhandled disturbances. 
Determine why the physical controls in place were ineffective in preventing 
the hazard. 
CAST step 6: Moving (recursively) up the levels of the safety control 
structure, determine how and why each successive higher level allowed or 
contributed to the inadequate control at the current level. For each system 
safety constraint, either the responsibility for enforcing it was never 
assigned to a component in the safety control structure, or a component or 
components did not exercise adequate control to ensure their assigned 
responsibilities (e.g., safety constraints) were enforced in the components 
‘below’ them. Any human decisions or flawed control actions need to be 
understood in terms of (at least):  
- the information available to the decision maker as well as any 
required information that was not available, 
- the behaviour-shaping mechanisms (the context and influences on 
the decision-making process), 
- the value structures underlying the decision, and 
- any flaws in the process models of those making the decisions and 
why those flaws existed. 
CAST step 7: Examine overall coordination and communication 
contributors to the loss. 
CAST step 8: Determine the dynamics and changes in the system and the 
safety control structure relating to the loss, and any weakening of the safety 
control structure over time. 
CAST step 9: Generate recommendations from the CAST analysis. 
As an analyst proceeds through these steps, the general idea is to start to construct one 
or more STAMP models (which provide the main theoretical/conceptual basis 
underpinning these 9 steps). These investigative hypotheses thus identify the system(s) 
Chapter 2 
47 
 
of socio-technical hazard control, which may or may not have been in place at the time. 
There is as yet no formalised procedure for creating these STAMP based investigative 
hypotheses (Underwood 2013, cf. Leveson 2011), or for providing structured 
presentation of them (Hollnagel and Speziali 2008, cf. Leveson 2011). Their 
development can therefore substantively vary across different case studies (the 
interested reader may wish to compare in detail the case-independent aspects of the 
investigative hypotheses developed: by Johnson and de Almeida (2008), Dong (2012), 
Leveson et al. (2012), and Underwood and Waterson (2014) for example). Despite 
such diversity, some commonalities seem to reoccur across different published 
incident analyses based on CAST/STAMP. 
One common emphasis seems to be on the explicit identification of hierarchical 
systems of control. These systems are socio-technical, and to an extent cultural in 
nature; and their hierarchical aspects have some similarity to the six ‘system levels’ of 
AcciMap (compare Figure 2.5 with Figure 2.8). An illustrative ‘generic model’ is 
presented as part of CAST/STAMP method, based on Leveson’s perspective of the 
key actors and control-relationships in the United States (Figure 2.8). This figure 
enumerates – in the abstract – some of the potential means of exerting/communicating 
‘control commands’, and monitoring the efficacy with which the associated safety 
constraints (of the societal systems of control) are being satisfied. The incident analyst 
then goes on to instantiate some of these abstractions as they pertain to concrete 
incident scenarios. Under a STAMP perspective, the communication of control 
commands and monitoring of safety constraints are done through the so-called 
‘reference’ and ‘measuring’ channels (as shown more concretely in Figure 2.9). For 
the purposes of this thesis, we assume that the system operations half of Figure 2.8 (i.e., 
the right hand side) is probably intended to be relevant to any CAST incident analysis. 
Leveson (2011) does not explicitly explain the extent to which the system development 
half of STAMP modelling is indeed applicable to CAST incident analysis, however, 
in the section of the book devoted to ‘CAST method’. Figure 2.9 illustrates some 
elements from a concrete STAMP model, from an analysis of the US pharmaceutical 
products control structure (circa 2010). 
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Figure 2.8: General form of a STAMP model of sociotechnical control. Adapted from 
Leveson (2011, Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 2.9:  The ‘bottom’ part of a concrete STAMP analysis, adapted from Leveson et 
al. (2012, Figure 1), and annotated by myself. This is from an analysis of the US 
pharmaceutical products control structure conducted by one of Leveson’s masters 
students. 
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Like for the AcciMap method, we see that the STAMP based investigative hypotheses 
underlying a CAST analysis also take a channel-based conceptualisation of how 
information flows (e.g., Figures 2.8 and 2.9). Leveson (2011, Section 11.8) does 
discuss issues around redundancy in information flow, however. The discussions in 
this part of her book again demonstrates how a channel-based conceptualisation 
necessitates the subsequent idea of ‘information objects’ – as the ‘content’ flowing 
through such conduits between actors in organised society. In this fashion, the 
‘information as object’ illusion is also sustained as part of the CAST method. 
2.3.4  A system of work functions, and variability propagation as the unit of 
incident analysis 
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM, Hollnagel 2012, Hollnagel et 
al. 2014) was developed to encourage explicit recognition of the everyday successes of 
‘safe system operation’: as simply the flip side of failures. In conducting FRAM 
analysis, no special conceptual distinction is made between work during incidents, and 
‘normal’ everyday work. In particular, incidents are considered as emergent 
phenomena resulting from dynamic, ‘non-linear’ interactions. One of the underpinning 
concepts of FRAM is based on the assumption that human and organisational 
performance is always necessarily variable. The idea of ‘stochastic resonance as noise 
benefits’ (McDonnell and Abbott 2009) seems to be analogously applied for FRAM 
analysis, in order to understand both safe ‘non-incident’ work in the same way as work 
during incident situations. Figure 2.10 illustrates the conceptual analogy drawn in 
FRAM – between the signal processing notion of ‘stochastic resonance’, and FRAM’s 
proposal of ‘functional resonance’. I added the annotations down the right hand side of 
this figure, to make this conceptual analogy more explicit and accessible to an 
unfamiliar reader. As shown in this figure, the concepts of ‘frequency’ and ‘amplitude’ 
are used metaphorically in FRAM – to draw an analogy from these two aspects of 
waveforms, to the ‘frequency’ and ‘amount’ by which work may or may not vary over 
time. 
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Figure 2.10: Visually illustrating the basic idea of FRAM’s ‘functional resonance’, as 
applied to both ‘safe’ and ‘incident work’. Adapted from Hollnagel and Goteman 
(2004, Figure 1).  
Taking the ‘functional resonance’ metaphor further, FRAM proposes the following 
main analytical steps. Because work during incidents is not treated as a special case 
under FRAM, these main steps remain basically the same, regardless of whether 
FRAM is used for analysis during risk management, or incident analysis. In the rest of 
this section, Initial Capitalisation will be used to distinguish between a more specific 
FRAM analysis concept, as opposed to the common usages and meanings of the 
particular word (e.g., ‘FRAM Function’ vs. ‘functional aspects of work’, ‘FRAM 
Function Input’ vs. ‘input’). Figure 2.11, Table 2.2, and Table 2.3 together, give an 
idea of what a concrete ‘FRAM model’ looks like. Like in the case of STAMP, these 
‘models’ predefine the kind of concrete investigative hypotheses developed during 
incident analysis, but with respect to aspect of functional coupling, and systemic 
variability instead here. The analysis output shown across these three representations 
were generated through FRAM analysis of a surgical incident, where material was 
unintentionally left in a patient’s abdomen. We go on to discuss aspects of FRAM 
specifically relevant to the contributions of this thesis, after presentation of its main 
steps and examples of FRAM analysis outputs. 
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FRAM step 1: 
Identify what is required for everyday work to succeed in terms of ‘FRAM 
Functions’, through a functional, rather than task-based, or activity-based 
conceptualisation; 
FRAM step 2: 
Characterise both the potential, and actual variability of each of the 
(FRAM) Functions identified through step 1; 
FRAM step 3: 
Look at the specific patterns of functional coupling between parts of the 
system of FRAM Functions identified, to better understand how the 
‘variability’ of individual work functions may ‘resonate/propagate’, 
potentially leading to unexpected outcomes for the system of Functions as a 
whole; 
FRAM step 4: 
Propose ways to manage the possible occurrences of uncontrolled 
performance variability that have been found through steps 1-3 (this step 
seems to be as yet largely under development, in terms of the lack of 
concrete guidance available to support what to do for incident analysis here). 
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Figure 2.11: Graphical representation of part of a concrete ‘FRAM model’ (2.11a), and 
a particular instantiation of this ‘FRAM model’ (2.11b). In this figure, ‘BS’ and ‘AS’ 
stand for work functions before, and after surgery respectively. Adapted from 
Hollnagel (2012, Figure 9.1). 
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Table 2.2: Textual representation of the ‘Suturing the wound’ Function shown in Figure 2.9b. 
Single quotes indicate adapted quotes from the original. Adapted from Hollnagel (2012, Table 9.1).  
Name of the FRAM Function:           ‘Suturing the wound’ 
Description: ‘[Suturing the wound] is part of the completion of the surgical procedure. 
To be done by the main surgeon’ 
Function aspect Description 
INPUT ‘Surgical procedure has been completed’ 
OUTPUT ‘Wound has been sutured’ 
PRECONDITION 
(two identified in this case) 
‘All instruments and materials are 
accounted for’ 
‘Special analgesic has been administered’ 
RESOURCE ‘not described initially’ 
CONTROL ‘not described initially’ 
TIME ‘not described initially’ 
 
Table 2.3: Textual representation of the ‘Administer special analgesic’ Function shown 
in Figure 2.9b. Single quotes indicate adapted quotes from the original. Adapted from 
Hollnagel (2012, Table 9.5).  
Name of the FRAM function:           ‘Administer special analgesic’ 
Description: ‘[Administering special analgesic is] to be done by the scrub nurse. Note 
that this was an additional task during this surgery’ 
Function aspect Description 
INPUT 
(two identified in this case) 
‘Tissue sample has been excised’ 
‘Syringe with special analgesic’ 
OUTPUT ‘Special analgesic has been administered’ 
PRECONDITION ‘Haemostasis has been achieved’ 
RESOURCE ‘not described initially’ 
CONTROL ‘not described initially’ 
TIME ‘not described initially’ 
Ideally, in a FRAM analysis the identification of such systems of (work) Functions 
should continue until no unexplained (or unexplainable) work variability remains. 
Although graphical representation of these Functions, and the coupling between the 
aspects of each Function can be used for convenient communication, it is their textual 
aspects (e.g., Tables 2.2, 2.3) which form the primary mode of FRAM based 
representation, of analysis outputs (according to Hollnagel). The graphical 
representations of FRAM analysis outcomes (e.g., Figure 2.11) conveniently 
complement the textual representation of the outcomes, however. In particular, the 
uncoupled system of FRAM functions (as shown in Figure 2.11a), forms the ‘FRAM 
model’ of the functional aspects of work. This uncoupled ‘FRAM model’ delimits the 
potential range of sets of functional couplings possible. One possible configuration of 
inter-Functional coupling in an incident context is shown, in Figure 2.11b for example. 
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For the purposes of the current review, the way in which these Functions are identified 
(FRAM step 1) is the focus of interest. Table 2.4 summarises the abstract coding 
scheme proposed by Hollnagel (2012), for this initial part of FRAM method. 
Table 2.4: The range of aspects and issues – in the abstract – one could identify as part 
of constructing a FRAM Function. Adapted from Hollnagel (2012, Chapter 5). 
The name of this FRAM Function (which must be a verb phrase, describing something 
being done) 
The six abstract aspects of each Function 
to consider in a FRAM analysis (the 
concrete ‘instantiations’ of each of these 
abstract Function aspects must be a noun 
phrase, describing a state); In terms of a 
(FRAM) Function’s: 
What should be described as part of a 
FRAM analysis (Capitalised words are used 
to refer to the individual abstract aspects 
of a FRAM Function) 
 
Input The analysis should identify that which is 
used or transformed by the Function, to 
produce its Output (in terms of its matter, 
energy or information Input(s) for 
example). 
Output An Output of a Function is the result of 
what it does, for instance by processing its 
Input. Corresponding to the proposal for 
Input identification, matter, energy, or 
information Output(s) may be identified 
for the current Function. 
Precondition The analysis should identify various 
additional conditions of work – which are 
(ideally) all satisfied before the current 
work Function is carried out. Unlike its 
Input, this aspect of a Function does not in 
itself constitute a signal that 
‘starts/activates’ it. 
Resources, and/or 
the Execution Conditions necessary for 
facilitating this Function 
The analysis should identify the things that 
are needed or consumed while a Function 
is carried out. Some examples of such 
‘consumables’ include matter, energy, 
information, competence, software, tools, 
manpower etc.  Although time is in 
principle also a Resource, it is treated as a 
‘special’ Function aspect in FRAM (cf. the 
last row in this table). 
Control (Input) aspects The analysis should identify that which 
supervises or regulates a Function, so that 
its desired Output is obtained. Some 
illustrative examples of Controls include a 
particular plan, schedule, 
guidelines/instructions, a (control) 
algorithm, exceptional work conditions to 
look out for, and work or social 
expectations. 
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Time aspects The analysis should identify the various 
ways in which issues relating to time can 
affect how a Function is carried out. In 
principle, these timing issues can 
alternatively also be characterised as part 
of the Input, Precondition, 
Resources/Execution-Conditions, or 
Control aspect of a FRAM Function. 
As shown in Table 2.4, FRAM clearly sustains the ‘information as object’ illusion as 
part of its theory and conceptualisation. A fairly traditional ‘information processing’ 
assumption is again elaborated on here, to encourage analysis of how ‘information 
(objects)’ can be both inputted into a Function, as well as outputted from it. Under this 
framing, information can naturally also be ‘used up’ – as part of a Function’s 
Resources, and/or Execution Conditions. 
2.3.5  Summary 
In summary, Section 2.3 has shown that the ‘information as object’ illusion is 
sustained by all three of the major methods of systemic incident analysis reviewed. In 
the case of the system of causes being advocated in patient safety, however, no strong 
theoretical commitment can be evidenced through the methodological literature 
reviewed, regarding the issue of conception of information. We join reputable others 
(e.g., Lakoff and Johnson 2003, Wears 2012) in arguing that the ‘information as object’ 
illusion fundamentally misconceptualises how natural human communication occurs. 
This motivates the need to develop a new method to offset the misleading dominant 
illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ currently present in the field of 
systemic incident analysis (Aim A of the PhD project). 
2.4   A Distributed Cognition perspective on ecosystems of (human) 
cognition 
This thesis was substantively influenced by the Distributed Cognition perspective of 
Edwin Hutchins (cf. Hutchins 2001, 2006, 2010, 2014; Rogers 1992, 1993, 1997; and 
Moore and Rocklin 1998 for example). We introduce the basic principles of 
Distributed Cognition at this point, to provide a theoretical foundation for the rest of 
the thesis.  
Over recent decades, Distributed Cognition has become increasingly popular. It 
provides an alternative to classical approaches to human cognition. As a cognitive 
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theory, Distributed Cognition does not make strong ontological claims. It does not 
claim to describe what human cognition is. Instead, it is probably best described as 
providing a loose set of epistemological foci and strategies. As Hutchins notes: 
“to take the distributed perspective is not to make any claim about the nature 
of the world. Rather, it is to choose a way of looking at the world, one that 
selects scales of investigation such that wholes are seen as emergent from 
interactions among their parts” 
(Hutchins 2014, p36) 
Moreover, a basic assumption of Distributed Cognition is that all cognitive activity is 
distributed in nature (Hutchins 2014). Taking this starting assumption, an investigator 
applying Distributed Cognition is encouraged to look for how cognitive distribution 
occurs, interactively. While Distributed Cognition retains the basic interest in seeking 
to understand and explain the organisation of cognitive situations, it differs 
substantively from classical cognitive science. In contrast, the Distributed Cognition 
emphasis is on broader, non human-centric units of analysis. Consequently, the 
boundary between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ aspects of human cognition is softened and often 
dissolved: with both often treated as a single conglomerate for effecting cognition. 
Existing citations of the original monographs and papers articulating Distributed 
Cognition show interest in this ‘framework theory’ from a diverse range of application 
domains. For example, Distributed Cognition has been used as a basis for theorising 
about research and engineering process and practice (Giere 2002, Nersessian 2009), 
clinical education (Pimmer et al. 2013), safety critical situations (Masci, Huang, et al. 
2012; Rajkomar and Blandford 2012; Franklin and Zhang 2014), and as a theoretical 
basis for data reduction in observation situations (Halverson and Clifford 2006, 
Blandford and Furniss 2006). In particular, the ‘cognition as computation’ metaphor of 
cognitive science is retained. The computation metaphor is ‘stretched’, however, to 
encompass and emphasis the broader, intersubjective contexts enabling ‘distributed 
cognitive systems’ to emerge. Whilst Distributed Cognition does not commit to how 
computations are actually ‘implemented’ inside people, a substantive focus is on how 
states of representation are created, transformed and propagated in naturalistic 
situations (Hutchins 1995a, p49). From a Distributed Cognition perspective, the world 
consists of constantly evolving patterns of interactive, functional couplings between 
participating elements – which form the distributed cognitive process and system 
emerging from analysis. 
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Two theoretical principles are distinguishing, and central to Distributed Cognition 
(Hollan et al. 2000). 
The first principle concerns the unit of Distributed Cognition based analysis. 
Distributed cognitive processes are looked for wherever they may occur, on the basis 
of what functional relationships emerge amongst the participating elements. These 
functional, cognitive relationships delimit the bounds of the analysis done, rather than 
the spatial colocation of the participating elements. Such dynamically configuring 
cognitive systems are socio, technical, and also often cultural in nature. A canonical 
illustration of two such systems is demonstrated, in terms of the differing 
representational assumptions between Western and Micronesian ship navigation 
tradition and culture (Hutchins 1995a, Chapter 2). Other ‘original’ examples of 
Distributed Cognition based analysis are also available – in the context of an airline 
cockpit situation for example (Hutchins 1995b, Hutchins and Klausen 1996, Hutchins 
and Palen 1997). In each case, the unit of Distributed Cognition based analysis is 
allowed to freely vary – depending on the particular patterns of emergent interactions 
observed. 
The second principle of Distributed Cognition concerns the range of participants 
assumed to be relevant in supporting systemic patterns of cognitive activity. 
Unlike the classical approaches to human cognition, Distributed Cognition is relatively 
agnostic, and not human-centric – about who, and/or what may participate in a 
particular cognitive system (Halverson 2002). Both human and non-human participants 
are potential candidates, for inclusion in an analysis of how systems of cognition 
naturally emerge. Counter-intuitively, non-human participants of such systems can 
include natural representation states of the world: such as states of particular islands 
perceived relative to the ocean and repurposed for supporting Micronesian ship 
navigation for example (Hutchins 1995a, Chapter 2). States of representation may also 
be more artificial in nature: in the form of states of a Western navigation chart or 
alidade for example (Hutchins 1995a, Chapter 2). In Distributed Cognition based 
analysis, the naturalistic and artificially constructed features of the world are both 
‘primary participants’ – of the distributed cognitive process and system. While it does 
not reject the internal representation assumption underpinning classical approaches to 
cognitive science, Distributed Cognition does take a contrastive, ‘outside-in’ approach 
to systemic description and explanation. Such an explanatory strategy naturally 
foregrounds the mediating role of externalised aspects of cognition, and minimises the 
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role of explanation based on traditional ‘egocentric’, ‘inner’ conjectures about how 
people cognize. In particular, one emphasis of Distributed Cognition is on how 
observable representations must contribute to the less observable aspects of human 
cognition. 
When these two central principles of Distributed Cognition are applied to the 
observation of human activity ‘in the wild’, at least three kinds of cognitive 
distribution become apparent through analysis: 
 distributed cognition across members of a social group, 
 distributed cognition through coordination between internal and external 
(material/environmental) structure, and 
 distributed cognition through time, such that the products of earlier events can 
transform the nature of later ones. 
The Distributed Cognition theory reviewed here provides the basis for development of 
the Information Safety Method (chapters 3, 4). In looking for how cognitive 
distribution occurs, interactively, the developed Systematic Reanalysis Method 
(chapter 6, 7) provides one way of exploring how systemic incident analysis method 
information is actually distributed – between their tangible representation and their 
users when used in practice. 
2.5   Learning from incidents 
2.5.1  Emerging models of learning from incidents 
Due to a growing interest in the area, several theoretical perspectives have emerged on 
learning from incidents in recent years. For example, Lindberg, Hansson and 
Rollenhagen (2010) proposed that learning from incidents may be viewed as a chain of 
steps. According to them, learning starts with the reporting of incidents (Step 1), 
selection of incidents for further investigation based on the initial reporting (Step 2), 
and incident investigation (Step 3), followed by the dissemination and communication 
of the outcomes of the investigation (Step 4), and finally the actual prevention of 
(future) incidents (Step 5). They proposed that the process as a whole can fail – if one 
of these links in the chain of steps fails. They also emphasised the need for the process 
to be self-reflective, to enable improvements to be recursively made to the learning 
process itself. 
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A different model of learning from incidents was presented by Jacobsson et al. (2010; 
2011). In contrast to Lindberg et al. (2010), they see learning as a more cyclical 
process. Jacobsson et al. also frame learning from incidents slightly differently: as 
consisting of data collection and reporting, analysis and evaluation, decisions, 
implementations and follow-up as part of a learning cycle. 
In response to the mostly theoretical nature of existing models of learning from 
incidents, Drupsteen (et al. 2013, 2014) developed a more elaborate model of the 
learning from incidents process. Her model claimed to integrate parts of the wider 
theoretical literature on learning. In contrast to the models by both Lindberg et al. and 
Jacobsson et al., the model of Drupsteen (et al. 2013, 2014) was additionally calibrated 
against new empirical data as part of her PhD studies, and subsequently refined in light 
of the resulting new understanding of key part of the learning from incidents process. 
Drupsteen’s model of learning also takes a stepwise view, like Lindberg et al. (2010). 
However, it also integrates conceptual elements from the well-known Deming cycle of 
continual business improvement (i.e., ‘Plan-Do-Check-Act’, see Deming 1982), with 
the organisational learning theory of Argyris and Schon (1979). The most recent, 
revised 2012 version of Drupsteen’s model is shown in Figure 2.12. 
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Figure 2.12 A revised conceptual model of learning from incidents. Reproduced from 
Drupsteen (2014, Figure 5) with permission. 
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Informed by its theoretical heritage, Drupsteen’s new perspective emphasises the need 
for an understanding of the complete organisational process: from studying incidents 
(i.e., incident analysis and investigation), through to using the resulting knowledge 
outcomes to attempt prevention of future incidents. Key assumptions embodied by 
Drupsteen’s model of the process include:  
 the fact that learning from incident situations will not be effective if there is a 
discrepancy between what actors in organisations say/think they do (the 
espoused theory in Argyris and Schon’s terms), and what they actually do (the 
so called theory-in-use), 
 the recommendation that improving learning from incidents will require a 
philosophy of ‘learning to learn’, and  
 the recommendation that it is useful to be sensitive to how learning from 
incidents may be supported or hindered by the organisational environment in 
which the process of learning is performed. 
2.5.2  Factors potentially hindering organised learning 
The various understandings of how learning from incidents occurs – embodied by the 
conceptual models reviewed above – are all necessarily simplified; due to the complex 
and contingent nature of incident evolution, occurrence, and situational progression. 
We now go on to review existing knowledge on a range of factors not fully captured 
by these simplified models of learning from incidents. As one might expect in this 
complex area of empirical research, many factors have been identified to potentially 
impact on how learning from incidents occurs. 
In conducting incident analysis as part of organised work, numerous factors may 
hinder the enactment of organised learning from incidents in practice. In terms of the 
initial parts of a learning process for example, learning may be limited by too few 
incidents being reported, or limited knowledge about particular incidents (Mancini 
1998, Sanne 2008, Rasmussen et al. 2013). A diversity of personal factors may also 
limit the extent of learning achieved. Personal beliefs and previous understanding and 
knowledge may limit how lessons for learning are identified, how remedial actions are 
selected, and how lessons learnt are implemented (Carmeli and Gittell 2009, Lundberg 
et al. 2010, Stockholm 2011, Fahlbruch and Schöbel 2011, Sanne 2012). People tend 
to hold on to their beliefs, despite evidence to the contrary (Reason 1990). Latent 
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causes for incidents may therefore not be identified (Jacobsson et al., 2009; Körvers 
and Sonnemans, 2008), and thus impede the implementation of remedial actions 
(Cedergren, 2013). 
Other contributing factors impeding learning include the formation of premature 
hypotheses, mono-causal thinking, and influences from how individuals have 
previously thought about and experienced work (Fahlbruch and Schöbel 2011, Sanne 
2012). Safety fixes that are known to work and easy to understand can also be more 
likely to be implemented (Lundberg et al. 2010). The presence or lack of high quality 
relations among people (i.e., shared goals, knowledge and mutual respect), and 
‘psychological safety’ (i.e., people feel that they can safely ask questions or feedback, 
and report errors) may also have an effect on the learning process (Carmeli and Gittell 
2009).  
Through qualitative interviews with 22 incident investigators across different domains 
in Sweden, Lundberg et al. (2010) found a wide range of factors which worked against 
the ideal of ‘what-you-find-is-what-you-fix’ (cf. Lundberg et al. 2009) during actual 
incident investigation. For example, in investigation practice, the prior theoretical and 
experiential competencies of the investigator could substantively affect the kind of 
data collected, and incident analysis done. This is broadly congruent with the earlier 
empirical research of Svenson et al. (1999) and Branford (2007), who independently 
found that opinion on analysing the same incident situation may vary substantively – 
depending on the particular backgrounds of the incident analysts (e.g., disciplinary), 
and leading to divergent understandings of system interactions and finding from 
incident analysis. Lundberg et al. (2010) also found that the cost-benefit balance 
projected by an incident analyst may also be significant, in shaping what remedial 
actions are designed for potential implementation; although investigators from 
different safety domains did not unanimously agree on the relevance of this particular 
factor in the study. Material limitations can also shape data collection and analysis 
during incident investigation, where limited time (e.g., for part-time investigators) or 
limited data (e.g., due to subsequent dissolution of a key relevant organisation after the 
incident occurred, or due to the voluntary nature of investigation co-operation as 
mandated by law or policy) may potentially constraint the depth of analysis and 
investigation enacted. 
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In attempting empirical explanation of why organisations may not necessarily 
effectively learn from incidents, Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) identified a number of 
contributing causes and conditions. These included low visibility of organised incident 
prevention efforts in some cases, fear of negative consequences as a consequence of 
speaking up for the organisational employee (i.e., extra work for the individual, or 
creating a negative image for management), and a systematic blind spot for 
recognising and discussing organisational/cultural issues. As a consequence of their 
empirical examination of the issue, Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) concluded that more 
studies are needed to identify both the differences, and broad commonalities in why 
organisations may fail to learn from previous incidents. 
Taken as a whole, this previous research shows that many factors may influence both 
what an investigator finds, and the lessons identified through incident analysis. Such 
lessons may be acted upon, sometimes. They are however not always necessarily 
addressed as part of incident investigation practice. This motivates the need for 
incident analysis methods to be developed which more actively encourage learning 
from incident situations (cf. Francis 2013, Macrae and Vincent 2014, Drupsteen and 
Guldenmund 2014). This concern is integrated into the developed Information Safety 
Method (chapters 3, 4). 
2.6   Emerging evidence on the gap between Systemic Incident 
Analysis research and practice 
While many viable methods exist in systemic incident analysis research, the 
corresponding empirical evidence base supporting these theoretical developments is as 
yet nascent. In particular, there is limited rigorous evidence of any of the existing 
methods being adopted and incorporated into routine incident investigation practice. 
Underwood (2013) undertook an initial examination of the issue, and found that the 
current gap between systemic incident analysis research and practice is complex and 
multifaceted in nature: multiple issues, stakeholders, and (inter)relationships between 
them are involved, as shown in Figure 2.13 below. 
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Figure 2.13: Factors contributing to the gap between systemic incident analysis research and practice, identified from an integrated analysis of 
research literature and semi-structured practitioner interviews. Reproduced from Underwood (2013, Figure 20) with permission.
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In the specific context of patient safety, broadly congruent findings have been obtained 
through other detailed empirical studies. Working in the context of healthcare in the 
United Kingdom, the ethnographic research of Nicolini et al. (2011) observed safety 
incident investigation practice over a substantive period. They found multiple 
challenges in moving from the theoretical thinking embodied by RCA, to its practice 
as part of healthcare organisation. Challenges in interpreting and enacting existing 
methodological guidance included difficulties observed in reconciling the 
rational/technical conceptualisation of incident investigation (as embodied through the 
language and terminology of organisational RCA policy), with the substantive 
emotional component of the actual process. Conflicting diaries, limited resource 
constraints, and active resistance through organisational politics were also found to be 
sometimes influential. Such challenges in enactment were explained by Nicolini et al. 
as in part due to the need to re-establish public legitimacy, and to demonstrate 
appropriate forms of governance and accountability in the wake of safety events. In the 
two Trusts of their ethnographic study, it seemed paramount for the reporting of 
incident investigation to tell a comprehensive, clear and polished story, concluding 
with tangible, easy-to-communicate recommendations. Substantive contradictions and 
dissenting voices were observed as part of the investigation process, but usually edited 
out of the final report produced, in imitation of supposedly “good” (positivist) 
scientific research. This limited the potential for practicing organisational learning, 
through voicing the differences and disagreements arising from the investigative 
process. 
Tamuz et al.’s (2011) serendipitous exploration of how one hospital learnt from a drug 
overdose identified a number of additional challenges of practice. The politics 
surrounding investigation of incidents were particularly highlighted, through their 
interviewing of healthcare workers with knowledge of or involvement in the actual 
incident or investigation. Following the occurrence of the incident situation, physicians, 
nurses, pharmacists, and quality-assurance/risk-management representatives responded 
in diverse ways. The same incident was classified differently by each of these four 
professional groups, who assessed a different segment of history in attempting to 
understand it. Decisions about different issues were also made, and different courses of 
action chosen by each group. In this particular study, the strong influence of 
organisational politics was evidenced by the fact that the physician, nursing and 
pharmacy management teams all seemed to have decided on which solutions to 
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implement, before the first root cause analysis meeting was even convened (as part of 
initial stages of formal investigation into the incident situation). This raises doubts 
about the practical relevance of organisational policy in this case, for purposes of 
actual usage and enactment in supporting the work of incident analysis in practice. 
A pair of papers by Iedema et al. (2006a, 2006b) focused around a series of five 1-hour 
RCA meetings, conducted as part of an evaluation of a health safety improvement 
practice program. As reported by the authors, both the disjunction between the ‘formal 
rules’ of investigation and its situated enactment (2006b), and the reflexive turn 
supported by the formulation and discussion of wider ‘systems solutions’ as part of 
these meetings are examined in some detail (2006a). In Iedema et al. (2006a), a 
discourse analysis of data from two of these meetings were conducted. These meetings 
were both conducted as part of an investigation of a ‘near-miss’: in mis-labelling a 
Computed Tomography scan. Despite the relatively benign final outcome of this 
particular incident however, staff seemed extremely wary about how they positioned 
themselves in relation to the issues and clinicians investigated during these analytical 
discussions. Consequently, the actual enactment of investigative analysis in these 
meetings was quite exploratory and uncertain: freely vacillating between both 
ideational and interpersonal issues, as well as between affective and more 
critical/judgemental discussion. This disjunction between the actual, and theoretical 
were explored in more detail by Iedema et al. (2006b), who explored the translation of 
the inherently uncertain and contradictory details of situated clinical activity into ‘root 
causes’, and then into recommendations for practice change. The data from this 
meeting showed considerable uncertainty about what individual staff did, knew and 
intended. Difficulties also arose in reconciling the formal parameters of the method 
used, with intuitions about the relative tradeoffs between verbal and written clinical 
communication; as well as in resolving the ‘philosophical conflict’ between the 
generalisation entailed by attempting formal rules for clinical practice, and the inherent 
contingent needs of such practice. Through their data analysis, Iedema et al. (2006b) 
found that the investigation team members acted not so much as clinical practitioners 
applying formal knowledge to in situ specifics, but as actors tasked with deducing 
organisational–managerial generalisations from the contingent practice of healthcare. 
Based on their empirical data, Iedema et al. (2006b) came to the conclusion that more 
recognition needs to be paid to the role of RCA as an active means to engender 
interpersonal debate and discussion between clinical staff of diverse backgrounds; and 
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integrate the related cross-disciplinary relationships, thinking, and knowledge about 
the organisation of each others’ work. In particular, Iedema et al. (2006b) argues for 
the need to better recognise the loosely coupled necessities of safe clinical practice, 
alongside the tight coupled solutions often considered in the related literature. 
The empirical evidence reviewed in this section provides an indicative description of 
issues relating to the gap between systemic incident analysis research and incident 
analysis practice. This motivates the need to start to bridge the gap between systemic 
incident analysis methods in theory, and their usage and utilisation in practice. This is 
done through examination of empirical data on contemporary safety incident analysis 
and investigation practice (Chapter 5); as well as through empirical analysis of the 
move from systemic incident analysis methods in theory, into their practice as part of 
real incident investigation (chapters 6, 7). Such efforts may help to better inform 
designers of systemic incident analysis methods, of the diverse situational needs which 
may be demanded of a particular systemic incident analysis method when enacted in 
practice. 
2.7   Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have reviewed related literature for the PhD project. We began by 
setting out and illustrating the four foundational assumptions of the thesis work. The 
chapter then went on to review the latest major developments in systemic incident 
analysis research, the basic principles and precepts of Distributed Cognition, and 
existing research on learning from incidents. Through this review, we have shown that 
the ‘information as object’ illusion is sustained by all three of the major methods of 
systemic incident analysis reviewed. Given that the ‘information as object’ illusion 
fundamentally misconceptualises how natural human communication occurs (Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003), a new method is needed to offset this misleading dominant illusion 
of ‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations. This is Aim A of the 
research project, met by the work conducted in chapters 3 and 4. 
In the penultimate section of the chapter, we reviewed emerging evidence on the gap 
between Systemic Incident Analysis research and practice. To date, there is little 
evidence of routine and wide usage of systemic incident analysis research in practice. 
In the context of patient safety specifically, the small body of empirical evidence so far 
indicates diverse and many potential challenges in moving from systemic incident 
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analysis research into organisational practice. This motivated Aim B of the research 
project, which is to start to bridge the gap between systemic incident analysis methods 
in theory, and their usage and utilisation in practice. To increase the potential for 
theorists in the area to better account for the demands of incident analysis as practiced, 
further data is needed. This is the work of Chapter 5. To allow closer research scrutiny 
of the empirical phenomena of using systemic incident analysis methods, more 
detailed examination of the point at which the relevant research theory moves into 
practice is needed. We develop and trial a new research method for this purpose in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
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Chapter 3 – A new method of systemic 
incident analysis 
 
The review of Chapter 2 motivated the need to develop a new method to offset the 
misleading dominant illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ during incident 
situations (Aim A, Objective 1), this chapter: 
 Develops a method of systemic incident analysis based on Distributed 
Cognition 
 Describes how the new method focusses on the flow of information through 
representations and their propagation 
 Explains how the new method aims to improve learning from incidents, 
through building into its core design the process of dynamic, ongoing 
investigator and data triangulation 
 Shows how the new method facilitates systemic integration and comparison 
of data and analytical insights across incident investigations 
3.1   Introduction 
As shown through the literature review of Chapter 2, the misleading illusion of 
‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations is dominant in the field 
of systemic incident analysis. In this chapter, a new method for systemic incident 
analysis is developed to offset this misleading dominant illusion, based on Distributed 
Cognition precepts. This also addresses the current lack of Distributed Cognition based 
methodology in the field. And codifies Distributed Cognition precepts for incident 
analysts in describing and reasoning about how systems of cognition emerge as a 
function of communication during incident situations. In particular, incidents are 
examined and explained, through the Distributed Cognition focus on propagation of 
representation states. 
To develop this basic focus of Distributed Cognition into a full and explicit method of 
analysis, two new concepts for systemic incident analysis are proposed here. The first 
new concept synthesises the notion of correctness with the Distributed Cognition 
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focus on representation. This new concept prompts the incident analyst to assess for 
correct representation of information in analysing incident situations. The second 
new concept is to prompt an incident analyst to assess for consistent coordination of 
representations during incident situations. This second concept synthesises the 
Distributed Cognition notion of coordination, with the notion of consistency. Together, 
these two new concepts of correct representation and consistent coordination are 
designed to offset the common analytical bias shown in Chapter 2: where the 
conceptualisation of information as objective representation is sustained by all three 
major alternatives from the general systemic incident analysis literature. The new 
analysis method presented here is intended to rebalance the theoretical toolbox 
available to systemic incident analysts. It is designed to heighten awareness of the 
deeply subjective, and context-bound aspects of natural communication and inter-
subjective representation during incident situations. Here, the unit of incident analysis 
is on how patterns of information representation and coordination naturally arise. In 
the context of the new method presented here, all of the relevant aspects of incident 
situations interact – to constitute the patterns of communication identified through 
incident analysis. 
To improve the likelihood of learning from incidents in practice, the new analysis 
method views the development of investigative hypotheses as a process of distributed 
cognition. This intersubjective design philosophy treats the doing of incident analysis 
as a predominantly systemic phenomena, following from the interaction between two 
or more minds across time and space. In Distributed Cognition terms, these two or 
more minds may be considered distributed, in terms of the thoughts of a single person 
across different points in time and space. Under Distributed Cognition, this counter-
intuitive idea sits alongside the more standard conception of two minds between two 
individual people. This Distributed Cognition interpretation of intersubjectivity 
informed the conceptualisation of how relevant factors are to be identified, developed, 
and scoped in an ongoing fashion. The method of systemic analysis developed here 
therefore encourages a process of ongoing definition, calibration, and constant 
comparison for each emerging factor – to encourage dynamically ongoing investigator 
and data triangulation across diverse incident analysis settings (cf. Rothbauer 2008). 
This is reflected in the design of the ‘safety functions’ part of the new method, 
presented later in Section 3.3.4. Due to its focus on information in the context of 
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analysing safety incident situations, the new method is called the Information Safety 
Method. 
The conduct of Information Safety Method analysis consists of two main parts. The 
first part is primarily concerned with descriptive analysis of incident situations. Here, 
the new method provides generic abstractions and procedures for generating concrete 
investigative hypotheses. About what natural information systems arise during incident 
situations, and how they result from the particular context (Section 3.3). The second 
part of the Information Safety Method is more inferential rather than factual in nature, 
providing four inferential questions to ask of the concrete investigative hypotheses 
generated through the descriptive incident analysis (Section 3.4). Four questions are 
provided as part of the new method: for both formative and summative use to support 
the ongoing, distributed process of incident analysis. Provisional interpretations of 
answers to these four questions are also developed and provided, as part of the 
Information Safety Method. 
In the following sections, we present the abstractions and procedural elements of the 
new method of systemic incident analysis in a stepwise fashion. The abstract 
constructs introduced by the Information Safety Method are illustrated using analysis 
of data from a concrete, real incident situation (Huang et al. 2014a). A synopsis of the 
incident situation analysed is presented next, based on factual material from Toft’s 
(2001) patient safety incident investigation report. 
3.2   An illustrative incident situation (Toft 2001) 
To demonstrate Information Safety Method analysis of a real incident situation, the 
incident scenario reported by Toft (2001) was chosen. We perceived the empirical 
reporting of Toft (2001) to be both comprehensive and exhaustive in reporting relevant 
contextual details. This seemed therefore to be a good initial basis for initial 
experimentation with core ideas of the Information Safety Method. 
At approximately 17.00hrs on Thursday 4th January 2001, a day case patient on Ward 
E17 at the Queen’s Medical Centre Nottingham (QMC) was prepared for an 
intrathecal (i.e., spinal) administration of chemotherapy. This chemotherapy was given 
as part of the patient’s medical maintenance programme following successful 
treatment of leukaemia (a type of cancer). After correctly administrating a cytotoxic 
drug (Cytosine), a second cancer treatment drug was administered to the patient. 
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However, this second drug, Vincristine, should never be administered by the 
intrathecal route – which is almost always fatal to the patient. Unfortunately, whilst 
emergency treatment was provided quickly in an attempt to rectify this error, the 
patient died at 8.10am on the 2nd of February 2001. Following an internal inquiry at 
QMC into the circumstances surrounding this death, Professor Brian Toft was 
commissioned by the Chief Medical Officer for England and Wales to hold an external 
investigation, with a remit: 
“To investigate the circumstances leading up to an intrathecal, rather than 
intravenous injection of Vincristine into a patient at the Queen’s Medical 
Centre Nottingham (QMC) on 4 January and to report findings to the Chief 
Medical Officer. 
To advise the Chief Medical Officer on the areas of vulnerability in the 
process of intrathecal injection of these drugs and ways in which fail-safes 
might be built in.” 
(Toft 2001) 
This incident situation, and the analysis results obtained are used here to illustrate, and 
help explain the main aspects of the Information Safety Method. The names of incident 
participants are taken ‘as is’ from the publically available external investigation report 
(Toft 2001). We refer to this as the ‘Vincristine incident situation’ throughout the rest 
of this chapter. 
3.3   Forming explicit investigative hypotheses using the Information 
Safety Method 
3.3.1  Selecting the information representation 
As a cognitive activity, any information use may be understood from a Distributed 
Cognition perspective. In characterising cognitive processes in terms of the 
propagation and transformation of representations (Hutchins 2001), one can naturally 
ask (Hutchins 2000): 
 what information is represented? 
 where and how it is represented? and 
 what patterns of information flow are formed? 
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In line with this Distributed Cognition perspective, the Information Safety Method can 
be used to analysis the propagation and transformation of any representations 
informative to work during incident situations. We use the term ‘information 
representation(s)’, to refer to natural classes of representations that inform. An 
example of such a class is the set of route of administration representations, used 
during the Vincristine incident situation. 
The choice of which specific class of information representations to analyse is left up 
to the discretion of the incident analyst, to be decided depending on the specific needs 
and interest of the incident analysis situation. The particular class of information 
representation chosen may impact on how subsequent parts of the analysis play out. In 
the case of the running example here, the route of administration was chosen as a 
focus for Information Safety Method analysis. But a more specific and different class 
could also have been chosen – of intrathecal route of administration representations 
(intrathecal meaning through the spine), leading to a different Information Safety 
Method analysis potentially different in form to the illustrative example presented here. 
A formal empirical study is presented in the next chapter, where we conduct 
Information Safety Method analysis for 7 different natural classes of information 
representation (Section 4.3).  
To help an analyst understand and use the method, we also provide an explicit 
information representation selection heuristic. This heuristic is adapted from Liu et al. 
(2008), and intended to help an analyst double check that their interpretation and 
understanding of Distributed Cognition is sufficiently close to the one underpinning 
the method being developed here. Additionally, the heuristic may also act as a quick 
sanity-check on the compatibility of the candidate information representation(s) being 
considered, for Information Safety Method analysis.  
Information representation selection heuristic: 
 “propagation of <?> information as representation states across a series of 
representational media that are brought into coordination with one another” 
(adapted from Liu et al. 2008, original emphasis). 
The <?> symbol is used to stand for a candidate information representation of interest. 
The meaningful substitution of a candidate information representation in place of <?>, 
indicates understanding of the Information Safety Method by the prospective user. The 
route of administration, and intrathecal route of administration mentioned above are 
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two example (classes of) information representations. Both examples are regarded by 
us as meaningfully substitutable in place of <?>, in the capacity of method designers. 
If you cannot meaningfully substitute any candidate information representations into 
the heuristic above, the Information Safety Method probably shouldn’t be used. Apart 
from the added <?>, all other parts of this heuristic are from Liu et al.’s interpretation 
of Distributed Cognition. 
The representation states of this heuristic exist in both unobservable and observable 
form. Both the human and non-human participants in a work-process are the 
representational media that are brought into coordination – coordinated through the 
particular information used, and its contextually constituted movement as part of the 
work done during incident situations. The analysis of particular classes of information 
representation is the new and general method developed here, for answering the initial 
question posed by Hutchins (2000): of what information is represented? 
3.3.2  Mapping out the patterns of representation coordination during an incident 
situation 
Having answered the what information is represented question through identifying 
relevant classes of information representations, the incident analyst next needs to 
answer the two remaining questions (Hutchins 2000), of: 
 where and how the information is represented? and 
 what patterns of information flow are formed? 
The Information Safety Method analyst identifies how representations were used and 
coordinated through the following two mapping heuristics:  
Two ‘information flow’ mapping heuristics: 
“Where did the <?> information in <PARTICIPANT> come from?”  
(for ‘upstream’ exploration of how patterns of information flow form during 
the incident situation) 
“Where did the <?> information in <PARTICIPANT> go to?” 
(for ‘downstream’ exploration of how patterns of information flow form 
during the incident situation) 
The general aim here is to map out the contextual interactions effecting the ‘flow’ of 
information – based on the incident data available. Selected significant ‘non-flows’ 
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may also be included in an Information Safety Method analysis – as cases of 
inconsistent information flow. Simple directed graph representation should be used 
together with corresponding textual explanation, to author this part of the incident 
analysis. Starting with any participant involved in the propagation and transformation 
of information representations, answers to the two questions above may help the 
analyst to map out the patterns of information flow. In using these questions, each 
‘<PARTICIPANT>’ part should be substituted for participants already identified 
through the ongoing systemic incident analysis, with <?> again substituted for each of 
the classes of information representation, identified to be of interest by the analyst 
earlier. 
For example, part of an Information Safety Method analysis is shown in Figure 3.1, for 
the Vincristine incident situation. This figure shows two interactions through which the 
route of administration information seems to have ‘flowed’ – as part of the interactions 
of this particular incident situation. Table 3.1 provides the corresponding textual 
descriptions and explanations. Together, such conjunction of graphical and textual 
elements forms the kind of investigative hypotheses entailed by using the Information 
Safety Method of systemic analysis. In conducting such incident analysis, the analyst 
assumes information to ‘flow’ only through an inherently fallible process of attempted 
replication, reproduction, and/or reconstruction. Communicative inconsistencies may 
thus naturally arise, routinely, as part of the formation of natural systems of 
representation propagation and transformation. 
Table 3.1: Textual representation of the information flow pattern shown in Figure 3.1 
and Figure 3.2. 
Links in the information 
trajectory 
(these are the arrows in the 
figures) 
Associated interactions leading to the 
propagation and transformation of route of 
administration representations 
Dr Morton to the patient Dr Morton administered the Vincristine drug intrathecally 
(i.e., via the spine) – which was the wrong route of 
administration. 
Dr Mulhem to Dr Morton Dr Morton confirmed the route of administration with Dr 
Mulhem. 
Dr Musuka to prescription 
chart 
Dr Musuka wrote out the patient’s prescription chart. 
Nurse Vallance to Dr Morton Nurse Vallance remarked to Dr Morton about an 
intrathecal injection. 
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Pharmacy database to the 
syringe label 
Pharmacy database generates syringe label 
4
. 
Pharmacy database to the 
syringe packaging label 
Pharmacy database generates syringe packaging label. 
Prescription chart to Dr 
Morton 
Dr Morton consulted the prescription chart. 
Prescription chart to Dr 
Mulhem 
Dr Mulhem consulted the prescription chart. 
Syringe label to Dr Morton Dr Morton read from the syringe label before 
administering the Vincristine injection. 
Syringe label to Dr Mulhem Dr Mulhem read from the syringe label prior to handing 
the syringe to Dr Morton. 
Syringe packaging label to Dr 
Mulhem 
Dr Mulhem took the package containing the syringe with 
the Vincristine drug from Nurse Vallance. We assumed 
that he also looked at the syringe packaging label at this 
point. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Two interactions in the Vincristine incident effecting the flow of route of 
administration information. In this case involving the coordination of three different 
representation states across the three participants shown.  
Such investigative hypotheses (e.g., Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 together) may be 
obtained from answering the two ‘information flow’ mapping heuristics just outlined. 
Sometimes, neither of these two mapping heuristics may seem to be applicable or 
relevant. In this situation, a natural stopping point in exploring part of the information 
flow patterns may have been reached. No further use of the particular class of 
information representations is perceived to have occurred during the incident situation, 
or is unknown due to natural data limitations perhaps. In terms of the method of 
analysis being developed here, the actual point at which to stop mapping these flows is 
                                                          
 
4
 The syringe label is directly attached to the syringe containing the Vincristine drug, and 
different from the syringe packaging label – which is attached to the packaging containing one 
or more syringes. 
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a discretionary decision by the incident analyst. In the example shown in Figure 3.2, 
the incident participant of Nurse Vallance formed one such ‘stopping point’, due to 
lack of incident data for further upstream analysis in this particular case. Figure 3.2 
shows the final pattern of coordination identified – for the flow of route of 
administration information during the Vincristine incident situation. We refer to such 
patterns as the information trajectory associated with a particular class of 
information representations. In this case Figure 3.2 and Table 3.1, together, present an 
information trajectory for route of administration information representations. By 
virtue of their nature, patterns such as the one shown in Figure 3.2 are describing 
ephemeral phenomena, rather than phenomena of a static or permanent nature. 
 
Figure 3.2: The pattern of route of administration information flow formed during the 
Vincristine incident. 
So far, we have referred to information movement predominantly using the term 
‘information flow’. The use of this term is because we have been unable to find a 
single convenient term to unambiguously and simultaneously express both: 
1) how information moves in a directed way (as time progresses, across 
individuals); yet ‘moves’ only through 
2) coordinative (re)representation and (re)construction (i.e., through the 
propagation and transformation of representations which inform). 
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Hutchins points out that the illusion of meaning being contained in a message is a 
hard-won social and cultural accomplishment (1995a, p238-9). In terms of this thesis, 
the illusion of information being contained in a representation is rejected as a basis 
for the new incident analysis method being developed here (cf. the ‘Social implications’ 
section from Reddy 1979; ‘Interpersonal Communication and Mutual Understanding’ 
section from Lakoff and Johnson 2003; ‘Cooperation fallacies’ section from Artman 
and Garbis 1998). The important conceptual distinction between ‘information as 
object’, and the Distributed Cognition alternative of ‘information as consequence of 
interaction’ is further clarified in the next section. Since the Information Safety 
Method is intended as a means of understanding systems of natural communication; 
the interactive, ‘de-objectified’ view of how information ‘moves’ is thus the one 
advocated and embedded into its design. 
3.3.3  Illustrating how the information as object conception radically differs from 
conceiving information only as a consequence of interaction 
In discussing human communication through the use of English representations, the 
linguist Michael Reddy presents two contrastive perspectives at odds with each other. 
Reddy (1979) proposed that English users commonly conceive communication in 
terms of a ‘conduit metaphor’. Under this model, what is being communicated 
(commonly referred to as ‘information’ in everyday parlance) can be literally inserted 
into English inscriptions. Such an ‘information parcel’ can then be freely ‘given’ or 
‘transferred’ to others – akin to the physical movement of a tangible object along some 
conduit or channel (e.g., like a boat in a river, with the boat being analogous to the 
‘information’ that is moving). As shown in Chapter 2, CAST/STAMP, FRAM, and 
AcciMap all sustain forms of such ‘information as object’ illusion, through their 
theoretical conceptualisation of the incident situation. 
Reddy than goes on to explain and substantiate his argument – which is that the 
provisions of English language systematically biases its users towards conduit-
metaphoric modes of thinking, making it very difficult to omit such modes of 
expression altogether in using English intersubjectively. The two ‘information flow’ 
mapping heuristics given earlier (Section 3.3.2) further illustrate this embedded 
biasing effect. We have found it difficult to negate this biasing effect in presenting the 
Information Safety Method (cf. Reddy 1979, Appendix). Under the ‘objective 
information’ illusion, information can indeed be literally ‘sent’ and ‘received’ by 
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individual participants, as highlighted graphically in Figure 3.3. In this figure, the light 
blue boxes visually embody the empirically problematic notion of ‘route of 
administration information parcels’ being created, packed up, ejected into a subject-
independent ‘ideas space’, and ‘sent’ to participants of the emerging natural 
information system. The ‘objective information’ illusion is one rejected rather than 
maintained by the user of the Information Safety Method. 
 
Figure 3.3: A conduit-metaphoric conceptualisation of how route of administration 
information is ‘sent/received’ around the information system identified for the 
Vincristine incident (based on Figure 3.2).  
As a means of contrastive explanation, Reddy (1979) proposes an alternative 
‘toolmakers paradigm’ for conceptualising how we communicate through 
representation. His detailed explanations are somewhat involved, but effectively 
highlight the reconstructive, mediating and contextual nature of English 
communication: intersubjective meaning making is dependent on both who is 
‘sending’, and who is acting in the capacity of ‘receiver’. To illustrate his ‘toolmakers 
paradigm’, a physical compound is the analogy chosen by Reddy. This compound is 
totally physically segregated, and the local environment within each segment of the 
compound is similar, but non-identical to other segments (Figure 3.4). Crucially, 
individuals can only communicate about useful tools through the exchange of 
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intermediary representations between each segment of the compound. No direct 
exchange of physical ‘samples’, or the tool itself is possible in this scenario. 
This compound metaphor is used by Reddy to highlight the usually non-identical 
mental life shared by two or more individuals. Relatedly, the example also draws 
explicit attention to the fact that intersubjective understanding is only ever achieved 
through indirect inference and naturally fallible interactions – through intermediating 
systems of symbolic representation. From this starting perspective, some 
miscommunication is the expected norm of any human-to-human communication, 
rather than the exception. Reddy’s toolmakers paradigm draws clear attention to the 
fact that ‘information’ only ever moves as a consequence of interactive and 
intersubjective activity between minds in practice; never, as context-free objects and 
streams – as conceived under the illusion of the conduit metaphor. 
 
Figure 3.4: A ‘toolmakers’ paradigm of human communication, in contrast to the 
conduit-metaphoric one show in Figure 3.3. Adapted from Reddy (1979, Figure 9). 
There are additional reasons to reject a ‘conduit-metaphoric’ conceptualisation of 
‘information flow’. A basic conduit-metaphoric treatment could encourage the 
mapping of information flows (Section 3.3.2) to terminate prematurely, and discourage 
substantive systemic analysis beyond the first point of ‘failure’ in flow along the 
conduit. Figure 3.5a illustrates such a situation graphically, where the flow of route of 
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administration information ‘stops’ with its ‘rejection’ by participant B (between 
participant A and B in Figure 3.5a). This may counterproductively restrict the scope of 
incident analysis, in situations where (different?) route of administration information 
continued to be used further downstream (e.g., between participant B and C in Figure 
3.5a). 
Particularly in cases of miscommunication, the conduit metaphor can bias thinking to 
focus on why participants somehow failed to appropriately pack/unpack the objective 
information being given to them (Reddy 1979, p295-6). This framing of the situation 
deemphasises the considerable background resources, and contextual factors effecting 
any communication attempt. Such background resources and factors may include 
nature and degree of education, knowledge of the symbolic language being used, 
specialist training, shared vision, culture, and so on. This ‘outside-in’ perspective is 
precisely what Distributed Cognition argues for – in its emphasis on prioritising 
explanation in terms of the external context in which cognition occurs (Hutchins 1995a, 
Chapter 9). The relatively context-free conceptualisation of how information moves 
(Figure 3.5a) also to an extent contradicts the broad emphasis on context-sensitivity in 
contemporary safety literature. 
 
Figure 3.5: Illustrating two alternative paradigms of how information moves through 
the socio-technical substrate (up to and including cultural/societal factors). The second 
one (Figure 3.5b) is the one advocated by the Information Safety Method. 
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Having had this explicit illustration, we can now more accurately reframe the two 
information flow mapping heuristics given earlier. In the interest of succinct 
expression, use of conduit-metaphoric expression is still retained in the following 
reframed definitions (notably in using the terms ‘receiving’ and ‘sending’). In 
conjunction with Figure 3.5b however, a better understanding of the coordinative 
conception of information flow (of the Information Safety Method) – as consequence 
of interaction – should now be possible. As before, each ‘<PARTICIPANT>’ part 
should be substituted for participants already identified through analysis (e.g., those in 
Figures 3.2, 3.5), with <?> substituted for the particular information representations of 
interest: 
A more accurate statement of the two ‘information flow’ mapping heuristics from 
Section 3.3.2: 
Which interactive co-ordinations involved <PARTICIPANT> in a ‘receiving’ 
capacity, to effect the flow of <?> information? 
(for ‘upstream’ exploration of how patterns of information flow form during 
the incident situation) 
Which interactive co-ordinations involved <PARTICIPANT> in a ‘sending’ 
capacity, to effect the flow of <?> information? 
(for ‘downstream’ exploration of how patterns of information flow form 
during the incident situation) 
Despite the conduit-metaphoric connotations of ‘information flow’, we continue to use 
such terminology in the rest of the thesis. In attempting intersubjective explanation and 
presentation of the new method developed here, we have so far been unable to omit 
conduit-metaphoric language use altogether. While its designers are not professional 
linguists, experience of many repeated attempts at written representation of the 
Information Safety Method seems to further support Reddy’s statement, that: 
“Practically speaking, if you try to avoid all obvious conduit metaphor 
expressions in your usage, you are nearly struck dumb when communication 
becomes the topic.” (Reddy 1979, p299) 
To offset this presentational complication, alternative graphical representations have 
been liberally used in this chapter to provide some redundancy, in attempting 
communication of the main ideas of the Information Safety Method. Compared with a 
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term like ‘information coordination’, talking about ‘information flow’ also helps to 
preserve the Information Safety Method emphasise on the temporally directed nature 
of representation propagation and transformation. In doing Information Safety Method 
analysis, information movement should be conceptualised as a consequence of 
interaction (e.g., Figure 3.5b), and not as object-transfer along a conduit (e.g., Figure 
3.3, Figure 3.5a). Analysts can choose to model these coordinative information 
movements at variable levels of detail using the new method. Figure 3.6 shows two 
equally valid Information Safety Method analyses of the same situation, based on 
factual details from the Vincristine incident situation. While both Figures 3.6a and 
3.6b are based on the same extended series of incident interactions, Figure 3.6b is at a 
less detailed level of analysis than the interpretative analysis of Figure 3.6a. In 
particular, Figure 3.6b shows how Information Safety Method based investigative 
hypotheses can abstract over an extended series of ‘informational interactions’. The 
level of detail in the available incident data may also inform and constrain the level of 
detail chosen.  
 
Figure 3.6: An example of two equally valid Information Safety Method analyses of 
the same aspects of the Vincristine incident situation. In both cases a coordinative, 
rather than conduit-metaphoric interpretation is the one intended. 
3.3.4  Mapping out factors potentially effecting information coordination and 
representation 
In an incident situation, many contextual factors may impact on the emergence of 
information trajectories and representations. This part of an Information Safety 
Method analysis involves the identification of such factors, and their explicit 
association to the information trajectories identified. Four functional relationships are 
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prioritised in particular, in relation to the specific information trajectories identified in 
systemic incident analysis. These are defined below, and named ‘safety functions’ 
(for convenient future reference to these abstract constructs). The four type of 
relationships defined here should be used to identify, and ‘instantiate’ specific concrete 
factors of interest, in analysing actual incident scenarios. The ‘interaction context’ 
refers broadly to the various interactions of an incident situation: 
Four types of ‘safety function’ for the Information Safety Method: 
CAPACITY 1 – A correctness-enhancing safety function [+] 
... is an aspect of an interaction context that can increase the probability of correct 
information representation in one or more interacting participants. 
A concrete example of a safety function acting in such a capacity could be the 
taken for granted rules of grammar, which are currently in use, accepted, and 
adhered to by both the writer and reader of a language, in successfully enacting 
unity of communication between them. 
CAPACITY 2 – A correctness-reducing safety function [-]  
... is an aspect of an interaction context that can reduce the probability of correct 
information representation in one or more interacting participants. 
A concrete example of a safety function acting in such a capacity could be a 
particular and substantively different set of background education: Between the 
writer and reader of the symbolic representation presented to facilitate meaning 
communication. 
CAPACITY 3 – A consistency-enhancing safety function [+] 
... is an aspect of an interaction context that can increase the probability of 
consistent information flow between two interacting participants. 
A concrete example of a safety function acting in such a capacity could be a nice 
quiet room for reading, which for many people improves their understanding and 
comprehension of what they are reading (but not necessarily in all situations and 
not necessarily for everyone). 
CAPACITY 4 – A consistency-reducing safety function [-] 
... is an aspect of an interaction context that can reduce the probability of 
consistent information flow between two interacting participants. 
A concrete example of a safety function acting in such a capacity could be the 
substantively different aspect of grammatical expectations from two different 
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languages, such as between elements of Chinese and English language for 
example. 
As suggested by the examples here, a safety function may act on both the correct 
representation of information, and consistent coordination of such representations 
during parts of the same incident situation, simultaneously. The concrete and relevant 
safety functions, and their specific scoping, will depend very much on both the 
incident data, and the specific nature of the safety function identified. Safety functions 
relating to emotion for example: may be relatively tightly scoped, to reflect their 
relatively proximal effects on the incident situation, and their typically shortish 
durations. A contrastive example would be the profound influences of elements of 
culture (including scientific cultures), which can often remain largely invisible until it 
is resisted or otherwise rejected by a member of society. Together, the four abstract 
safety function definitions just presented express the totality of the Information Safety 
Method perspective: on how particular aspects of an incident may effect information 
trajectories in one or more of the four different capacities defined above. Any aspect, at 
any level of abstraction may be related in principle to the information trajectories 
identified, through these four kinds of functional relationships. Such ‘safety functions’ 
may include both constructed aspects of the situation (e.g., an artefact design feature), 
as well as more naturally arising issues (e.g., various ‘latent’ conditions of society). 
The identification of safety functions should be predominantly inductive, based on 
knowledge of the incident situation as much as possible. A single safety function may 
act in several of its four capacities simultaneously, across different parts of information 
trajectories. For example, a specific checking protocol may act as a correctness-
enhancing safety function for particular nurses, who routinely follow such a protocol 
faithfully; At the same time, the same protocol may be perceived as an unnecessary 
bureaucratic burden by others involved in effecting the information flows – thus 
perhaps acting negatively (as a correctness-reducing safety function), to reduce the 
likelihood of serendipitous self-checking and self-correction. In this case the same 
safety function – of the particular checking protocol used – may simultaneously have 
two effects that are converse and opposite, when compared with the prior likelihoods 
of correct information representation in each participant if the checking protocol hadn’t 
been there. Multiple safety functions acting on the same part of the information flows 
may not always act at the same time. An example of this is provided by safety function 
5 (the separation of packaging and supply of drugs) and safety function 7 (avoiding 
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compromising patient care), presented in Table 3.2 and graphically depicted in Figure 
3.7. The red links in Figure 3.7 correspond to safety functions acting in capacity 2 and 
capacity 4. The green links correspond to ones acting in capacity 1 and capacity 3. 
Here safety function 5 did not seem to have actually happened at the time of the 
specific incident situation. This possibility of non-concurrent, potential functional 
impact is reflected in the specific wording chosen, through using the word ‘can’ in the 
four types of safety functions defined earlier in this section. 
 
Figure 3.7: Showing how three safety functions (3, 5, and 7) are associated with the 
route of administration information-trajectory.  
 
Table 3.2: Textual representation of the safety functions shown in Figure 3.7.  
Safety Function identified 
(the numbering corresponds to the 
identifiers shown in Figure 3.7) 
Brief description 
3: Fallible human transcription 
(an ‘old’ safety function identified from 
Information Safety Method analysis of a 
prior incident situation, see Figure 3.8 
below for the general idea behind this kind 
of analytical move) 
Human ‘transcription’ of information is a 
fallible process. Any information flows 
to/from humans will be potentially effected 
by this. 
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5: Physical and temporal separation of the 
packaging and supply of drugs to the wards 
The practice of separating the packaging 
and supply of intrathecal and non-
intrathecal drugs reduced the chance of 
inadvertent mix-ups. Therefore increasing 
the chances that the route of 
administration information displayed on 
the syringe and syringe packaging label 
would be correct. 
7: Avoiding compromising patient care In this particular incident, both intravenous 
and intrathecal drugs were in fact sent at 
the same time to the wards. This directly 
contradicted the purpose of safety 
function 5. In the report not much more 
detail is provided about this workaround, 
other than that it happened in the interests 
of not compromising patient care. This 
safety function increased the chances that 
inadvertent mix-ups between the labelling 
of drugs intended for different routes of 
administration may occur. 
In some cases, it may be more convenient to represent a participant of the incident 
situation directly as a safety function, instead of as part of information trajectories. 
This choice is intentionally left underspecified here, and up to the judgement of the 
analyst using the Information Safety Method. The scopings of ‘old’ safety functions, 
developed through prior investigative hypothesising using the Information Safety 
Method, may also be extended as part of the new ongoing incident analysis. This 
occurs when an explicit link is authored: between the current set of investigative 
hypotheses, and other investigative hypotheses constructed using the Information 
Safety Method. 
Through extended scoping of the fallible human transcription safety function, to the 
analysis of the Vincristine incident situation (safety function 3 in Table 3.2), a concrete 
example of this kind of integration of previous knowledge about incident situations is 
provided as part of the current explanation. This example shows how the integration of 
previous (articulated) knowledge about incident situations was concretely integrated, 
as part of the analytical knowledge derived from the new Information Safety Method 
analysis (of the Vincristine incident situation). This kind of extension of scoping – 
across incident analyses – is obviously dependent on the informed assessment of the 
incident analyst (as in the coding of incident data done for any incident analysis using 
a pre-defined method). Such informed assessment is again based on the known facts of 
the case, representing the analyst’s informed judgement of whether each safety 
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function is sufficiently relevant to each new incident situation and analysis. Figure 3.8 
graphically illustrates this kind of ongoing scoping process, across the contingencies of 
individual incident situations and their analysis. 
 
Figure 3.8: A visualisation of how a safety function is dynamically developed over 
multiple incident analyses. 
3.3.5  Indicative generalisations to illustrate possible concrete configurations of 
Information Safety Method information flows and safety functions 
To show how the various concepts introduced so far fit together more generally, Figure 
3.9 generically illustrates a variety of relationships which may be identified using the 
new method. This figure presents a small set of investigative hypotheses in the abstract, 
developed using the Information Safety Method. The relationships depicted in this 
figure are not exhaustive. As for other incident analysis methods, infinite unique sets 
of investigative hypotheses are potentially identifiable in practice – depending on the 
particulars of the incident situation (e.g., future investigative hypotheses currently 
unknown and not yet needed). Together, the various concrete information 
trajectories and safety functions delimit the scope of Information Safety Method 
based investigative hypotheses, and the representation coordination systems they 
describe. In the interests of concise generic illustration, not all of the relationships 
shown in Figure 3.9 necessarily have a realistic gloss in terms of a real situation. A 
minor point of the Information Safety Method is in its suggestion of an optional 
distinction – between the human and non-human participants of incident situations 
(Huang et al. 2014a, Section 4.2.3); this distinction is illustrated now in Figure 3.9, but 
was not utilised in the previous figures in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.9: A generic illustration of an Information Safety Method information 
trajectory, with related generic safety function associations. 
Using the ideas described so far in this chapter, Figure 3.9 shows generalisations of 
some of the possible configurations of participants, information flows and safety 
functions that may be found through incident analysis done using the Information 
Safety Method. In this particular case, five generic safety functions (labelled A to E), 
and five unique human and non-human participants (labelled S1 to S5) are shown. 
In terms of the four types of safety functions (discussed in the previous section): 
-  B is a correctness-enhancing safety function, 
-  C is a correctness-reducing safety function, 
-  D is a consistency-enhancing safety function, 
-  E is a consistency-reducing safety function. 
Safety function A provides a generic example, of a safety function perceived as acting 
both positively and negatively, on both the correctness of information, and consistency 
of information flow at different parts of the information trajectory. The figure shows 
how safety function A may reduce the correctness of information representation ‘in’ 
S2 and S4, and the consistency of flow from S4 to S1. Safety function A may also 
simultaneously enhance the consistency of the flow of information from S2 to S4, and 
the correctness of information in S1. Different flows of information between the same 
two participants may also be compactly represented as a pair of uni-directional arrows 
– shown between S1 and S2 in Figure 3.9. In principle, different safety functions and 
their combinations may be perceived to act separately and independently, on such a 
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pair of flows. Each safety function may in principle be simultaneously associated with 
one or more information trajectories, as shown generically in Figure 3.9. The specific 
relationships coded for in analysis are in terms of the four possibilities: of the safety 
function’s correctness-enhancing, correctness-reducing, consistency-enhancing and 
consistency-reducing effects (as perceived by the incident analyst). These effects may 
be on information trajectories of the same information representations (e.g., route of 
administration information flows in other incident situations), or on different symbolic 
representations of information. This aspect of the Information Safety Method will be 
concretely demonstrated in detail later in Section 4.3.2.  
3.4   Systematically exploiting the investigative hypotheses generated 
to support formative and summative investigative reasoning 
The information flows and safety functions identified constitute the descriptive 
investigative hypotheses generated using the Information Safety Method (e.g., Figure 
3.7, Table 3.1, and Table 3.2 collectively). Once created, the following four questions, 
and some possible interpretations of their answers are suggested as part of the new 
method presented in this chapter. These questions and interpretations are intended as a 
starting, rather than ending point for systematically exploiting the investigative 
hypotheses thus constructed. Other questions and interpretations may also be ‘applied’ 
to these hypotheses at the analyst’s discretion. Figure 3.10 provides an ‘example 
answer’ for Question 2, based on the final set of investigative hypotheses identified 
through analysing the Vincristine incident situation using the new method. 
Four starting questions for interacting with Information Safety Method based 
investigative hypotheses: 
Question 1: Which parts of the information flows have neither positive (i.e., 
correctness/consistency-enhancing) nor negative (i.e., correctness/consistency-
reducing) safety functions acting on them? 
Question 2: Which parts of the information flows have only negative safety 
functions acting on them? 
Question 3: Which parts of the information flows have both positive and 
negative safety functions acting on them? 
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Question 4: Which parts of the information flows have only positive safety 
functions acting on them? 
 
Figure 3.10: The subset of a full set of investigative hypotheses developed using the 
Information Safety Method which answers Question 2 (parts of the same investigative 
hypotheses were shown earlier in Figure 3.7). The optional human/non-human 
distinction of the new method was used in the case of this particular analysis. 
3.4.1  Interpreting the developing investigative hypotheses to support their 
iterative generation and refinement 
As a way to support formative understanding, answers to Questions 1, 2 and 4 may 
identify areas particularly needing further investigation. Areas of apparent interactional 
simplicity are systematically identified through answering these three questions; in 
terms of how the use of correct, and consistent information representations are shaped 
in these parts of the work-system. The absence of safety functions (i.e., through 
answering Question 1), or very unbalanced ones (i.e., through answering Questions 2 
and 4), help highlight where investigative understanding of factors effecting 
information movement may perhaps be particularly incomplete, and/or one-sided. The 
analyst may wish to double-check the completeness of their incident understanding for 
these areas of apparent simplicity. Further data collection may help to give a more 
thorough understanding of these aspects of an incident situation. 
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3.4.2  Interpreting a set of Information Safety Method based investigative 
hypotheses on conclusion of an investigation 
When the answers to these same four questions are interpreted summatively, Question 
1 (i.e., no positive or negative safety functions acting) helps to localise places where 
there may be substantive system performance variability. If the investigative 
understanding embodied by the investigative hypotheses reflect reality accurately, then 
there is a total lack of contextual shaping factors in these parts. This implies only weak 
enforcement of robust communication in these parts. Under a summative interpretation, 
the answers to Question 1 indicate where system performance is apparently 
predisposed neither towards ‘good’, nor ‘bad’ patterns – and is likely to be largely 
uncontrolled and unpredictable. If viewed as a control problem (e.g., Leveson 2011), 
robust information flow in these parts cannot be assured with confidence, in the 
absence of actual controls and constraints, and/or knowledge of them. Under a control 
based starting perspective, future similar ‘breakdowns’ in information use is thus likely 
to unpredictably (re)occur in these under-controlled parts of the work-system. 
Answers to Question 2 (i.e., only negative safety functions acting) helps to localise 
areas of obvious weakness in assuring robust information flow. The fact that there are 
negative safety functions, yet apparently no positive safety functions to offset them, 
indicate where information representation(s) may be incorrect, or be inconsistently 
propagated through the work-system. These are areas of high priority, for 
understanding how to assure/improve robust communication for the future. 
Answers to Question 3 (i.e., both positive and negative safety functions acting) helps 
to localise areas of high complexity. The answers to this question highlight where 
multiple competing shaping factors may or may not concurrently act, in shaping the 
ideally correct and consistent flow of information. For these areas of a work-system, 
reasoned judgement and expertise is particularly needed from investigators. To weigh 
up the on-balance likelihood, of information being incorrectly represented, or 
inconsistently propagated again in the future. Relatedly, investigators may also wish to 
assess whether areas with only positive safety functions acting are sufficiently safe, in 
answer to Question 4 (i.e., only positive safety functions acting) – bearing in mind the 
particular forms, and degree of ephemerality of each positive safety function identified. 
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3.5   Summary 
This chapter has developed a new method of systemic incident analysis based on 
Distributed Cognition ideas and its worldview, called the Information Safety Method. 
This new incident analysis method is based on the Distributed Cognition focus on 
propagation of representation states. Two new concepts are proposed based on the 
Distributed Cognition worldview, as part of the new analysis method: the incident 
analyst is prompted to assess for both correct representation, and consistent 
coordination of representation states during incident situations. Through doing this, 
we are able to systematically analyse how information ‘flow’ is constitutive of the 
formation of distributed cognitive systems. The incident analysis using the new 
method identifies the systemically interactive, emergent, and naturally fallible acts of 
communicative representation during incident situations. Communication during 
incident situations is understood as a direct function of the communication context, 
irrespective of the degree of success or failure in attempting communication. 
As is often the case for qualitative methods of analysis, the individual ‘steps’ of the 
Information Safety Method are unlikely to be strictly sequential, but more 
iterative/recursive in practice. As a means of generating analytic representations, the 
new method’s outputs are intended as focused and selective additions on top of the 
available incident data. These analysis outputs are not intended to lead to a single, true, 
and complete representation of incident situations, but are instead designed to enrich 
human discourse in this area (as is standard for much of qualitative modes of inquiry). 
Interpreting systemic incident analysis outputs as a single, true, and complete 
representation of the incident situation is only likely to lead to a false sense of security, 
given the often highly complex and context-specific nature of incident situations (cf. 
Shojania 2010). As recognised by contemporary social scientists as well as some 
cognitive linguists for example, the assumption of a single, true, and complete reality 
is also unfeasible, and very difficult to defend in practice from a technical perspective, 
when seeking to account for issues of human action and sociality (Ragin and Amoroso 
2011, Lakoff and Johnson 2003).  
To provide an alternative means of explanation, the Information Safety Method 
embodies a strong interpretation of Distributed Cognition concepts (cf. Pea 1993). The 
new method is based on a disbelief of the possibility of cognition residing solely in 
people, and the flow of objective information between them in communicating (Lakoff 
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and Johnson 2003). Instead, the incident analyst is prompted to focus on interactive 
co-ordination, as the sole and only means of empirically evidencing any of the 
communicative and cognitive aspects of incident situations. The new method also 
seeks to improve the likelihood of actual learning from incidents, through treating 
incident analysis as a distributed cognitive process; of ongoing incident analyst and 
data triangulation (cf. Rothbauer 2008). This explicitly reflects the heavily qualitative 
nature of systemic incident analysis, as both conceived and practiced.  
Like other existing alternatives, the new systemic incident analysis method developed 
in this chapter is intended to be generalised and generative in nature. To play a part in 
enriching constructive discourse about incident situations regardless of the particular 
safety domain in question. The new method represents an advance in theory, through 
codifying Distributed Cognition ideas for the specific empirical purposes of systemic 
incident analysis. This follows through on the recognised promise of Distributed 
Cognition based safety explanations (cf. Busby and Hughes 2003, Sweeney 2009), for 
explaining problems of communication during contingent incident situations in this 
particular case. In advancing safety science methodology, a new method of systemic 
incident analysis is contributed to the field. 
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Chapter 4 – Analysing five patient 
safety incident situations using the 
Information Safety Method 
 
To explore the new systemic incident analysis method developed in Chapter 3 (Aim A, 
Objective 2), this chapter: 
 Describes an initial validation of the new method, using five diverse and 
relevant patient safety incident situations 
 Illustrates some of the original and productive insights resulting from the 
use of the method 
 Illustrates how these insights lead to better understanding of how 
communicative fragilities develop, as natural information systems form 
during incident situations 
 Shows how active distribution of knowledge across individual incident 
situations could be achieved through the new analysis method, to improve 
learning from incidents through distributed incident analysis 
4.1   Introduction 
Chapter 3 presented a new method for analysing how systems of interactive 
information coordination and representation form during incident situations. In order 
to study the new method, this chapter presents an application of the Information Safety 
Method to five patient safety incident situations. This study was designed to enable an 
initial understanding of whether the Information Safety Method does what it is 
supposed to do, and also explore empirical consequences following from controlled 
use of the new method of systemic incident analysis. 
The particular aims of the study were threefold, to: 
Aim 1: Determine the extent to which the Information Safety Method can 
be used to analyse diverse patient safety incident situations. 
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Aim 2: To explore whether analysis using the new method can generate 
additional knowledge to extend/enrich the existing incident investigations. 
Aim 3: To explore what potential operational difficulties may unfold – in 
moving from the abstract theory of the new method, to concrete incident 
analysis in practice. 
The study procedure is first presented in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 then presents some 
indicative examples, to give a detailed idea of the kind of concrete outputs generated 
from the Information Safety Method analysis done. We then go on to discuss broader 
implications of these analyses in Section 4.4. The study limitations (Section 4.5) and 
conclusions (Section 4.6) are finally presented. 
In the lead up to the current study, substantive preparatory work was done. The main 
goal of this preparatory period of work was to try to represent the core ideas and 
details of the Information Safety Method into a form suitable for rigorous, 
demonstrable, and exploratory research investigation. A technical report was therefore 
written to tangibly represent our Information Safety Method (Huang et al. 2014a), 
involving a sustained design effort over the course of around 1½ years. The technical 
report was then used interactively, for the current study. To improve the representation 
of the new method through it, diverse efforts were used to calibrate the construction of 
the technical report. These efforts included conference presentation of some of the core 
ideas of the Information Safety Method at the 2013 Communicating Medical Error 
conference (Huang et al. 2013d), informal discussions with a variety of patient safety 
stakeholders, extended detailed correspondence with an incident-investigator/safety-
researcher experienced in the safety domains of transport and aviation. During this 
period, pilot Information Safety Method analysis was also conducted, and reported on, 
based on incident data from two publically available reports of patient safety incident 
situations (Huang et al. 2014a). 
4.2   Methods 
In this study, five recent patient safety incident situations (from 2010 onwards) were 
analysed using the Information Safety Method. The incident data was provided by 
collaborating incident investigators from a large Foundation Trust in the United 
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Kingdom 
5
. This represented access to previously unseen incident data. The data was 
drawn from reports of the corresponding internal incident investigations – used in the 
capacity of primary data for the incident analysis of the current study. Appendix A.1 
shows one of these data sources, as an indicative example. The two collaborating 
incident investigators from the Trust were on hand, to clarify significant details where 
necessary. 
The five incident situations to be analysed using the new method were selected by the 
collaborating investigators, from their existing catalogue of completed investigations 
into Serious Untoward Incidents. This is the most serious category of patient safety 
incident situations internally investigated by the Foundation Trust. The incident 
investigators selected for relevance based on our inclusion criteria, where an incident 
scenario was a suitable candidate if: 
 It involved inappropriate patient care information being used, and/or 
 It involved inappropriate information used in work with interactive medical 
devices, and/or 
 It involved one or more of the ‘five rights’ of medication administration not 
being fully discharged (i.e., the right patient, right drug, right dose, right 
route, and given at the right time; cf. Federico 2011), and 
 Either of the two collaborating incident investigators was closely involved 
in investigating the particular incident situation. 
These inclusion criteria were used to scope the scenario selection process to include 
only incident situations relevant to the Information Safety Method. At the same time, 
they would enable potential operational issues to be discovered, when the new method 
was used to analyse concrete and diverse incident scenarios. 
For the current study, the author acted as scientific investigator and incident analyst, 
with expert knowledge about the analysis method used. Although not a professional 
incident investigator, he had conducted a small scale incident investigation using 
‘systemic Root Cause Analysis’ prior to the current study (reported in Chapter 7).  
The Information Safety Method analysis was conducted over a period of 43 working 
days, taking place over 230 person-hours of analysis work. Analysis of each of the five 
                                                          
 
5
 These are the two incident investigators interviewed in the next chapter. 
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incident situations proceeded one-by-one. For each information representation chosen 
for analysis, the descriptive analysis parts of Information Safety Method analysis was 
conducted (as described in Section 3.3). The descriptive incident analysis was 
continued using the new method, until the investigative hypotheses generated had 
stabilised in each case, and no longer changed. This process is analogous to one of the 
standard stopping heuristics for coding qualitative data: when nothing substantial is 
being added or revised through revisiting the emergent analysis (as in Braun and 
Clarke’s 2006 thematic analysis for example). The emerging analytical structures here 
are the investigative hypotheses generated – which were constantly compared and 
coordinated with the available data, and revised and refined as understanding of each 
incident situation developed throughout their analysis. There were no a priori time 
constraints for completing the incident analysis reported in this chapter. 
Through a separate pilot Information Safety Method analysis prior to the main study 
reported here, a custom recording scheme was developed for recording the 
investigative hypotheses. The textual elements of the recording scheme are illustrated 
in detail in Appendix A.2. Its graphical aspects are shown as part of the analysis results 
presented later in the chapter. 
In the next four subsections, we describe the steps common to the Information Safety 
Method analysis of each incident situation. As typical in practicing qualitative data 
analysis, these distinct incident analysis steps did not proceed completely sequentially, 
but in a more iterative, overlapping fashion in practice (cf. Miles and Huberman 1994). 
43 daily ‘snapshots’ of the developing investigative hypotheses and related 
background material were taken, using 7-zip archives (http://www.7-zip.org/) 
throughout the study. These 7-zip files provided an archival record of how the 
investigative hypotheses developed from day to day, across the different incident data 
and incident situations for Information Safety Method analysis. 
4.2.1  Developing an initial understanding of each incident situation 
Prior to analysis using the new method, an initial understanding of each incident 
situation was developed. The original internal incident investigation reports were used 
as the primary source of incident data here (e.g., Appendix A.1). Background 
biomedical literature was also consulted to help understand the patient safety work 
taking place during each incident situation. This helped the incident analyst understand 
the various healthcare work concepts and processes involved in each incident situation. 
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Sources ranged from pedagogical online sources written by reputable clinicians (e.g., 
http://www.ccmtutorials.com/cvs/Shock/page_01.htm for understanding the meaning 
of ‘clinical shock’), to published research literature (e.g., reading Stevens et al. 2006 to 
better understand the role of Creatinine, and Glomerular Filtration Rate measurement 
in assessing kidney function). Initial incident understanding also came about through 
completing the full anonymisation of each internal investigation report. The specific 
people and organisations involved were anonymised, as a data preparation step by the 
incident analyst. 
As in the studies of de Carvalho (2011), Salmon et al. (2012), and Underwood and 
Waterson (2014), narrative accounts from investigation reports provide only indirect 
representation of the interactions and events of an incident situation. Since our 
collaborating investigators were directly involved in investigating each of the incident 
situation considered in this study, they were able to clarify details where necessary. 
The bulk of these internal reports also seemed to focus on detailed description of 
various interactions and events which occurred. They were thus substantively richer in 
terms of details and specifics, than the two public incident investigation reports (Toft 
2001, ISMP Canada 2007) used earlier to pilot the Information Safety Method (Huang 
et al. 2014a). We were therefore able to gain an accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of the events and interactions of each incident situation – within the 
scope of the incident and investigation situations as reported by the collaborating 
incident investigators. 
4.2.2  Identifying information representations 
Based on the initial incident understanding gained, the analyst considered various 
candidate information representations. Particular candidates were then taken forward 
for ‘full’ Information Safety Method analysis – based on all of the following criteria 
being satisfied: 
 The incident situation was compatible with the purposes of the Information 
Safety Method (Section 3.1), 
 The candidate information representation can be sensibly substituted within 
the information representation selection heuristic of the new method (Section 
3.3.1), 
 Based on the initial incident understanding (Section 4.2.1) the candidate 
information representation was relevant to the particular incident situation, 
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 There was likely to be a substantive amount of available data from the 
corresponding investigation report, about the actual role played by the 
candidate information representation. 
This identification of candidate information representations was contingent, on the 
very fluid period of evolving initial understanding of each incident situation. 
4.2.3  Identifying the information trajectories and safety functions 
For each information representation chosen and taken forward for ‘full’ analysis, the 
analyst identified its associated information trajectories, and the various safety 
functions associated with these trajectories (cf. sections 3.3.2, 3.3.4). As consistent 
with the design of the Information Safety Method, both graphical and textual 
representations were coordinated as part of the incident analysis process. Microsoft 
PowerPoint 2010, and Microsoft Word 2010 were the main tools repurposed here, for 
authoring and recording the Information Safety Method investigative hypotheses 
developed (for the graphical and textual representation).   
The identification of relevant safety functions consisted of two main parts (as 
described in Section 3.3.4). The first was to identify ‘new’ safety functions – based on 
‘freestanding’ analysis of the particular incident situation. The second part was to 
attempt generalisation of each of the safety functions identified in the previous 
Information Safety Method analysis, based on the data from the new incident situation. 
This process was conducted on a rolling, cumulative basis. As in the pilot study of the 
Information Safety Method (Huang et al. 2014a), investigative hypotheses identified 
included all of the ‘old’ safety functions identified to be relevant to each new incident 
analysis. 
4.2.4  Answering the four ‘starting questions’ about the investigative hypotheses 
After the investigative hypotheses had stabilised, the four systematic questions of the 
Information Safety Method (as described in Section 3.4) were applied to highlight 
subsets of these investigative hypotheses. The time taken to do this step was brief, and 
spent largely on a straightforward mechanical process of highlighting parts of the 
investigative hypotheses. The analytic understanding of the incident situation did not 
change during this study step. Broader implications of the answers to the four 
systematic questions are discussed in Section 4.4. 
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4.3   Outcomes of Information Safety Method analysis 
4.3.1  An overview of the Information Safety Method analysis conducted 
Table 4.1 presents the seven information representations identified, from the five 
incident situations. 
Table 4.1: Basic details of the analysis done, showing the sequence in which the 
incident situations were analysed. 
Sequence 
followed 
for the 
incident 
analysis 
The incident situation Information representation(s) 
identified 
Approximate 
time taken for 
analysis 
1 ... involved a wrong 
drug being dispensed 
drug identity 
 
25 hours 
2 ... involved the wrong 
‘direction of venting’ 
during heart transplant 
direction-of-blue-pump-tubing  
(‘blue pump tubing’ refers to one of the 
sets of tubes for the heart/lung bypass 
machine) 
40 hours 
3 ... involved a late 
diagnosis of Acute 
Kidney Injury 
creatinine-level, and  
glomerular filtration rate 
(Both are significant physiological 
indicators for detecting and monitoring 
Acute Kidney Injury, see Stevens et al. 
2006 for more detailed explanation) 
37 hours 
4 ... involved a late 
detection of cancerous 
tumour in the lung 
Dr I’s interpretation of Mr G’s chest 
x-ray 
(Dr I’s interpretation of Mr G’s x-ray 
image was important to this incident 
situation, since it explicitly highlighted 
potential cancerous tumour – at a 
perhaps nascent and treatable stage of 
development. Dr I’s x-ray 
interpretation was missed early on, as 
part of the development of this incident 
situation) 
38 hours 
5 ... involved the late 
detection of patient 
physiological 
deterioration  
blood pressure, and 
Modified Early Warning Score 
(Both are useful indicators for 
detecting patient physiological 
deterioration, see Gardner-Thorpe et al. 
2006 for more detailed explanation) 
88 hours 
For five of these seven natural classes of information representation, a single, holistic 
information trajectory was identified. The exceptions were the information trajectories 
for the last two classes identified: of the blood pressure (BP), and Modified Early 
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Warning Score (MEWS) information representations from the 5th incident situation. 
Multiple ‘sub’ information trajectories were identified for the BP and MEWS 
information representations, reflecting the 12 separate BP readings, and 9 separate 
MEWS readings taken over the course of a single weekend. 
In total, 47 safety functions were associated with the various information trajectories 
identified in the study. Safety functions 1-8 were ones previously identified through 
initial piloting of the Information Safety Method (see Appendix A.3 for details). These 
8 safety functions were used as the point of departure for the new incident analysis of 
the current study. 
4.3.2  Two detailed contrasting examples 
To avoid a very lengthy chapter, we now present two contrasting examples from the 
Information Safety Method analysis. Some of the safety functions presented in the 
figures are explained in the corresponding tables; for full details see Huang (2014c). 
The first example relates to incident situation 4 (i.e., as shown in Table 4.1), 
demonstrating how a doctor’s interpretation of a patient’s chest x-ray was propagated 
through a distributed cognitive system of representations. Examples from the analysis 
are presented to give an idea of the concrete incident analysis outcomes – in the 
context of very loosely standardised systems of representation. In this first case, 
natural language representations of the doctor’s interpretation were used during the 
incident situation. 
In contrast to the systemic analysis of incident situation 4, a strongly standardised 
system of representation underpins the second of the two illustrative incident situations 
(incident situation 5). This second set of examples serves to illustrate a contrasting 
case of Information Safety Method analysis – in the context of how distributed 
cognitive systems formed around representations of blood pressure, and Modified 
Early Warning Scores. In comparison to the case of the doctor’s interpretation, both 
the blood pressure, and Modified Early Warning Scores are underpinned by much 
more standardised means of representation: in terms of numbers and pre-set levels of 
seriousness, respectively. 
In each case, the presentation of example investigative hypotheses is prefaced by a 
brief synopsis of the incident situation. Unlike in the case of FRAM (Hollnagel 2012), 
both the textual and graphical aspects are equally important for presenting Information 
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Safety Method based investigative hypotheses. This is because textual and graphical 
representations complement each other (Hill 2001). The textual parts of the 
investigative hypotheses are presented in Tables 4.2 through to 4.5. Figures 4.1 
through to 4.5 present the corresponding graphical parts. The same numbers are used 
between the tables and the graphics for cross-referencing each safety function. Further 
examples from the other three incident situations are available in Appendix A.4. 
 
Analysis of an incident situation involving late detection of cancerous tumour in 
the lung 
In this incident situation, the patient (Mr G) had a total laryngectomy operation (i.e., 
separation of the food, and air passageways; see Cancer Research UK (2013)). A 
speaking valve was inserted to enable him to speak after his operation. Shortly after, it 
became apparent that the speaking valve had become dislodged, and its whereabouts 
could not be located. A chest x-ray was requested by Mr H, the consultant caring for 
Mr G. This x-ray was intended to rule out the possibility of the speaking valve having 
been dislodged into the lungs. This x-ray imaging was completed, reported on, and 
initially filed by a radiologist ‘external’ to the hospital (Dr I). The associated report 
was filed electronically by the 25th of July, 2012: documenting advice to the referring 
clinician (Mr H) of a suspicion of underlying chest lesion which may need further 
investigation. This was not however responded to promptly at the time. Later on, the 
patient presented to his GP (Dr J) with symptoms of breathlessness. After further 
delays, the patient was eventually diagnosed with lung cancer, which was found to be 
inoperable upon attempted surgery to remove it. An investigation was conducted into 
the incident situation, to try to enable more timely detection of cancer in similar care 
situations in future. 
Figure 4.1, Table 4.2, and Table 4.3 together show examples take from the full set of 
investigative hypotheses developed: about how Dr I’s interpretation of Mr G’s chest 
x-ray was represented and coordinated. The investigative hypotheses include the 
various relevant safety functions, together with their scoping across the participants of 
this emerging natural information system. 
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Abbreviations and acronyms used in interpreting the incident situation 
ENT – Ear, Nose, and Throat (a clinical specialty) 
GP – General Practitioner 
ICE system – Integrated Clinical Environment system (an electronic system used at 
the Trust as part of x-ray requests, imaging, and reporting) 
PACS system – Picture Archiving and Communication System (another electronic 
system used at the Trust as part of x-ray requests, imaging, and reporting) 
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Figure 4.1: Graphical part of the final investigative hypotheses generated. Showing 
both the information trajectory, and scoping of the safety functions relating to Dr I’s 
interpretation of Mr G’s chest x-ray. 
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Table 4.2: Corresponding textual counterpart to the information trajectory shown in 
Figure 4.1 (for each arrow in the figure, alphabetically ordered). 
Links in the information trajectory 
(hypothesised inconsistent coordination of 
information representations are marked 
with CF) 
The interaction(s) leading to the 
propagation and transformation of 
representations of DR I’s 
INTERPRETATION OF MR G’s 
CHEST X-RAY 
(the two participants in each interactive 
‘flow’ are indicated in bold) 
Chest x-ray image report 
(an electronic document filed on the 25th 
July 2012) 
  to ICE system 
Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image, 
was put onto the ICE system. 
Chest x-ray image report 
(an electronic document filed on the 25th 
July 2012) 
  to PACS system 
Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image, 
was put onto the PACS system. 
Chest x-ray image report 
(an electronic document filed on the 25th 
July 2012) 
to Paper copy of chest x-ray image report 
    (for faxing) 
A paper copy of the electronic version of 
Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image 
is made; in preparation for faxing to Mr H, 
ENT consultant. 
ICE system 
  to Consultant urologist Mr Y 
Consultant urologist Mr Y reviewed Dr I’s 
report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image from 
the ICE system. 
ICE system 
  to GP Dr J 
Dr J was Mr G’s GP, and reviewed Dr I’s 
report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image from 
the ICE system. 
ICE system 
  to Mr H, ENT consultant                       CF 
Mr H was an ENT consultant, and was the 
clinician who requested Mr G’s chest x-ray 
on the 6th July 2012. 
This link represents Mr H’s timely review of 
Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image 
– also through accessing the ICE system. 
PACS system 
  to Mr H, ENT consultant                       CF 
Mr H was the ENT consultant who requested 
Mr G’s chest x-ray on the 6th July 2012. 
This link represents Mr H’s timely review of 
Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray image 
– through accessing the PACS system. 
Paper copy of chest x-ray image report 
(for faxing) 
  to Mr H, ENT consultant                       CF 
Ideally, Mr H would have reviewed the paper 
copy of Dr I’s report on Mr G’s chest x-ray 
image in a timely manner. 
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Table 4.3: Textual representation of an illustrative selection of safety functions. 
Corresponding to the numerical identifiers shown in Figure 4.1. 
Safety function 
‘newly 
identified’ [I], or 
extended [E] 
More elaborate description and explanation 
(positive safety function to information trajectory associations are 
highlighted with [+], and negative ones with a [-]) 
38: Procedures for 
‘double-checking 
the information 
channel’, from the 
Trust Information 
Security Policy 
6
 (in 
particular the part 
regarding “safe 
havens”, in the case 
of this incident 
situation). 
[I] 
According to the organisational information security and safe haven 
policy in use at the time of this incident situation, the National Health 
Service has used so-called ‘safe havens’ for many years to ensure the 
secure transfer of personal identifiable data. Part of this policy 
describes a number of specific procedures, designed to help ensure 
that the fax number used is the correct one. In the case of this 
particular incident situation, this safety function did not apparently 
take effect. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can increase 
the probability of consistent information flow, from the Paper copy 
of chest x-ray image report (for faxing) participant, to Mr H, ENT 
consultant. 
41: Expected 
‘organisational 
norm’ of x-ray 
imaging follow-up 
for requesting 
clinicians. 
[I] 
In the particular Trust where this incident situation occurred, there is 
an expectation that clinicians review the electronic report for 
investigations that have been requested for patients under their care. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can increase 
the probability of consistent information flow to Mr H, ENT 
consultant – from both the PACS and ICE systems (these are the 
‘standard two routes’ of information propagation, for x-ray imaging 
electronic reports). 
Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis prior 
to this current study 
(8, see Appendix A.3 for the original context of identification) 
8: Lack of a 
rigorous checking 
procedure for the 
doctors. 
[E] 
As for the Information Safety Method analysis of the 3rd incident 
situation (and for much the same reasons), this safety function is 
treated as a consistency-reducing safety function here. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function here, which can reduce 
the probability of consistent information flow to any ‘doctors’ 
involved in the information trajectory identified here. 
                                                          
 
6
 We do not name the specific trust policy here, to preserve a high level of organisational 
confidentiality in reporting the results of the incident analyses. 
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Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis of the 
3rd incident situation 
35: The 
substantively 
different nature of 
the original illness 
requiring entry to 
the hospital. 
[E] 
Somewhat similar to its treatment in the Information Safety Method 
analysis of the 3rd incident situation, this safety function also applies 
to this incident situation. Here Mr G originally presented to the 
outpatient clinic (of Hospital A) because his speaking valve (inserted 
after his earlier laryngectomy) had disappeared. This initial 
presentation of Mr G’s illness is perhaps not too closely related to a 
‘new’ cancer developing in his lung; This situation may thus reduce 
Mr H’s sensitivity to the possibility of a new cancer developing in Mr 
G – and thus not consulting Dr I’s interpretation of Mr G’s chest 
x-ray image in a timely way. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [-] 
Here this acts as a consistency-reducing safety function, which can 
reduce the probability of consistent information flow to Mr H, ENT 
consultant. 
 
Additional comments 
In principle, we would need to double-check the validity of this 
Information Safety Method hypothesis through further 
conversation/discussion with Mr H. 
 
 
Analysis of an incident situation involving the late detection of patient 
physiological deterioration 
The patient (Mrs R) originally presented at hospital for a jaw fracture, due in part to 
her ongoing cancer of the jaw. She was kept in hospital for further assessment and tests. 
During the course of her weekend in hospital, her physiological condition deteriorated, 
eventually leading to a heart attack. A report of this situation was filed on the hospital 
system, presumably in part due to a hypothesis that the patient’s bad physiological 
condition could have been responded to earlier. The actual clinical response was 
mostly late on the Sunday of that weekend. 
Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show four out of the many ‘sub’ information trajectories 
identified – corresponding to the many blood pressure (BP) and Modified Early 
Warning Score (MEWS) readings taken over the weekend Mrs R spent in hospital. 
While their specific details are not identical, each information trajectory involved 
mostly fairly mundane interactions. In the interests of succinctness, only the detailed 
interactions for Figure 4.2 are presented here in Table 4.4. As similar to the previous 
example, Table 4.5 details some of the safety functions shown graphically, and their 
Chapter 4 
110 
 
specific instantiation and scoping across each of the four ‘sub’ information trajectories 
presented in the following figures. 
Abbreviations and acronyms used in interpreting the incident situation 
Max Fac – Maxillo Facial (A specialty which deals with medical issues around the 
mouth, jaw, face and neck) 
SHO – Senior House Officer 
SpR – Specialist Registrar  
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Figure 4.2: Graphical part of the final investigative hypotheses generated. Showing both the 
information trajectory, and scoping of the safety functions relating to the 6th MEWS reading 
taken on the Sunday of that weekend (MEWS = 11, suggesting severe physiological 
deterioration). 
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Table 4.4: Corresponding textual counterpart to the information trajectory shown in 
Figure 4.2 (for each arrow in the figure, alphabetically ordered). 
Links in the information 
trajectory 
(selected ‘inconsistent information 
flows’ are marked with CF) 
The interaction(s) leading to the 
propagation and transformation of 
MEWS representations  
(the two participants in each interactive ‘flow’ 
are indicated in bold) 
A nursing staff 
  to A SHO 
A (generic) member of nursing staff 
communicated Mrs R’s MEWS to the on-duty 
SHO. 
A SHO 
  to Medical Registrar on call 
An on-duty SHO discussed Mrs R’s condition 
with the medical registrar on call. 
Medical Registrar on call 
  to A member of the outreach team  CF 
The medical registrar on call ‘escalates’ Mrs 
R’s MEWS score to the outreach team. 
Medical Registrar on call 
to Consultant (ultimately) in charge of 
    Mrs R’s care                                CF 
The medical registrar on call informs Mrs R’s 
consultant of Mrs R’s MEWS score. 
Mrs R 
  to A nursing staff 
A (generic) member of nursing staff calculated 
and took note of Mrs R’s MEWS score. 
Mrs R 
  to Part of Mrs R’s clinical record 
Mrs R’s MEWS score is recorded onto part of 
her clinical record by clinical staff. 
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Figure 4.3: Graphical part of the final investigative hypotheses generated. For the 1st 
MEWS reading taken on the Saturday of that weekend (MEWS = 3, which should be 
escalated to the outreach team according to the policy in effect at the time). 
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Figure 4.4: Graphical part of the final investigative hypotheses generated. For the 3rd 
BP reading taken on the Saturday of that weekend (BP = 76/54, indicating low blood 
pressure). 
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Figure 4.5: Graphical part of the final investigative hypotheses generated. For the 1st 
BP reading taken on the Sunday of that weekend (BP = 68/50, indicating low blood 
pressure). 
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Table 4.5: Textual representation of an illustrative selection of safety functions. 
Corresponding to the numerical identifiers shown in Figures 4.2 through to 4.5.  
Safety function 
‘newly identified’ [I], 
or extended [E] 
More elaborate description and explanation 
(positive safety function to information trajectory associations 
are highlighted with [+], and negative ones with a [-]) 
42: Perception of a 
patient (e.g. Mrs R) as 
being ‘asymptomatic’ 
(i.e. the patient is not 
showing symptoms of 
illness). 
[I] 
In this incident situation, Mrs R was perceived by medical staff 
as ‘asymptomatic’ for a time, and thus probably reasonably ok 
physiologically; This is despite many of the BP/MEWS 
readings suggesting that she could be deteriorating. This 
perception of ‘asymptomaticness’ could be partly explained by 
the fact that most of the BP/MEWS readings were not taken in 
conjunction with a systematic review of the prior BP/MEWS 
readings taken.  
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of consistent information flow between two 
interacting participants, in the form of either: 
 
1) reducing the chance for proper/timely observation or 
recording of BP/MEWS (for a patient perceived to be somewhat 
ok); and/or 
2) reducing the likelihood that patient physiological status 
would be ‘escalated’ to the other medical staff in an information 
trajectory. 
 
In terms of its temporal scope, this safety function is interpreted 
to potentially effect all information trajectories occurring 
between 17.00 on Saturday of that weekend, to 18.00 on Sunday 
of that weekend (inclusive). Concretely, this scope includes 
information trajectories for the 3rd, 4th and 5th BP readings 
taken on Saturday, and the 1st and 2nd BP readings taken on 
Sunday. All but one of the information trajectories for MEWS 
readings on Saturday/Sunday are also included within the scope 
of this safety function. The exception is the trajectory 
corresponding to the 6th MEWS reading taken on Sunday 
(Figure 5.5), as Mrs R’s poor physiological status was finally 
fully recognised and addressed. 
43: Outreach training. 
[I] 
Outreach training occurs at Hospital A – in the form of training 
on the use of MEWS scores on hospital induction, and an Acute 
Illness Management course. This could positively effect the 
timeliness with which the two SHOs involved in this incident 
situation could/would escalate relevant BP and MEWS 
information to others. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of consistent information flows – from 
each of the two SHOs involved in this incident situation, to 
either 1) members of the outreach team, or 2) other ‘higher’ 
clinicians (such as registrars and consultants). 
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44: Patient physiology 
monitoring and escalation 
policy. 
[I] 
To help consistently detect and catch patient deterioration, the 
Trust’s 1) minimum standards of observation policy, and 2) 
MEWS escalation policy, are both designed to facilitate timely 
recording and escalation of patient physiological status. 
Only the MEWS escalation policy in effect at the time of this 
incident situation was readily accessible during the Information 
Safety Method analysis (the specific reference for this document 
is not provided here, to preserve organisational anonymity); the 
minimum standards of observation policy was not readily 
accessible. Thus here this safety function is only explicitly with 
respect to the potential effects of the MEWS escalation policy. 
However, inferring from a later version of the Trust’s minimum 
standards of observation policy, there is substantive overlap in 
the functional roles of Trust policies for MEWS escalation and 
minimum standards of observation. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of consistent information flow along 
each ‘potential escalation pathway’. 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Qualifying criteria for scoping this safety function with 
respect to ‘escalation’: 
Based on reading it, the Trust MEWS escalation policy (as a 
safety function) is supposed to help effect ‘escalation’ when a 
‘medium’ or higher MEWS score is obtained (of score 3 or 
above); the other physiological condition of substantial concern 
is when one or more ‘red parameters’ are obtained for a patient. 
A BP of 70 systolic or below is regarded as such a ‘red 
parameter’. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Based on these qualifying criteria, this safety function effects 
‘escalation’ for the 4th and 5th BP information trajectories on 
Saturday, and the 1st and 3rd BP information trajectories on 
Sunday; all the MEWS information trajectories identified 
through the Information Safety Method analysis are also 
included under these qualifying criteria. 
This safety function also increases the probability of the patient 
BP or MEWS being initially measured, as part of the ‘initial 
information flow’ link from Mrs R in each figure, prior to 
further ‘escalation’ to other healthcare professionals. 
 
Additional comments 
If the Trust’s policies were followed strictly, many 
counterfactual ‘potential escalation pathways’ would need to be 
visually depicted here for completeness. For simplicity here, we 
only visualise how safety function 44 effects the information 
trajectories actually identified in the current study. 
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45: Routine close 
communication between 
medical staff. 
[I] 
The Max Fac SHOs in this incident situation communicated 
with the registrar on call every shift, either in person or via the 
telephone. This close communication could increase the chances 
of consistent flow of patient physiological information between 
these medical staff. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of consistent (BP and/or MEWS) 
information flow, between a SHO and a registrar. 
 
Additional comments 
There is however basically insufficient detail in the 
corresponding incident investigation report, to support explicit 
investigative hypothesising about how this safety function 
‘attaches’ to the various BP/MEWS information trajectories 
identified. The precise pattern of attachment would depend on 
more detailed knowledge of the shift times of, and number of 
times each Max Fac SHO communicated with the registrar on 
call; this knowledge would allow precise cross-referencing with 
the interaction patterns corresponding to each information 
trajectory. 
 
This safety function was therefore NOT APPLIED to the 
various information trajectories identified. 
46: Dental, rather than 
medical training of 
clinical staff. 
[I] 
The two SHOs involved in this incident situation were both 
dentally qualified, with limited prior exposure to critically ill 
patients like Mrs R. This may negatively effect the likelihood of 
them perceiving the need to appropriately escalate BP/MEWS 
information to other (possibly more senior) clinicians – such as 
a registrar, consultant or the outreach team for example. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of all information flows ‘outgoing’ from the 
SHOs involved in this incident situation. 
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47: Signs of renal failure. 
[I] 
Renal failure is a serious illness, where blood pressure and 
MEWS readings are both of relevance; when a patient develops 
signs of renal failure, this could increase the chance for these 
two patient physiological statuses to be communicated to others 
(as part of clinical discussions). 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of consistent information flow – in 
terms of Mrs R’s BP and MEWS readings being ‘escalated’ to 
other (possibly more senior) clinicians; This escalation is by 
members of the medical staff who know about Mrs R’s potential 
renal failure. 
With the possible exception of the Medical SpR, there is 
basically no detail in the corresponding incident investigation 
report to support convincing investigative hypothesising about 
precisely who was aware of Mrs R’s potential renal failure. 
 
This safety function was therefore NOT APPLIED to the 
various information trajectories identified. 
Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis of the 
2nd incident situation 
29:  Busy and high-
pressured working-
environment. 
[E] 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
Like for the Information Safety Method analysis of the 2nd 
incident situation, this safety function similarly acts here as a 
consistency and correctness-reducing safety function. 
In the case of this incident situation, this safety function is likely 
to have acted on parts of the information trajectories around the 
time just after Mrs R’s MEWS spiked up to 11 (i.e., from 22.40 
to around midnight on Sunday the 15th of May); here the 
working-environment is likely to also have been similarly busy 
and high-pressured, in caring for a patient in dire physiological 
condition. 
Concretely, parts of the information trajectories for the 5 blood 
pressure readings taken on Saturday (i.e., the parts where these 
blood pressure readings were later consulted by the Medical 
SpR on Sunday); and parts of the trajectories for the 5th, 6th and 
7th blood pressure readings on Sunday are effected by this 
safety function. The extent to which this safety function effects 
the trajectory for the 6th MEWS reading on Sunday is unclear 
from the corresponding incident investigation report; where 
there was insufficient detailed timing information to relate this 
safety function specifically to the corresponding information 
trajectory. 
 
Additional comments 
The precise scoping of this safety function across the various 
interactions in this incident situation is perhaps debatable (e.g., 
it does not currently extend to the information trajectories shown 
in Figures 4.2, 4.3, or 4.5). Mrs R is also not included within the 
scope of this safety function, since as a patient she is not 
‘working’ in this incident situation. 
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30: (Perceived) 
surgeon/doctor 
‘dominance’, over 
‘lower’ parts of the 
medical hierarchy (e.g., 
nurses, junior doctors, 
perfusionists etc.). 
[E] 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
Like in the Information Safety Method analysis of the 2nd 
incident situation, this acts as a consistency-reducing safety 
function here, which can reduce the probability of consistent 
information flow between two interacting human participants – 
where the ‘receiving participant’ is ‘higher’ in terms of their 
perceived ‘clinical seniority’. 
 
4.4   Discussion 
We now discuss some of the broader implications from the Information Safety Method 
analysis, taken as a whole across analysis of all five of the incident situations. Many 
incident-specific issues and ideas were raised through this work, like the examples 
shown in Section 4.3.2. Here, we discuss and illustrate some broader kinds of issues 
arising which may be replicated in future similar studies. These discussions serve to 
give indicative insight, into some of the more situation-independent properties of the 
Information Safety Method. Most of the issues raised in the following discussion were 
not treated in any depth by the original incident investigation reports. This study 
outcome shows that Information Safety Method analysis can support the generation of 
additional analytical knowledge, to extend and enrich the work of existing incident 
investigations (Study aim 2).  
4.4.1  Fragilities of natural information systems 
Analysis using the Information Safety Method consistently enabled additional insight 
into how the natural information systems forming during various the incident situations 
were fragile. The Information Safety Method facilitated insights going beyond an 
abstract statement of ‘communication problems’ (as discussed by Taylor-Adams et al. 
(1999), Tighe et al. (2006), Alvarez and Coiera (2006), and Kripalani et al. (2007) for 
example). We discuss the two main types of insights obtained below, using examples 
from the study for illustration. 
A type of fragility consistently identified in the study was that of the low number of 
information coordinations involving the same participant as ‘receiver’ (see Section 
3.3.3 for the substantive caveats around the word ‘receiving’). Figure 4.6 illustrates 
this, based on the analysis results obtained. In the figure, Accuracy checker (Ms F), Mr 
P, and the Dispensing technician (Mr E) are the participants doing the ‘receiving’. 
Each of these three participants are ‘receiving’ two co-ordinations of drug identity 
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information. These ‘receiving’ interactions are highlighted with thick orange lines in 
the figure. Further details of these investigative hypotheses can be found in Appendix 
A.4. Similar examples were also discovered for the other four incident situations. 
 
Figure 4.6: Two ‘incoming flows’ to each ‘receiver’ interpreting drug identity 
information. From analysis of the 1st incident situation relating to drug dispensing.  
Taken at face value, such patterns of interaction suggest a lack of potential redundancy. 
‘Mis-coordinations’ through one part of this system of informative interactions could 
allow unchecked downstream propagation: of one or more divergent interpretations 
and forms of representation. Due to a lack of alternative lines of informative 
representation coordination, divergent interpretations/representations could occur in 
spite of otherwise consistent ‘good’ coordinations elsewhere in this system (e.g., prior 
to the creation of Mr P’s drug prescription for instance). Hutchins (2000, p58-9) has 
already discussed similar such issues of representational redundancy – in the context of 
the various socio, technical, and cultural interactions effecting information flow in an 
airplane cockpit. In contrast to the work of this and Chapter 3 however, Hutchins 
(2000) did not describe a specific, generic analysis method for identifying such issues 
of representational redundancy. He only took a relatively less defined Distributed 
Cognition perspective of the cockpit interactions (as is commonly done in Distributed 
Cognition based analysis). 
Mr P
Tablet box
(with Ribavirin 
label)
Dispensing
technician (Mr E)
Dispensing
‘robot’
Pharmacy 
computer 
system
Dispensing
technician (Mr E)
Tablet capsule 
pack
(Boceprevir)
Accuracy 
checker (Ms F)
Tablets
(Boceprevir)
Drug label
Capsule pack
(Ribavirin)
Mr P’s drug 
prescription
2 hypothetical 
misinterpretations of 
drug identity
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The annotation in Figure 4.6 also suggests one way in which the overall robustness of 
this emerging system may be easily reduced, in the form of two potential 
misinterpretations of drug identity which may arise in practice. This kind of systemic 
weakness is particularly acute for the system corresponding to the drug identity 
example, since none of the explicitly identified incident participants were the original 
prescribing doctor. The human participants were predominantly the pharmacy staff in 
this incident situation. They were therefore heavily dependent on the communicative 
functionality of the indirect drug identity representation(s) informing their work. Like 
in the situation shown in Figure 4.6, all of the other information trajectories in the 
current study showed no occasions where the same participant ‘received’, as part of 
more than two ‘incoming’ information coordinations. 
The three junctures highlighted in Figure 4.6 centre around the Accuracy checker (Ms 
F), Mr P, and Dispensing technician (Mr E) participants. The interactions highlighted 
with thick orange lines represent situations where the representation coordinations are 
‘temporally dispersed’ (i.e., each interaction denoted by an arrow occurs across a 
different point in time). Such Information Safety Method analysis provide a means of 
systematically highlighting opportunities for error-checking and detection, based on 
highlighting where communicative interactions may be amended to occur closer in 
time. In the case of the current example, the Dispensing technician (Mr E) could read 
the Ribavirin drug label at around the same time as he looked-at the Boceprevir 
capsule pack from the fridge in the dispensary (see Appendix A.4, Table A.4.1 for 
technical details). This amendment to the work process could have positively 
contributed towards preventing the particular drug dispensing incident situation.  
Here the junctures identified are in the form of three different people. Such junctures 
may also be more generally in the form of artificial artefacts: such as the relevant part 
of a pharmacy computer system for example. Simultaneous comparison by a single 
participant of the emerging natural information system may thus be enacted for the 
future, whether by a person or artefact. Compared with the collaborative cross-
checking perspective proposed by Patterson et al. (2007), this aspect of the Information 
Safety Method facilitates an alternative, generalised, and different Distributed 
Cognition based method, of generating ideas for improving the validity of the 
information representations used. 
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A second type of information fragility was also identified through the current study, 
relating to the second of four systematic questions proposed as part of the Information 
Safety Method (see Section 3.4):  
Question 2: Which parts of the information flows have only negative safety 
functions acting on them (i.e., correctness/consistency-reducing)? 
Figure 4.7 shows an example answer to this question, illustrated using the drug 
identity information trajectory. Applying this question resulted in a focused 
understanding, to identify where consistent information coordination and correct 
information representation is as yet poorly supported by the drug identity natural 
information system. Some details of Figure 4.7 are discussed next. 
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Figure 4.7: The answer to Question 2 of the Information Safety Method, for the drug 
identity information trajectory. Answers are highlighted using the orange double-lined 
arrows. 
As part of the information trajectory associated with drug identity, safety functions 14, 
15, 19, 20, 3, and 21 (as explained in Huang 2014c) were identified to potentially 
effect the information coordination between Mr P’s drug prescription and Accuracy 
checker (Ms F). This information coordination corresponds to Ms F looking at Mr P’s 
drug prescription (details in the 8th entry of Appendix A.4, Table A.4.1). As shown in 
Figure 4.7, all six safety functions associated with this particular part of the natural 
information system were identified to act in a consistency-reducing capacity. Here, 
consistent coordination of drug identity information between Ms F and Mr P’s drug 
prescription could be reduced. For example, the association between safety function 
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14 (potential interruptions from junior staff), and Ms F’s looking at Mr P’s drug 
prescription, was part of the following analytical statement: 
That potential interruptions from junior staff (safety function 14) can reduce 
the probability of consistent drug identity information coordination in any 
part of the drug identity information trajectory involving a pharmacy staff. 
In a similar way, safety function 15 reifies ‘a busy work environment’, which was also 
judged by the analyst to have a similar reductive role and impact with respect to the 
information co-ordination aspect of Ms F looking at Mr P’s drug prescription. While 
particular details and scopings vary, similar systematic identification of the fragile 
parts of existing natural information systems can be done: through asking Question 2 
of similar Information Safety Method based investigative hypotheses. 
4.4.2  Active learning through understanding systemic causes potentially effecting 
information coordination and representation 
The study also showed that the Information Safety Method can be used to understand 
how systemic causes potentially effect information coordination and representation 
across different incident situations (and analysis contexts). The safety functions 
mentioned in Section 4.3 give an idea of the kind of systemic causes which may be 
identified using the Information Safety Method. These systemic causes may be used to 
better understand part of the structuring of future incident situations. We go on to 
illustrate how these systemic causes may be accumulated, in the form of the safety 
functions of the Information Safety Method. 
The first example is safety function 29, originally identified through Information 
Safety Method analysis of the 2nd incident situation (see Table 4.1). This identified the 
“Busy and high-pressured working-environment” as a safety function significant to the 
natural information system emerging around the direction-of-blue-pump-tubing for a 
key piece of machinery used during heart transplant. As part of the analysis of the 5th 
incident situation (involving the late detection of patient physiological deterioration), 
the scope of safety function 29 was then extended to other parts of the various incident 
analyses. Through doing this, its scope was extended to the various natural information 
systems forming around the various blood pressures and Modified Early Warning 
Scores – both relevant to the 5th incident situation (see Figure 4.4, together with the 
7th entry in Table 4.5, for details). 
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Safety function 21 serves as our second detailed example. This safety function was 
identified as the “‘fallible human’ assumption” in the current study: as an embodiment 
of the assumption of the inevitability of human mistakes underpinning much of 
contemporary safety scientific thinking (cf. Reason 1990 from instance). Unlike most 
of the other safety functions identified, safety function 21 was one of the few not 
explicitly grounded in particular incident data. It was ‘identified’, in response to 
reading a particular part of the discussions in the corresponding incident investigation 
report of the situation involving a wrong drug being dispensed (see Appendix A.4 for 
details: Table A.4.2 and Table A.4.6). Translating this into the specifics of the incident 
analysis, safety function 21 can negatively affect all human participants of an incident 
situation, and the various natural information systems they become part of. The scope 
of safety function 21 was therefore extended across the human parts of all of the 
information trajectories identified in the current study. In the case of the drug identity 
information trajectory, safety function 21 was identified to potentially affect Mr P the 
patient as well; because Mr P was an active rather than passive participant in the 
incident situation analysed (see Figure 4.7). 
By making a ‘background hypothesis’ like safety function 21 explicit, the Information 
Safety Method helps to remind a future incident analyst of the need to mitigate against 
the expected potential systemic failure represented by the safety function. In the case 
of safety function 21, the future incident analyst is reminded of the assumption of 
human fallibility amongst safety scientific academics. Through using the Information 
Safety Method, the incident analyst is explicitly required to reconsider the ‘old’ 
analytical knowledge base against the details of a new incident analysis situation. 
Analysts are thus required to explicitly reconsider the precise extent to which 
particular old lessons are relevant to new incident situations. In such a fashion, it is 
hoped that the intersubjective aspects of the Information Safety Method could 
encourage improved retention, and more active learning from past knowledge about 
incident situations. Thus actively encouraging enhanced ‘collective safety memory’, as 
part of the incident analyst’s participation in a transparent and systemic learning 
process (cf. Department of Health 2000, Wrigstad et al. 2014, UK Department of 
Health 2013). 
The third and final example discussed here is safety function 43 (Table 4.5, second 
entry). This safety function was identified as “outreach training”. It reflects the fact 
that the Foundation Trust provided training for staff on their Modified Early Warning 
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Score through a hospital induction, alongside staff training through an Acute Illness 
Management course. Two Senior House Officers were involved in the related incident 
situation. Both officers had received this staff outreach training. In this light, safety 
function 43 could positively effect the timeliness with which these two Senior House 
Officers could or would escalate blood pressure, and Modified Early Warning Score 
information to others. Safety function 43 was not in the end associated with all of the 
many ‘sub’ information trajectories occurring over the weekend of the 5th incident 
situation; because the two Senior House Officers had participated in only some of the 
emergent natural information systems forming around the various blood pressures and 
Modified Early Warning Scores. 
In terms of the examples shown in Section 4.3, information trajectories relevant to 
safety function 43 corresponded to the 3rd blood pressure reading on Saturday (Figure 
4.4), and the 1st and 4th blood pressure reading on Sunday (e.g., Figure 4.5). At least 
one of the two Senior House Officers were involved in all three of the associated 
information trajectories for the Modified Early Warning Score readings taken on 
Saturday (e.g., Figure 4.3), and the 2nd, 5th, and 6th readings on Sunday (e.g., Figure 
4.2). 
The Information Safety Method analysis of the 5th incident situation therefore gives a 
more nuanced analysis; it substantively further developed the original investigation’s 
recognition of a ‘lack of escalation’ of such physiological readings to more senior 
doctors. A ‘lack of escalation’ is a relatively abstract statement providing little insight 
into the particulars of which escalations didn’t occur, or possible explanations for the 
situation. The Information Safety Method analysis therefore encouraged clearer 
understanding, and detailed explication, of the variable extents to which a particular 
aspect of the incident situation (e.g., ‘outreach training’ in the case of safety function 
43) can effect each of the many information trajectories emerging. 
Through using the Information Safety Method, the general idea is to dynamically 
develop ongoing broader patterns of causal explanation, through systemic explanation 
of diverse incident data, collated through their distributed incident analysis. The 
Information Safety Method provides one way through which such distributed 
knowledge building could start to be done. This could help to dynamically build 
evidence based analytical understanding – of the scope of potential systemic factors (a 
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safety function) and an approximation of the extent to which each potential factor is of 
systemic relevance across diverse incident data. 
4.4.3  Other implications from Information Safety Method analysis 
In this section, we discuss other generative implications from the Information Safety 
Method analysis, and how such analysis results can lead to lines of productive enquiry. 
Before commencing the incident analysis of the current study, we expected that we 
would be able to associate all the safety functions identified with the various 
information trajectories identified. However, an unexpected outcome of the incident 
analysis was in the form of safety function 45 (routine close communication between 
medical staff) and safety function 47 (signs of renal failure) (Table 4.5). Both safety 
functions were identified from the available incident data; neither could be concretely 
associated to the various blood pressure, and Modified Early Warning Score 
information trajectories, however. In the case of safety function 45, more detailed 
knowledge about the shift times, and the number of times each Senior House Officer 
communicated with the registrar on call was needed, to fully instantiate the 
Information Safety Method analysis. This would have enabled an evidenced judgement 
about which specific parts of the information trajectories were potentially effected by 
safety function 45. In the case of safety function 47 (signs of renal failure), it was 
unclear from the available incident data which medical staff were in fact aware of the 
patient’s potential renal failure during the incident situation. In both cases, further lines 
of reasonable inquiry were prompted by the attempt to associate a concrete safety 
function to specific parts of the information trajectories identified. In principle, the 
incident details thus prompted may help facilitate more thorough understanding of the 
potential causes of information (mis)coordination and (mis)representation. 
Figure 4.8 shows part of the analysis of the drug identity incident situation, involving 
the accuracy checker, tablet box, and tablets. This also raised an interesting question 
of fact about drug identity information coordination. 
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Figure 4.8: Highlighting the bottom part of Figure 4.6, omitting the safety functions for 
clarity here. 
Figure 4.8 implies that no coordination of drug identity information occurred between 
the accuracy checker Ms F, and the Boceprevir tablets in the tablet box with a 
Ribavirin label. This fact may or may not be true, depending on the details of the 
incident situation. This particular aspect of what happened was beyond the scope of the 
available incident data. It remains unknown in this particular case, but does suggest a 
line of possible further safety inquiry about the coordination of drug identity 
information. Through systematically explicating the information coordinations 
supported by available incident data, the Information Safety Method analysis has also 
highlighted an aspect of the situation which may be changed in principle, to facilitate 
more robust systems of drug identity information coordination and representation in 
future. If the accuracy checker had taken the tablets out of the enclosing box and had 
looked at them, this would have added further redundancy to the system of drug 
identity information coordinations formed through the work. This is equivalent to 
adding an arrow from the Tablets (Boceprevir) incident participant, to Accuracy 
checker (Ms F) in Figure 4.8. In this amended working scenario, the Boceprevir tablets 
themselves would have then formed a third comparative source; for a three way 
consistency-check of drug identity by the accuracy checker Ms F, against: 
1) the tablet box with a Ribavirin label,  
2) the patient Mr P’s drug prescription (the omitted end of the top left arrow in 
Figure 4.8, see Figure 4.7 also), and  
3) the perceived drug identity of the Boceprevir tablets. 
Mr P
Tablet box
(with Ribavirin 
label)
Dispensing
technician (Mr E)
Tablet capsule 
pack
(Boceprevir)
Accuracy 
checker (Ms F)
Tablets
(Boceprevir)
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Such a modification to the interactions of the work system would increase the 
likelihood of detecting a drug dispensation error 
7
. This point is made without the 
intention of promoting hindsight bias here. The point is not that the checker ought to 
have taken the tablets out of the box at the time of this incident situation. Instead, the 
point is that the structure of the investigative hypotheses developed here (through 
using the Information Safety Method) can naturally lead to some relatively practical 
ideas for enhancing the robustness of future information coordination. If this 
suggestion for work modification was found to be already implemented upon further 
investigation, the corresponding investigative hypotheses can then be revised to better 
represent the more complete state of knowledge about the incident situation. Similar 
discussions could be conducted with respect to other parts of the various information 
trajectories developed from this study, where the ‘missing’ arrows between various 
incident participants could prompt creative discussions around additional redundancy 
paths worth considering for the future. The lack of more than one outgoing arrow from 
the capsule pack for Boceprevir tablets on the right-hand side of Figure 4.8 provides a 
further example. 
Analysis results from the first incident situation were also presented to a multi-
disciplinary group of safety researchers (Huang 2014b). This presentation prompted 
lively debate around what was known about the accuracy checking aspects of the 
incident situation. In this case, the context of discussion was somewhat different from 
that reported for the AcciMap (Rasmussen and Svedung 2000), and Root Cause 
Analysis based methods (Iedema et al. 2006a, 2006b). However, the Information 
Safety Method seems to have similarly contributed towards creating a conversation 
space – around which semi-structured discussion about the strengths and limits of the 
extant incident knowledge and response could be conducted. From the peer debate 
which ensued around the Information Safety Method analysis, it became clear that 
there may be knowledge gaps about the precise physical co-locations of the tablet box, 
tablets, and tablet capsule pack used. We assumed that the Boceprevir tablets were 
within their tablet capsule pack at all times during the incident situation. Further 
understanding about how the tablet box labelled as Ribavirin was physically co-
located with the other incident participants, however, could lead to an enriched 
                                                          
 
7
 Although with obvious caveats relating to its practicality, which incident investigators 
embedded in an organisation would be better placed to determine in principle. 
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understanding of the drug identity information coordinations at the time. Since the 
participant interactions shown in Figure 4.8 were mostly proximal to the ‘critical event’ 
of the incident situation 
8
, fuller understanding of the precise details of their physical 
co-locations is an arguably useful area for further reducing investigative uncertainty. 
Another notable example emerged through the identification of safety functions from 
the 1st incident situation, involving safety function 9. This safety function reified the 
“clinical checking of patient prescriptions by a pharmacist”. According to the 
corresponding incident investigation report, this clinical checking: 
“involves firstly checking the patient’s allergy status to confirm the patient 
is not allergic to the medication prescribed. Next, the dose, frequency, route 
and length of treatment are reviewed” 
(quoted from the original incident investigation report, my emphasis) 
Through the analysis, safety function 9 was identified to potentially increase the 
probability of correct drug identity information representation (in the form of Mr P’s 
drug prescription). The clinical checking process may allow the checking pharmacist 
to serendipitously detect the wrong drug being used. As reported by the incident 
investigation however, drug identity is notably not explicitly included, amongst the 
(four) aspects to check for in dispensing patient medication. The comparison between 
the incident analysis and the facts from the report suggest that if the drug identity is 
indeed not routinely checked, adding such a check to the existing clinical checking 
process could increase the chances for timely error detection. Such an addition to the 
routine checking process would make fuller use of the expertise of pharmacists to help 
catch, and double check unusual prescription-illness configurations (cf. Al-Khani et al. 
2014). 
In principle, our Information Safety Method can facilitate uncertainty reduction in 
incident investigation – by using Question 1 (where the information trajectory has no 
safety functions), Question 2 (only negative safety functions present), and Question 4 
(only positive safety functions present) (Section 3.4). In a formative capacity, the 
answers to these questions may indicate areas of underdeveloped investigative 
understanding. The answers to Question 1 can highlight where few performance 
                                                          
 
8
 A ‘critical event’ in the sense of Rasmussen and Svedung (2000). 
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shaping factors are as yet known or explicitly recognised. The answers to Question 2 
and Question 4 can highlight where investigative understanding is perhaps as yet 
biased – towards either the negative, or positive aspects of incident situations, 
respectively. Across all of the investigative hypotheses actually developed in the 
current study, only the non-human parts of the natural information systems had no 
safety functions, in answer to Question 1. Very few parts had only positive safety 
functions, in answer to Question 4. This may reflect natural human biases towards 
focusing only on what went wrong (evidenced by the many answers to Question 2). 
Even so, the use of the Information Safety Method enabled these emergent patterns of 
inference to be systematically identified, recognised, and potentially addressed for the 
future. 
4.5   Study limitations 
A potential weakness of the study reported here is in its use of already interpreted 
‘incident data’, some of which may have been already interpreted so substantively by 
the original incident investigators so as to be no longer usable as ‘raw data’. As 
contributions such as de Carvalho (2011), Salmon et al. (2012), and Benner (2013) 
show, the use of second-hand reports of ‘incident data’ is common in academic 
incident analyses. We have repeatedly found that the line between ‘analysis’, and 
undisputable empirical data in a patient safety incident investigation report can become 
very blurry in practice. This reflects a growing need for research into standard source 
data documentation structures, to better support the diverse needs of the many 
potential users of incident data/reports, or incident investigation reports (cf. Johnson 
2003b; Benner 2012, 2013). The reports used for the current study were relatively 
‘data-rich’, however, without too much ‘analytical filtering’ as to render them 
unusable for its purposes. An anonymised full example of the source incident data is 
presented in Appendix A.1, which shows how the level and richness of contextual 
empirical data used for the current study was an improvement, over that provided by 
public reports such as Toft (2001), and ISMP Canada (2007). Original investigators 
involved in the reported investigations were on hand to help us with clarification when 
needed. This was rarely needed during the study. Nevertheless, live use in an actual 
incident investigation is a next step needed, to provide a more ecologically valid 
context of study for the Information Safety Method. 
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A second potential critique is in the fact that only a single analyst undertook the 
incident analysis of the current study. Due to its Distributed Cognition based 
conception of the incident analysis task however, this potential critique is a moot point 
in the case of the Information Safety Method. Under the Distributed Cognition 
perspective, there is very little theoretical difference, in kind, between that of the one 
incident analyst situation, or where multiple incident analysts are involved. The study 
context reported in this chapter is simply one of a range of anticipated real scenarios 
for which the Information Safety Method could be deployed. The current study shows 
that it is possible for a single analyst to distribute their analytical understanding across 
analysis of multiple incident situations using the Information Safety Method. Further 
research is necessary, to explore the extent to which similar study outcomes are 
possible across other incident analysts and incident situations. 
4.6   Conclusions 
This chapter presented a study exploring the use of the Information Safety Method, 
and the empirical implications following from its controlled usage.  
To determine the extent to which the Information Safety Method can be used to 
analyse diverse patient safety incident situations (study aim 1), the Information Safety 
Method was applied to analyse previously unseen incident data. It was successfully 
used across all five of the diverse incident situations independently identified to be 
relevant for the purposes of the method. While further empirical study is clearly 
necessary, the diverse incident situations productively analysed suggests that the 
Information Safety Method can be used to analyse diverse patient safety incident 
situations.  
The second aim of the study was to explore the generation of additional knowledge, 
beyond that obtained from the existing incident investigations. In all cases, additional 
issues, ideas, and lines of inquiry were generated through applying the Information 
Safety Method. Although some of these were touched on by the original investigations, 
the majority of the additional issues and ideas were not substantively reported by the 
corresponding investigation reports (Collaborating patient safety incident investigation 
department 2010-2013). In particular, the study showed that the Information Safety 
Method (Section 4.4):  
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 can help the analyst better understand where systems of information 
representation are naturally fragile, and provide Distributed Cognition based 
insights into the nature of these systemic fragilities; 
 can be used to support active learning from incidents, through 
understanding systemic causes potentially effecting information 
coordination and representation; 
 can lead to various (other) implications of interest. 
We found that Information Safety Method analysis can trigger further lines of 
productive inquiry, suggest ideas for making existing systems of communication more 
robust, and help create a conversation space for debate about the strengths and limits 
of the related knowledge about the incident situation analysed. Using the new method, 
we may therefore discover other knowledge pertinent to an incident situation, to 
extend and enrich the existing work of incident investigations. These additional 
knowledge and analytical insights could then be debated and discussed, to help 
ultimately improve the robustness of the systems of information coordination and 
representation formed through communicative work acts during incident situations. 
The third and final aim of the study was to explore potential difficulties unfolding in 
moving from the abstract theory of the Information Safety Method, into incident 
analysis practice using the new method. In the current study, a notable logistic issue 
was unexpectedly encountered. In identifying all of the sub-information-trajectories 
associated with the multiple blood pressure and Modified Early Warning Score 
information representations (over the course of a single weekend), substantive 
practical difficulties were encountered in managing the systematic ‘live’ recording of 
the Information Safety Method analysis generated. For the current study, a largely 
manual means was used to record the investigative hypotheses generated. This raised 
substantive organisational complexity for the author (as incident analyst): to 
simultaneous manage the development of the multiple ‘sub’ information trajectories 
being identified, and explicitly relate them to various individual safety functions being 
identified. This highlights an area of further methodological development, for the 
Information Safety Method. 
In conclusion, the current study shows that the Information Safety Method can be used 
to raise new issues of interest. The current study indicates that the Information Safety 
Method can indeed do what it is supposed to do – which is to help illuminate how 
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distributed cognitive systems form during incident situations through attempts at 
communicative interaction. The current study therefore represents an initial validation 
of the Information Safety Method (cf. Branford 2007). However, the study also shows 
that we need to pay more attention to the needs, demands, and constraints, of the 
practice of doing incident analysis. Empirical understanding of whether systemic 
incident analysis is practiced (or not) as part of real incident investigation, and exactly 
how this is done, is as yet underdeveloped. The next three chapters explore the practice 
of incident analysis in more depth, and explicitly consider the move from research-
based theory into practice. This is done through detailed empirical examination of both 
interview data, and incident analysis tools, drawn from the domain of patient safety 
incident analysis and investigation. 
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Chapter 5 – Concepts significantly driving 
incident analysis and investigation practice 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 explored the development and validation of a new systemic incident 
analysis method, in an academic research context. However, the review of Chapter 2 
also indicated the need to start building bridges, between systemic incident analysis 
research innovations and practice. To contribute toward this effort (Aim B, Objective 
3), this chapter: 
 Explores the degree to which systemic incident analysis is in fact practiced 
as part of patient safety incident investigation 
 Reports on two in-depth interviews with practicing patient safety incident 
investigators, providing an initial answer to a new research question around 
conceptualisation of their analysis and investigation practice  
 Provides an initial understanding of common significant concepts driving 
incident analysis and investigation at a United Kingdom Foundation Trust 
 Further indicates the nascent nature of patient safety incident analysis and 
investigation practice, as evidenced by a partial rather than full rejection of 
the monocausal style of incident explanation  
5.1   Introduction 
The empirical evidence reviewed in Chapter 2 provided an indicative description of 
issues relating to the gap between systemic incident analysis research and incident 
analysis practice. This motivated the need to start to bridge the gap between systemic 
incident analysis methods in theory, and their usage and utilisation in practice. In order 
to better understand contemporary incident analysis practice, we examine empirical 
data on safety incident analysis and investigation practice in this chapter. In particular, 
we focus on practice in the context of patient safety, to better understand the degree to 
which systemic incident analysis is in fact practiced as part of patient safety incident 
investigation. This is done through two in-depth interviews, with two of the three 
practicing patient safety incident investigators directing incident analysis and 
investigation efforts at a large Foundation Trust in the United Kingdom. Unless 
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specified otherwise in this chapter, ‘investigation’ refers to the investigation of Serious 
Untoward Incidents – which is the most serious kind of incident situation investigated 
at the Trust. 
5.2   Study aim 
Given the substantively conceptual nature of incident analysis work, the following 
novel research question provided a natural broad focus for the interviews, and the 
coding process during the qualitative data analysis: 
What are the significant concepts for patient safety incident investigators in 
their investigative practice? 
To generate data for answering this research question, the interviews specifically 
focussed on eliciting both explicit and tacit knowledge: relating to the process, 
rationale and decision-making aspects of the investigative work practice of the 
interviewees. 
5.3   Methods 
5.3.1  Method selection 
Given the limited knowledge base on patient safety incident investigation practice, 
flexibility was needed in terms of the topics explored and examined during the two in-
depth interviews. Semi-structured interviews were selected as an appropriate method 
of qualitative data collection, since they provide the ability to flexibly examine 
emerging topics of interest in varying degrees of depth, as part of exploratory research 
design (Robson 2011). To maximise the exploratory aspect of the study, the author-as-
interviewer did not assume prior knowledge of what concepts significantly drove the 
two patient safety incident investigators’ practice, for each of the two interviews 
conducted. 
Thematic analysis was chosen to complement the method of interview, for the 
following reasons. Firstly, thematic analysis is a flexible analysis approach suitable for 
investigating under-researched areas, regardless of the extent to which data analysis is 
inductive and/or deductive (Braun and Clarke 2006). It is therefore appropriate for the 
current exploratory research study. Secondly, Braun and Clarke (2006) was the same 
analysis instrument as used by Underwood and Waterson (Underwood 2013, 
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Underwood and Waterson 2013), in their examination of the systemic incident analysis 
research-practice gap. The analytic narrative (presented later in Section 5.4) was 
therefore obtained through the use of the same analytical lens. These contributions 
may thus complement and enrich the nascent knowledge base on the nature and extent 
of the research-practice gap for systemic incident analysis: as a form of investigator 
and data triangulation (cf. Rothbauer 2008). In the current study, we specifically 
examine practice in conducting patient safety incident investigation. 
5.3.2  Participants and sampling strategy 
Two practicing incident investigators participated in the study, from a Foundation 
Trust in the United Kingdom. They both led safety investigation efforts at the Trust, 
and formed two-thirds of the team leading patient safety incident investigation at the 
time of the interviews. A one-to-one interview was conducted with each of the two 
investigators by the author. Both investigators were originally from a nursing 
background, coming to their incident investigation role through the ‘clinical 
governance’ route. They are referred to as investigator A and B throughout this chapter, 
using a generic ‘his/he’ pronoun for reasons of simplicity and anonymity. 
A mix of purposive/convenience sampling was used to recruit the two practicing 
incident investigators for separate interview. Candidate interviewees were first 
identified through the author’s attendance at the 2012 Clinical Human Factors Group 
conference (Clinical Human Factors Group 2012). The contacts made at this event 
were further pursued and developed through subsequent email invitations for 
collaborative research. Snowball sampling occurred when investigator A 
recommended/recruited investigator B as another interviewee suitable for the current 
study. Interviewees were eventually chosen based on their detailed knowledge of one 
or more of the five incident situations analysed in the previous study (Chapter 4), and 
the corresponding incident investigation of each situation. Shared knowledge of these 
specific incidents and investigations would then provide a focused context for the 
conversations between the interviewer (the author) and interviewee, in the context of 
the current study. The interviewer’s knowledge of the incident situations and 
investigations was developed as part of the incident analysis work reported in Chapter 
4. 
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5.3.3  Interviewer preparation and interview schedule design 
The author had some prior experience of conducting semi-structured interviews (e.g., 
see Huang 2011, Appendix 3). However, he was a relative beginner at the practice of 
research interviewing at the time of the current study. Pilot interviewing with other 
patient safety incident investigators was not feasible in the run-up to the study. Active 
measures were taken as part of study planning and research design, however, to offset 
this a priori limitation of the context of research. These measures centred around the 
preparation of a detailed interview schedule beforehand, a final version of which was 
used interactively to support the actual interviews. As part of the planning process, 
supporting cues were also considered, and in the end utilised – with the aim of aiding 
interviewees in recalling specifics from the past. The developing interview schedule 
was reviewed by the author’s supervisors, to refine and improve the developing study 
plans. These plans were also explicitly compared with, and refined against ideas from 
a variety of related interviewing literature by the author: ranging from the more generic 
(e.g., Klein et al. 1989), to the more specifically relevant (e.g., Rollenhagen et al. 
2010). Parts of the interview schedule were also informally piloted beforehand, in non-
patient safety contexts. 
While considerable care was taken in calibrating the interview schedule, it was not 
intended to be followed strictly in the actual interview (cf. Blandford 2013). The 
schedule design and preparation process was the main means by which the ‘researcher-
as-instrument’ could be prepared and refined (cf. Pezalla et al. 2012 for related 
discussions), within the pragmatic constraints of the study. Given that these interviews 
took place late on in the training process for a PhD in Safety Science (February 2014), 
the researcher/interviewer was already considerably sensitised to basic issues in 
incident analysis and investigation research. The final version of the interview 
schedule is shown in Appendix B.1. Appendix B.2 shows the related interactive 
timeline used to support interviewee recall during each interview. 
5.3.4  Data collection and transcription 
Around three hours of interview data was audio recorded, with the permission and 
written consent of the two incident investigators. The data consisted of over 35,000 
spoken words in total, with a ratio of approximately 60:40 in terms of time spent 
talking to investigator A and investigator B, respectively. For investigator A, a 
relatively complete walkthrough of one of his incident investigations formed the main 
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focus for our conversation. A similar walkthrough was attempted with investigator B, 
but impeded by the fact that both the incident investigations we attempted to 
walkthrough were considered not to be good examples of their investigative practice 
by investigator B. This was not obvious from the corresponding investigation reports 
accessed beforehand, and came to light only during the interview. There was 
consequently less standardisation between the outcomes of the two interviews than we 
originally hoped for during research planning, to support integrative analysis of the 
data; references to specifics of incident situations and investigations therefore had to 
be elicited on a more improvised basis with investigator B. 
Nevertheless, both research interviews focused on both the specifics and broader 
generalities of the investigators’ practice. Both conversations were fairly ‘natural’, and 
co-constructed, with relatively non-directive interviewing used throughout the bulk of 
each interview. Specific questions were occasionally used by the interviewer 
deliberately, however, to probe more deeply into particular details of the incident 
investigation work practice. In the role of interviewer, the author believes that 
relatively good rapport was established in both interviews, despite occasional moments 
of tension and awkwardness during each of the two conversations. 
A ‘verbatim’ representation of the audio stream was constructed following the 
interviews, in preparation for thematic analysis of the data. Figure 5.1 gives an 
illustrative example, from the full interview transcription constructed. The fine 
granularities of talk were mostly unimportant for the purposes of this study (e.g. non-
verbals, facial expressions, meaningful pauses etc.). The few potential exceptions were 
noted explicitly, as part of constructing the textual transcript. Dots of varying lengths 
(e.g., “..”, “...”) were loosely used as part of the transcript, to approximate pauses of 
varying lengths in the conversation. Extra dots have been added to the extracts 
presented in this chapter to ease reading, without substantively altering the meaning of 
the quoted passage. A lack of capitalisation is also used in the quotes, to indicate a 
relatively quick ‘run on’ from one part onto the next part of the conversation.  
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Figure 5.1: A simple 3-line representation of the conversation. 
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The written transcript served as a convenient intermediate representation for 
supporting the subsequent data analysis, after being ‘accuracy checked’ against the 
original audio stream. The audio stream remained the de facto primary data however, 
for the purposes of the data analysis. Additional ‘interview data’ also supported the 
analysis, alongside the audio stream and transcription. This consisted of the final 
version of the interview schedule interactively used by the author during the interview 
(using a printed version of Appendix B.1), as well as the interactive timeline sheet 
used by each of the two interviewees during their interviews (using a printed version of 
Appendix B.2). 
5.3.5  Data analysis 
The interview data was analysed from a critical realist perspective, which assumes a 
socially influenced reality (e.g., Danermark et al. 2002; Willig 2013, Chapter 2). An 
inductive, latent thematic analysis was conducted (Braun and Clarke 2006). Its 
inductive nature meant that the analysis was primarily data driven, without deliberately 
coding using existing ideas from the background literature (particularly during earlier 
stages of analysis). The latent aspect meant that the analysis sought to go beyond a 
surface/descriptive understanding only – and attempted interpretation of some of the 
underlying ideas, assumptions, conceptualisations, and ideologies underpinning the 
primary data (not necessarily obvious from a cursory examination of the data). In 
following the method of thematic analysis set out by Braun and Clarke (2006), review 
and refinement of the themes was conducted with an eye for achieving both internal 
homogeneity (meaningful cohesion within each theme) and external heterogeneity 
(clear and identifiable distinctions between themes). The iterative/recursive process of 
qualitative data analysis was continued until nothing substantial was being added or 
revised through revisiting the emerging themes. A good ‘fit’ with the underlying data 
was judged to be achieved, at this point in the study. 
Initial coding was started towards the end of the data transcription process (Section 
5.3.4), continuing in earnest after ‘accuracy checking’ the transcript. Just under 400 
initial codes were generated in total across the two interviews, as the basis for an 
initially ‘flat’ set of themes (i.e., non-hierarchical). These initial themes were then 
iteratively (re)structured, refined, and compared back with the data: through the 
process of drafting in the form of five Microsoft Word documents. Additional 
intermediate physical copies of each of these five documents were also annotated, to 
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facilitate effective comparison and refinement between the data and emerging analysis 
(in-between each of the five drafts of data analysis). The ‘headings’ functionality of 
Microsoft Word 2010 was used throughout, as a hierarchical structuring aid in 
developing the themes being identified. Figure 5.2 presents a thematic map from early 
on in the analysis process. 
 
Figure 5.2: A thematic map from early on in the analysis process. 
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5.4   Findings: An analytic narrative of significant concepts driving 
patient safety incident investigation practice 
5.4.1  Theme A: What went wrong, to cause significant patient harm? 
A significant concept for both investigators is to understand the things which went 
wrong, to have caused significant harm to the patient. For example, investigator B sees 
“Identifying what went wrong.., to enable you to do something about it” as the principal 
aim of an incident investigation. This emphasis is congruent with investigator A’s 
repeated emphasis on ‘wrong’ issues throughout his interview, in explaining and 
illustrating parts of his investigative process. An example is given below, in the 
context of investigator A describing the kind of situation clearly requiring a full 
investigation: 
“..so sometimes you know that quite quickly: we’ve chopped off the wrong 
leg, we’ve given the wrong drug, we missed a fracture, we missed a lung 
cancer. Sometimes it’s absolutely black and white.” 
(investigator A) 
The other part of this theme is about ‘significant patient harm’. Although the interview 
data shows some inconsistencies relating to this idea, it nevertheless forms a loose, but 
key focus for driving investigation practice, by virtue of its association with the 
definition of ‘incident’ proposed in national-level guidance documents (e.g., National 
Patient Safety Agency 2010, which is part of what the investigators and their Trust are 
working under). 
To support and develop an understanding of what went wrong, a timeline is the main 
supporting tool used. In conversation about its relationship with Root Cause Analysis, 
investigator A notes that: 
“if I haven’t got a timeline, I haven’t got a clue what I’m investigating. So I 
need [the timeline], to give me structure” 
(investigator A) 
Investigator B similarly uses the timeline as an interactive aid to support his 
investigation process: 
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“I always start with the timeline, so I always plot the timeline out first. I just 
find it easier to assimilate that knowledge first, so it puts things into... an 
ordered fashion for me. And as I’m doing it, I always... make little notes in 
the side (physically gestures to show this point), what the issues are... so, 
as they come up, to remind you, to make sure that you address those I 
suppose within the body of the report. Um.. so that’s how I would.. do an 
investigation.” 
(investigator B) 
Relatedly, a kind of ‘pre-investigation’ feeds into an internal ‘panel decision process’9 
– to collaboratively decide whether to officially declare, conduct, and report a full 
Serious Untoward Incident investigation. A brief narrative understanding is also 
important for this ‘precursor’ stage (regarding the patient harm, and what went wrong 
to cause it). An example of the initially panel-driven investigation process is given by 
investigator A: 
“so if we just took a story to panel and said ‘well we gave the wrong drug’, 
and the panel will say, ‘well what drug? what was the consequences of the 
drug? what was the impact for the patient?’ (hypothetical investigator 
response:) ‘well we don’t really know..’, they’d say ‘well go away and find 
out, we can’t make a decision..’ ” 
(investigator A, the ‘decision’ here is whether to officially declare, conduct, 
and report a full Serious Untoward Incident investigation) 
To help determine what went wrong, the events of the incident may be compared with 
normative practice – in the form of organisational policies or standards for example. 
This kind of comparison allows an understanding of some of the apparent omissions, 
or mistakes made in the care actually given at the time. An example from investigator 
A describes an important aspect of one particular investigation: 
                                                          
 
9
 The precise details of how this panel process works was being changed at the time of the 
interview study. 
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“So probably, most of the time, they would correctly select the right drug 
out of the back of the robot. But on this occasion, it didn’t happen. So I 
thought that was important to bring out, because I don’t think they’d 
realised how far they’d deviated away from ‘the norm’ – which was ‘we rely 
on the robot to deliver the tablet’.” 
(investigator A, here the ‘robot’ refers to a semi-automated drug dispensing 
machine in use at a pharmacy) 
5.4.2  Theme B: Searching for the root cause of what went wrong? 
To avoid, prevent, or reduce the chance of harm to the patient, the ‘analysis’ part of 
investigation consists of a loosely defined search for what went wrong. In particular, 
the focus is on ultimately arriving at a/the ‘root cause’ (this was always referred to in 
the singular, and never in the plural form by both interviewees). 
Figure 5.3 presents one shared incident causation model the investigators are working 
under. It was not possible to elicit clearer conceptualisations beyond this level of detail 
in the interviews. 
 
Figure 5.3: A sketch of one incident causation model the investigators are working 
under. The arrows represent a loose ‘causes’ relationship. 
Root Cause
Patient harm
VARIOUS ‘CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS’
(with a non-exclusive focus on contributory omissions or mistakes)
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The search for this root cause is not always straightforward in practice however. For 
example, investigator B gives an account of when the collaborative ‘root cause finding’ 
process may prove to be challenging: 
“And sometimes it just gets you to a point, especially where you’re caught 
between two opposing clinical teams, that have got two very different 
opposing views. You know, you might.. you know.., You could say to me: 
‘no you did the wrong thing’, and I could say: ‘no, you did the wrong thing’... 
and you’re caught between the middle, because you can’t.. – you might not 
have the knowledge.. the intricate knowledge..” 
(investigator B) 
Intuition may also be necessary, to probe beyond the initial accounts of incident 
participants to get at this root cause: 
“... you’ve got to have a bit of a feel for it – definitely; and maybe that’s 
where that curiosity comes in as well..? Because you could accept what 
people tell you at face value, and not probe any further, but I don’t think 
you’d always get anywhere near the root cause then. I think you got to 
have that ability to sniff it out, like a blood hound.” 
(investigator A) 
It is worth noting that while the general idea seems to be to search for a root cause 
leading to the patient harm, there is also a recognition of the multifactorial aspect of 
incident causation (as shown by the ‘contributory factors’ in the middle of Figure 5.3). 
For example, in one part of the conversation about his practice, investigator A draws a 
parallel with a plane crash incident – touching on some of its potential ‘contributory 
factors’: 
“What was it... you’d want to unpick it, wouldn’t you, you’d want to say, was 
the pilot.. was he ok? did he have a heart attack? was he stressed, was he 
drinking? you’d want to know all those things...  What were other people 
doing, and did they notice anything? you know... if you put it in that sort of 
context, it’s not sufficient to just know the what, but it’s really important to 
know the how and the why.” 
(investigator A) 
Investigators at the Foundation Trust have only recently been asked to evidence the 
methods they use for incident investigation. The choice of specific method is however 
left to the discretion of the individual investigator. This may reduce the level of 
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standardisation between the investigative outputs obtained, in searching for the root 
cause of what went wrong. 
5.4.3  Theme C: A grounded basis for investigative inference 
Both investigators believe that investigation must be based on the ‘facts’ of the 
incident. In addition to the factual timeline, investigator A notes that the: 
“analysis stage should come at the end, when you’ve got all the facts, 
otherwise you might be analysing something that’s incomplete.” 
(investigator A) 
In discussing some of the documentation limitations he faces, investigator B also notes 
that: 
“So you’re trying to make a rational.. decision, not based on all the 
evidence that you could possibly have, so it does make it really difficult... 
Because you can’t.. just make it up, you know.. You’ve got to base it on 
something.. [...] And I think in all our reports, we say that it’s factual, you 
know” 
(investigator B) 
For these incident investigators, such ‘facts’ are inclusive of ‘normative items’ – such 
as declared policies, normal practice etc. These are in addition to more obvious 
primary sources for supporting incident investigation (e.g., patient observation notes, 
staff interviews). 
Sometimes it can be difficult to reconcile this ‘factual’ basis for incident investigation, 
and the need to find the root cause of what went wrong (Theme B), with the seemingly 
reasonable clinical judgement(s) made at the time. 
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“..it’s difficult, because.. These [incident investigation] reports are 
supposed to be based on what we know to be true – fact; but clinical 
judgement for sure comes into it. And if somebody’s given.. if somebody’s 
given documented rationale for a reason – for clinical judgement, then.. 
you know, it.. and their rationale seems to be the correct way of thinking at 
the time, then they’ve gone with the best of intentions; although.., in 
hindsight, this was probably an error of judgement. We’ve done that before 
– and written that. Because sometimes you don’t have a... you can’t come 
up with a.., you know.. somebody has done something with the very best 
of intentions.” 
(investigator B, almost certainly referring to not being able to come up with 
a root cause towards the end of this quote) 
“Because what I find quite a lot, is that the consultant group will try and 
bamboozle you with academic papers – they’ll say, ‘I made that decision, 
because..’ and then they’ll pull it up on their laptop, and they’ll say: ‘see, 
this is the latest research..!’ And I’ll say: ‘that’s fine, but what’s our Trust’s 
current policy, and what guidance do we follow? ok, did you follow that 
guidance?’ ...” 
(investigator A, in discussing how he probes incident participants about 
departures from formal organisational policy during the incident) 
5.4.4  Theme D: Meeting the challenges imposed by time, resource, and 
knowledge limitations 
Both investigators conduct investigations alongside other ‘day jobs’. And one 
significant shared concern is in managing the substantial time and resource constraints 
on their work. For example, investigator A comments that “if there were more of us 
doing [incident investigation], we could probably have a better quality product at the 
end of the day”. Figure 5.4 illustrates investigator B’s perception of the 
multitasking/juggling entailed by his work situation, and its routine ebb and flow. 
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Figure 5.4: An annotated sketch of the interleaved management of multiple patient 
safety incident investigations (adapted from the original sketch by investigator B, 
based on corresponding parts of the interview data). 
The national ‘45 working days’ limit for completing each investigation is a significant 
concept in shaping the conduct of investigations. In the interview, investigator B 
reveals that flexible work patterns for, and between the three ‘main’ investigators are 
sometimes necessary, to get the job done in time. For one particular incident situation, 
the same incident investigation was led by all three of the ‘main’ investigators working 
at the Trust at different points in time (investigators A and B were two of these three 
investigators). Time pressures may also sometimes significantly shape when or how an 
incident investigation concludes, as the following quote shows: 
“so sometimes, my curiosity – I might hold back; because I might think: ok, 
I think I’ve got to the root cause there, or I think I’ve got/uncovered that, but 
probably, if I spent another week, I might uncover a lot more.” 
(investigator A) 
In addition, knowledge limitations are a significant challenge to investigative practice. 
Reasons for this can range from limitations in the documentation, 
“... in every single Serious Untoward Incident investigation, there’ll be an 
element of poor documentation, I would imagine..” 
(investigator B) 
to a lack of more specialist knowledge: 
“So what happens there – the basic questions, but the pharmacist knew 
the layout, and the workings; so she had a different view, so she was able 
to help and support; because it’s very hard to construct – it’s a bit like you 
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trying to write the report from scratch, and thinking: ‘I don’t know the 
context, I don’t know the environment, I don’t know which questions to 
ask..’ You could argue that’s a good starting point, but it’s a harder starting 
point – do you know what I mean..?” 
(investigator A, whilst explaining one aspect of the working relationship 
between him and a collaborating ‘specialist investigator from a medical 
speciality’; such a ‘specialist’ may sometimes drive the direction of the 
investigation) 
To an extent, such knowledge constraints directly conflict with the need for an 
investigation to be based on ‘facts’ (Theme C). 
One way to address some of these practical challenges is to devolve some of the 
investigative responsibilities to ‘sub-investigators’ from a relevant speciality. 
“... and sometimes it’s decided actually at the panel, the best person to 
investigate this will be – person X or person Y, or... yeah, because 
sometimes it’s quite clear who needs to investigate it.”  
(investigator A, the ‘panel’ here refers to the decision panel discussed 
earlier) 
In such a case, the investigator then takes on a much more managerial/supportive role, 
leaving the bulk of the concrete investigative activities up to the individual ‘sub-
investigator’. However, such sub-investigations may not always be satisfactorily 
conducted/completed. A pragmatic attitude is taken towards the specifics of 
investigation practice. For example, investigator B notes that the proposed responses 
must be both achievable by the organisation, and measurable. Both ‘actionability’, and 
sufficient incident understanding, are sometimes used as heuristics for concluding a 
particular incident investigation: 
“and I guess ... it’s a judgement call really, as to.., sometimes whether you 
feel you’ve answered the question. Whether you feel you’ve arrived at what 
was the cause, what was the root cause. Can you keep on digging, you 
know, have we uncovered enough... And sometimes, if I’m being honest, 
it’s time pressures; if I’ve got three other investigations that are due in the 
next 3 weeks, and I’ve not even started them yet, there’s only so much I 
can spend on this one. If I feel I’ve got to the key players, they’ve given me 
a statement, I’ve unpicked what’s happened, I can understand what’s 
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happened, and I can make a series of recommendations, I’ll probably stop 
there. So sometimes I guess it’s a bit of pragmatism as to...” 
(Investigator A, the ‘question’ to be answered probably refers to Theme A: 
relating to what went wrong) 
Alongside the substantive practical challenges imposed by time, resource, and 
knowledge limitations, both investigators explicitly recognise that some of their past 
investigations can be ‘wrong’ to an extent – and be potentially improved, or be 
reasonably done differently. This indicates a reflective, pluralistic attitude to 
investigative process. It also suggests that outputs from these investigations should not 
be treated as the ‘final word’ on understanding and responding to an incident; but 
instead as a ‘best effort’ – given the practical circumstances constraining the 
investigation work. 
“... And I don’t know that we always get it right.., we may not get it right ...” 
(investigator A) 
“... and I’m not saying that you get it right every time, I’m sure you don’t.., 
I’m sure you don’t. And sometimes you know.. we get unstuck with that I’m 
sure, um.. because we failed to see things, and.. You don’t see things the 
same do you: so if you and I were to do an investigation, you would 
probably do a very different investigation than I would, and that’s your 
own ...” 
(investigator B) 
5.4.5  Theme E: A humanistic approach to incident investigation and reporting 
Both investigators take an empathetic and sympathetic starting point, in conducting 
their work. For example, at one point investigator A describes his consideration of how 
some work demands could potentially be unreasonable, and help explain the incident 
occurrence (as a hypothetical situation in this case): 
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“So again that was.. had we expected too much of her? Had somebody 
phoned in sick, and they said well you can do 2 hours worth.. you know if 
the error had happened at the end of that two hours, as an organisation 
we’d feel pretty bad about that. And in that situation, that’s when you say 
actually, the individual, there are.. reasons, why she’s maybe being tired. 
Because we’ve expected too much of her, because it’s beyond what we 
said she should do..” 
(investigator A, in talking about reasonable normal expectation for a 
pharmacy prescription checker) 
In terms of the investigation and reporting process itself, the patient forms the 
substantive focus. Investigator B describes the following idealised incident 
investigation report: 
“What makes it ‘great’ is it’s got all the key elements in.. [...] well they’ve 
identified the right people to speak to – who are involved... They’ve put the 
right information in there, and given a really good detailed description of 
what happened to the patient, in terms of you know.. ‘Mrs. X came into 
hospital on..., she had a chest x-ray, it wasn’t acted upon. The reasons it 
wasn’t acted upon were ...... ’ you know; And then, obviously identify the 
errors that occurred during that patient journey, the root cause, and then 
the recommendations ...” 
(investigator B) 
And investigator A describes how he always tries to write the report from the 
perspective of the patient: 
“So you.. I guess it’s... maybe I can’t really put it into words as to how you 
would synthesise.. the whole [incident] analysis into the conclusions [of the 
investigation report], but you try and write the report from.. I personally 
always try and write it from the point of the person receiving the report – 
the patient, or their family, to say: ‘what would I want to know, in words that 
I can understand?’ 
(investigator A) 
Due to resource constraints, it is sometimes necessary for an investigator to play the 
role of ‘family liaison’ and ‘patient advocate’, in addition to their role as ‘objective 
incident investigator’. This can lead to basic conflicts in fulfilling the partially 
contradictory responsibilities of these multiple roles; and thus confound the 
investigators’ efforts to implement the ‘objective investigation’ approaches promoted 
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and portrayed by healthcare policy stakeholders, in the form of policy documents for 
guiding patient safety incident investigation (cf. Dechy et al. 2012). 
5.5   Study limitations 
Only two patient safety incident investigators from one Foundation Trust were 
interviewed, and a single qualitative analyst conducted the data analysis. Similar 
studies with investigators from other healthcare settings would therefore give further 
insight, into the extent to which the five significant concepts identified in Section 5.4 
transfer to other research contexts (cf. Graneheim and Lundman 2004). Like in Iedema 
et al.’s (2006b) analysis of a 1-hour Root Cause Analysis meeting, the limited contact 
time for the two research interviews here is an important qualification to bear in mind, 
in interpreting and using the themes reported. 
Despite these limitations however, the current study adds to the nascent, piecemeal, 
and growing evidence base on how patient safety incident investigation is actually 
practiced (e.g., Braithwaite et al. 2006, Tamuz et al. 2011, Wu et al. 2008, Nicolini et 
al. 2011). In focusing specifically on the conceptual aspects driving this work process, 
an initial answer is provided to the novel research question posed at the outset of the 
study, of: 
What are the significant concepts for patient safety incident investigators in 
their investigative practice? 
Given that the two investigators interviewed formed two-thirds of the frontline 
investigation team at the Foundation Trust, the analytic narrative reported in Section 
5.4 may have broader implications for the Trust’s incident investigation practice. 
Given the currently limited empirical evidence base on patient incident investigation 
practice, however, further research is needed before conclusive arguments on the 
benefits and drawbacks of their current incident analysis and investigation practices 
can be made. 
5.6   Conclusions 
This chapter presented an inductive study of significant concepts driving patient safety 
incident investigation practice. An explicit study of the concepts driving patient safety 
incident investigation practice has not been attempted prior to the study reported here. 
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This chapter therefore contributes a new research question. In successfully answering 
this question, we have also shown that Braun and Clarke’s (2006) version of thematic 
analysis can be used to productively analyse the conceptual motivations driving 
incident investigation practice. 
From the interview data, the five themes identified show that for the two investigators 
interviewed: 
 Incident investigation work is very much a “pragmatically rational” process, 
often conducted under conditions of high uncertainty, and a largely 
unknown degree of completeness in relevant knowledge of the particular 
situation (cf. Lundberg et al. 2010). 
 A grounded, ‘fact-based’ search is crucial to these investigators and their 
incident investigations, to determine the root cause of what went wrong to 
cause significant patient harm (Themes A, B, C). This analysis rationale is 
however tempered by both the substantive time, resource, and knowledge 
limitations of an investigative situation (Theme D), as well as the 
investigators’ naturally humanistic approach to incident investigation and 
reporting (Theme E, explainable by both investigators’ nursing 
backgrounds).  
 For the two investigators interviewed at least, their main focus is not on 
analysing how systems of information representation and coordination form 
during incidents, or on any of the three major alternative conceptions of 
system proposed in the general systemic incident analysis literature 
(compare Themes A, B, and C, with Section 2.3). There is no obvious 
focus on issues of how communication or cognition during incident 
situations lead to the emergence of natural information systems, in the 
analysis and investigation practice identified. This suggests a niche for the 
Information Safety Method, in practice, as a means of opening up new 
avenues of productive analysis and inquiry during patient safety incident 
investigation. 
As a whole, the experiences and data from the current study suggest that mixed 
rationales are in operation in patient safety incident investigation practice. In 
conducting their incident analysis work, the two incident investigators interviewed 
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draw on both the belief that there is a single, ultimate cause to be uncovered (e.g., 
Theme B, Figure 5.3), alongside the conflicting belief that such a single cause is 
impossible to determine practically (e.g., Theme D). The monocausal assumption of a 
single main cause seems to be only partly rejected as a basis for incident analysis for 
these two incident investigators, despite the full rejection of the monocausal ‘root 
cause’ assumption by the safety scientific research community at least since 1995 (cf. 
Section 2.2.1; Stoop 1995 for example). This conceptual conflict seems to be only one 
part of the complex mix of ideational and practical concerns and pressures surrounding 
the systemic incident analysis research-practice gap (Section 2.6). In this particular 
study, five concepts have been identified to significantly drive incident analysis and 
investigation, in the nascent area of patient safety practice. 
Detailed empirical understanding of the interrelation between investigation process, 
and the broader organisational context in which this work occurs, is currently in its 
infancy. Examples such as Nicolini et al. (2011), Lundberg et al. (2012), and 
Drupsteen and Hasle (2014) are starting to open up our nascent understanding of this 
growth area of empirical research, both in patient safety and beyond. Through its 
design and findings, the study reported in this chapter contributes towards furthering 
our developing understanding of this issue; focusing on the qualitative-conceptual 
aspects of doing incident analysis in the case of this chapter. 
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Chapter 6 – A new method for relating incident 
analysis research theory to its practice 
 
The small interview study of Chapter 5 further confirmed the need to build bridges 
between systemic incident analysis research and practice. To better understand the 
conceptual and other challenges which may arise in the move from systemic incident 
analysis theory into practice (Aim B, Objective 4), this chapter: 
 Develops a new research method, to support empirical analysis of the point 
at which systemic incident analysis research theory becomes practice 
 Gives detailed insight into how systemic incident analysis methods are 
enacted in practice 
 Provides a general way of characterising how particular methods constrain 
or afford elements of real investigation practice 
6.1   Introduction 
The literature review in Section 2.6 showed a substantive and complex gap existing 
between systemic incident analysis research theory with its practice. Little knowledge 
yet exists, on exactly how systemic incident analysis research theory is enacted by 
practitioners, and the extent to which it is in fact enacted at all as part of real incident 
investigation. This was reinforced by the interview study reported in Chapter 5. Part of 
those study findings suggest that the investigators’ practice are not really strongly 
influenced by contemporary incident analysis research theory (e.g., Theme B: 
Searching for the root cause of what went wrong?). There was little evidence of either 
the concepts or methods from mainstream systemic incident analysis research having 
any substantive influence on the practice of the patient safety incident investigators 
interviewed.  
To better understand the move from theory into practice, in this chapter we develop a 
method for detailed characterisation of the relationship: between the theoretical and 
practical elements of systemic incident analysis. This new method explicitly relates the 
abstract theory of the chosen method to its concrete practice during incident 
investigation. It is called the Systematic Reanalysis Method.  
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The next section discusses the notion of constraint and affordance of theories of 
systemic incident analysis when used in practice. This forms the theoretical basis of 
the Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
6.2   Understanding systemic incident analysis methods in terms of 
their methodological constraints and methodological affordances 
Many kinds of contextual factors, such as psychological, group-based, and 
organisational ones, could potentially shape the behaviour of participants of the 
systems under investigation (e.g., see Reason 1990, Johnson 2003a). Many of these 
factors may also shape incident analysis process, since incident investigators are also 
participants of the systems they investigate (cf. Drupsteen and Hasle 2014). Like the 
participants of the systems investigated, investigators are also fallible. In attempting 
understanding of a new incident situation for example, it is possible that an 
investigator may not representatively recall the most relevant past incidents and factors 
worth reconsidering for the current situation (cf. Kahneman 2003). 
Given the intimate interrelation between investigative process and the object of 
incident investigation, it is natural to inquire about the extent to which particular 
aspects of incident investigation are attributable to a particular systemic incident 
analysis method. To start clarify the relationship between a particular method and its 
notional effects and outputs, we need a general way of explicitly discussing how the 
theoretical abstractions of the method (e.g., as embodied through Canadian Patient 
Safety Institute et al. (2012)) relates to its actual practice as part of real incident 
investigation. In this and the next chapter, we will use the term ‘manual’ to refer to the 
tangible guidance for the systemic incident analysis method. The Canadian Patient 
Safety Institute et al. (2012), and Hollnagel (2012), are both concrete examples of such 
guidance. 
The notion of constraint has been previously utilised by Nancy Leveson, in the form 
of safety-constraints imposed by systems of socio-technical control (cf. Section 2.3.3, 
Leveson 2011). The Systematic Reanalysis Method we develop in this chapter 
provides a way to consider the specific constraints methods impose on investigation 
process, and how they consequently limit investigative behaviour (to reduce the degree 
of behavioural freedom that may otherwise have been possible). These limiting aspects 
are referred to as the methodological constraints of a particular method. 
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The converse of such constraints on investigation methodology, are the behaviours 
actively encouraged by a systemic incident analysis method. These are referred to as 
its methodological affordances. The notion of affordance refers to a set of perceived 
or actual action possibilities predicated on a particular environment, situation, or 
artefact (cf. McGrenere and Ho 2000). Here, we consider the affordance of systemic 
incident analysis methods and their manuals. In particular, a Systematic Reanalysis 
Method analysis considers which investigative actions and findings are explicitly or 
implicitly encouraged by a systemic incident analysis method.  
Figure 6.1 presents the workflow in using the Systematic Reanalysis Method. As is 
common in qualitative data analysis, these steps in practice are unlikely to be quite as 
linear as suggested by the figure. 
 
Figure 6.1: The workflow in moving between different parts of doing a Systematic 
Reanalysis Method analysis.  
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6.3   Step 1: Provisionally challenging the method and findings of an 
incident analysis  
The Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst starts by critically inspecting and 
comparing the actions and findings from an actual incident investigation against the 
guidance for the chosen method. While inspecting the record of the investigation 
enacted, the analyst challenges the validity of the enacted investigative actions and 
findings, provisionally. Potential methodological criticisms are raised, based on 
closely reading of the account of the incident investigation. Such criticisms are 
contingent on later confirmation, refutation, and/or elaboration, as part of the ongoing 
systematic reanalysis. These critiques may relate to the validity of both: 
1) the investigative procedure followed, and/or 
2) the validity of particular investigative findings obtained.  
The analyst’s preferred means of recording and notation should be used at this initial 
stage. The critical challenges raised by a Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst may 
be about ‘omissions’ during investigation (i.e., actions that were not done, and/or 
things that were not found). These challenges may also be about various ‘commissions’ 
(i.e., things that were done/found). A challenge to the method of investigative analysis 
is ‘action-based’ – regarding the particular part(s) of a manual used to support the 
incident investigation for example. An example of a ‘finding-based’ challenge may be 
about the type of investigative findings actually obtained through utilising the chosen 
method of investigative analysis. 
6.4   Step 2: Normalising the challenges identified into standard forms 
of provisional critique 
After identifying an initial set of methodological criticisms, the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method analyst reviews and rephrases each of them, to fit with one of the three 
standard phrase templates presented below: 
1 “The investigative choice(s) <?> was/were invalid ”, or 
2 “The investigative finding(s) obtained <?> was/were invalid ”, or 
3 “The investigative choice(s)/finding(s)-obtained <?> was/were invalid”. 
The third template is for when a particular part seems to relate to both the method of 
investigation and the investigative finding(s). <?> denotes where a rephrased 
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methodological criticism should be inserted, to fit within each of these templates. 
These three phrase templates are intended to normalise the critiques generated initially, 
in preparation for subsequent comparative analysis (described in the next section). A 
concrete illustration for the second phrase template could be: “The investigative 
findings obtained <of five findings per ‘cause category’> was invalid”. If such a 
provisional challenge holds, based on closer inspection of the account of the incident 
investigation and its chosen manual, then ‘more valid’ courses of investigation could 
have been taken with respect to the chosen method. 
The three phrase templates above are intended as a focusing device for the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method analyst – to clarify the specific nature and scope of each criticism 
raised. In these templates we refer to investigative actions only indirectly, through the 
particular choices made in incident investigation (for example regarding the kind of 
incident data to collect). This was a deliberate design choice for the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method, because the appropriate level of granularity for examining 
investigative actions is not obvious. These ‘choice points’ are where the incident 
investigation could potentially have taken a substantively different course. These 
choices are also arguably more important to examine than the consequent investigative 
actions, for the purposes of enriching our understanding of how methods are applied 
during incident investigation.  
6.5   Step 3: Explicitly identifying the relationship between a systemic 
incident analysis method and its practical application 
The Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst has by this point decided on a specific set 
of methodological criticisms, to be assessed explicitly against the chosen manual. The 
analyst has also determined the order in which these criticisms will be compared 
against the manual in turn (e.g., through the optional steps presented in the next 
section). The account of the investigation is now compared explicitly, against the 
chosen manual; in order to systematically understand the validity of the investigation 
done with respect to the chosen method. Analytical understanding of the chosen 
method is thus gained, and expressed in terms of the methodological affordances and 
methodological constraints of the manual. 
Concretely, the actual investigative choices and findings encapsulated within each of 
the critiques raised may be resolved into one of three mutually-exclusive possibilities: 
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as constrained, strongly afforded, or weakly afforded by the manual. This is done 
using the three definitions below: 
 The constrained choices or findings are those where the investigation is 
unambiguously contradicted by the manual. This is where the manual does 
not offer methodological support for, but only explicitly against the 
investigation as done. 
 The strongly afforded choices or findings correspond to the converse 
situation, where the chosen manual only offers support explicitly for the 
investigation as done. When a strongly afforded analytical assignment is 
made, the particular criticism initially raised is judged to be an invalid 
critique, based on detailed examination of the manual used. 
 Finally, the weakly afforded choices or findings correspond to the 
situation where the manual used apparently offers contradictory, 
underspecified, or otherwise ambiguous guidance. These highlight parts of 
the manual where users are less likely to be able to faithfully follow the 
methodology prescribed. 
Due to potential ambiguity in understanding what ought to be done according 
to the chosen method, the weakly afforded areas of a manual are less likely 
to be dominant, in shaping the development of an incident investigation. 
These weakly afforded areas also partly contradict the normalising and 
standardising role of systemic incident analysis methods, in a sense. In the 
face of unintended methodological ambiguity, more ad hoc investigative 
solutions may necessarily dynamically develop for the investigators, as they 
fall back to operating at a more knowledge-based level (Rasmussen 1983). 
They may intuitively resort only to more familiar strategies and operations (cf. 
Rasmussen and Jensen 1974), with little tendency to pause, backtrack, or 
develop alternative or parallel paths of reasoning. Such unpredictable 
investigative solutions could sometimes conflict, with the more idealised aims 
of the chosen method (cf. Lundberg et al. 2010, Tamuz et al. 2011). These 
points of weak affordance may only minimally influence the actual course of 
the investigation, and also indirectly enable a stronger impact from the many 
other contextual factors shaping its course. 
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We need to note a caveat about these points of weak affordance however. Since 
systemic incident analysis methods are designed for use as part of contingent practice 
situations (e.g., incident investigation), intentional underspecification in describing 
and presenting the method is often necessary and helpful. This underspecification 
serves to maintain a usable degree of flexibility of method. Like any ‘rules’ for people 
to follow, the normative guidance of manuals may sometimes be followed in practice 
only partially for good reasons (cf. Rasmussen 1997, Leveson 2011, Hale and Borys 
2013); due to limitations of time, resource, and knowledge for example. Forms of 
ambiguity of methodology relating to contradiction seem less desirable, however. 
Figure 6.2 complements the current text: to visually depict how notions of constraint 
and affordance are extended to analysis of investigative methodology, as part of the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method. It illustrates the extent to which parts of actual, and 
potential investigations are classified as supported by a particular method. Light-grey 
arrows indicate hypothetical courses of investigation which may in principle have been 
taken using the chosen method, but were not taken in the case of the actual 
investigation. 
 
Figure 6.2: A visual depiction of how actual and potential courses of investigation 
may be strongly afforded, or constrained by a particular method. The weakly 
afforded parts are the various other potential courses of investigation unmarked by 
any box. 
In conducting this part of the systematic reanalysis, the analyst should fully search the 
chosen manual for guidance relevant to the particular criticism under consideration. 
This should be done regardless of the portions of the manual originally used for 
enacting the investigation. In doing this, the systematic reanalyst minimises the 
likelihood of missing relevant guidance distributed throughout the manual, in multiple, 
and possibly non-contiguous places for example. Detailed reasons and discussions 
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should be recorded to support the specific assignments of constraint or affordance 
made at this point. These reasons and discussions should explicitly refer to both the 
chosen manual, as well as parts from the account of incident investigation using the 
manual. 
6.6   Optional steps for data reduction 
Data reduction is an integral part of qualitative data analysis (Miles and Huberman 
1994). This refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and 
transformation of the original data (in the form of field notes, transcriptions etc.). Data 
reduction is not a process separate from that of qualitative data analysis, but a 
transformative process which continues through and after the fieldwork, until a final 
report is completed. Two optional strategies are presented in this section for doing data 
reduction using the Systematic Reanalysis Method. These options are to be considered 
in case of limited time and resources for doing the systematic reanalysis.  
6.6.1  Annotations to support (further) qualitative data reduction 
When resources for supporting the reanalysis are limited, two independent sets of 
annotations may help the analyst further decompose the set of critiques and challenges 
initially identified, to inform which ones to prioritise for further analysis. These 
annotations reduce the set of methodological criticisms into more manageable subsets, 
to enable systematic prioritisation based on the analyst’s particular interests and 
concerns. 
The first set of annotations correspond to the three phrase templates prescribed in 
Section 6.4. The analyst annotates each criticism according to whether it is specifically 
about: 
1 the investigative procedure, 
2 investigative findings,  
3 or potentially relating to both investigative procedure and findings. 
The second set of annotations sort the criticisms identified according to whether they 
seem general or specific. General criticisms could undermine the validity of a 
significant portion of the investigation, if found to be evidenced and sustained by the 
chosen manual. Specific criticisms are ones judged to have only a localised potential 
effect on the validity of the investigation, if found to be evidenced by the manual. The 
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precise point at which a particular criticism becomes general rather than specific is left 
to the discretion of the analyst. A general criticism may be about the data collection 
strategy used throughout an entire incident investigation, for example. 
These two sets of annotations can be utilised independently of each other. The general 
and investigative procedure related critiques might be explored first, for example, as 
they arguably most significantly affect how valid the investigation is with respect to 
the manual. Note that there is no single ‘correct’ way of annotating the various 
methodological criticisms identified. These annotations are intended purely as a means 
for facilitating the comparative reanalysis described in Section 6.5. They are not an 
end in themselves. To be of most practical benefit in saving time, these annotations 
should be done largely prior to doing the comparative reanalysis. 
6.6.2  Simple random sampling of methodological criticisms 
If it is not feasible to exhaustively evaluate every criticism identified, simple pseudo-
random processes may be used to control for potential selection bias on the part of the 
data analyst, whilst reducing the scope of the data analysis. Such pseudo-random 
sampling may be used either in conjunction with the annotations described in Section 
6.6.1, or independently of them. 
6.7   Supplemental step: Resolving vague methodological criticisms 
In utilising the Systematic Reanalysis Method, ambiguities may arise in how to deal 
with methodological criticisms that are too general. For example, a broad and rather 
ambiguous criticism of “The investigative choices made at all steps were invalid”, is a 
coarse-grained and multi-faceted criticism. This kind of critique could be potentially 
confusing to reanalyse directly. The analyst should instead deconstruct and further 
unpack such coarse-grained statements, until the resulting ‘sub-criticisms’ are at a 
level of detail comparable with only a specific part rather than most of the chosen 
manual. To avoid unnecessary confusion, such clarification of criticisms should be 
done prior to proceeding with the main, comparative analysis step detailed earlier in 
Section 6.5. 
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6.8   The stopping criterion for the analysis 
A Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis is finished, once all of the criticisms chosen 
for comparative analysis (Section 6.5) have been assessed in turn. The primary data for 
this consists of both the manual chosen, together with the account of investigation 
enacted using the manual. 
6.9   Summary 
This chapter has motivated and presented the second of the two new methods of 
analysis developed: the Systematic Reanalysis Method. It is a semi-structured 
qualitative research method, developed specifically for analysing the detailed 
relationship between a method in the abstract, and its actual practice as part of real 
investigation. In particular, the comparative analysis of Step 3 (Section 6.5) leads to an 
evidenced, demonstrable assessment, of the extent to which particular parts of an 
investigative enactment can be directly related to the chosen method. 
Sometimes, aspects of an investigation may be due to a priori limitations of the 
context of investigation. These are situations where investigative choices were 
inherently lacking – regardless of the particular method chosen. Such ‘contextually 
limited’ aspects should not be analysed as part of the Systematic Reanalysis Method 
analysis, since the resulting analysis would tell us little about how the chosen method 
effected the course of investigation. 
As systemic incident analysis methods are used more in future, the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method may be useful, as part of broader efforts for bridging the gap 
between systemic incident analysis research theory, and its practice. A crucial point in 
the journey between theory and practice is empirically examined, through analysing 
how a chosen method constrains or affords particular aspects of investigative practice. 
The Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst actively challenges the validity of the 
particular investigative actions taken, and the particular investigative findings 
obtained, as a way to critically examine how the chosen theory of systemic incident 
analysis in fact relates to its attempted practice. 
The ‘Reanalysis’ part of the name emphasises that in principle, the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method can be used to reanalyse existing accounts of how analysis 
methods were used as part of a completed incident investigation, as a form of 
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secondary research. This usage of the Systematic Reanalysis Method is explored in the 
next chapter, as part of the analysis of the move from theory to practice within a small 
scale incident analysis and investigation. The primary account of incident investigation 
is interrogated using the Systematic Reanalysis Method, to start exploring the actual 
implications of the new research method for both the theory and practice of systemic 
incident analysis. 
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Chapter 7 – Exploring the implications of the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method  
 
To investigate the empirical implications of the new research method developed in 
Chapter 6 (Aim B, Objective 5), this chapter: 
 Reports on an initial study of the use of the research method, to analyse how 
systemic incident analysis theory becomes practice in the context of a small 
scale incident investigation 
 Reports on how two researchers conducted independent empirical analyses 
using the new method 
 Explores, illustrates, and discusses the actual implications of the method, for 
generating new knowledge on issues relating to both systemic incident 
analysis theory and practice 
 Generates detailed research results using the new research method, which 
could be used to support both the work of method designers, and 
stakeholders interested in quality assuring the conduct of incident analyses 
7.1   Introduction 
The last chapter developed the Systematic Reanalysis Method, for relating incident 
analysis research theory to its practice. To start exploring the practical consequences of 
this method, it was used to analyse the relationship between: 
 a systemic incident analysis method from research, and  
 its investigative enactment as part of real incident investigation. 
The method chosen was a ‘systemic Root Cause Analysis’ method, similar to those 
reviewed in Chapter 2. Its tangible representation (i.e., the ‘manual’) was the ISMP 
Canada (2006) document. This manual, and the primary account of a real incident 
investigation done using it, together formed the primary data interrogated using the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
A study was conducted, where the author serendipitously needed to investigate a small 
incident situation formally, using a specific, codified incident analysis method. This 
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provided experience of a live, real incident investigation, and the incident situation. 
Here, the safety researcher (i.e., the author) ‘wore the shoes’ of an incident participant 
(cf. Saleh et al. 2010, Saleh and Pendley 2012); the author was also the incident 
investigator here. This experience allowed broader insight into the practical aspects of 
doing real incident investigation. It also supported a high fidelity primary account of 
the incident situation (from one of its participants). 
The current study focuses on exploring the empirical implications of the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method. The focus is therefore not on the underlying incident situation, nor 
even the incident investigation per se. As such, details of both will only be selectively 
referenced in the chapter as needed. It is also worth re-emphasising that a Systematic 
Reanalysis Method analysis does not compare between two or more different methods 
(as in the contributions of Underwood and Waterson (2014) for example). Instead, the 
relationship being empirically examined here is between the abstract theory of a single 
method, and its enactment as part of incident investigation. Here, we explore in detail 
how ISMP Canada (2006) is related, to the incident investigation practice detailed in 
full in Appendix C.1. 
We first briefly overview the incident investigation as done (Section 7.2.1, full details 
in Appendix C.1). Then, we summarise the two independent Systematic Reanalysis 
Method analyses of the incident investigation situation, and the subsequent wrap up 
session based on these analyses (Section 7.2.2). We go on to discuss three different 
knowledge generating roles emerging for the Systematic Reanalysis Method, and also 
present feedback from the independent researcher-analyst who used the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method (Section 7.3). Finally, the main study limitations and conclusions 
are presented (sections 7.4, 7.5). 
7.2   Methods 
7.2.1  Overview of the incident investigation done 
The incident situation investigated occurred on 10
th
 September 2012. I parked my car 
and paid for the parking space, but did not display the proof of purchase for the space. 
As a result I was charged with a Parking Contravention Charge Notice. This notice 
was eventually revoked, after further correspondence with the car park management 
company. 
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To understand and explain this incident through systemic analysis, we investigated the 
situation using the ISMP Canada method (ISMP Canada 2006). This involved 
gathering incident data leading to both an initial and final incident understanding. Both 
these incident understandings were then used to analyse the root causes of the situation. 
This data was derived by personal reflection after the incident, supported by a return 
visit to the site of the incident situation where photographic evidence was also 
collected. The related correspondence with the car park management company formed 
the final part of the evidential basis for the incident investigation. The proximal cause, 
for commencing the analysis of root causes, was the fact that: 
‘the user (A1) of the car park forgot to display the proof of purchase for 
parking after paying for the space’ 
The investigation took just over 45 man-hours, and was completed by the end of the 
27th day after the occurrence of the incident situation. Figure 7.1 shows the final 
investigative hypotheses developed using the ISMP Canada method, about the 
causative factors contributing towards the incident situation.  
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Figure 7.1: Final set of investigative hypotheses about factors contributing to the 
proximal cause (Appendix C.1, Figure 12). Each arrow should be read as ‘caused by’ 
(e.g., A1 did not notice the pay and display signs, ‘caused by’ A1’s rush about the 
parking).  
On completing Figure 7.1, the investigator judged the analysis of the incident situation 
to be both sufficiently accurate and complete. The time spent investigating, and speed 
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of investigative response, were both comparable with contemporary expectations for 
RCA-based patient safety incident investigations (cf. NHS Commissioning Board 
(2013), for instance). Unlike the Serious Untoward Incident investigations discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5, no a priori deadline was imposed on the incident analysis and 
investigation done here. 
A variety of contributing factors were identified through the investigation. The tree of 
root causes developed in Figure 7.1 was delimited by the potential scope of future 
intervention by the incident investigator, as suggested by the ISMP Canada method. In 
particular, contributing factors relating to the management of the car park was deemed 
outside the likely capability of the investigator to intervene on. These kinds of factors 
were explored no further as part of the incident analysis.  
The chronological record of the investigation enacted (Appendix C.1) is comparable 
with the corresponding parts of an independent investigation using the same ISMP 
Canada method in a patient safety context (ISMP Canada 2007). As Hanks et al. 
(2002) points out, such concrete investigations are basically two ‘instances’ of the 
same theoretical guidance. Since the car parking incident situation was not within a 
patient safety context, only the domain-independent aspects of the ISMP Canada 
method were used to support the current incident investigation.  
7.2.2  A summary of the Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses and subsequent 
wrap-up study session 
Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses were independently conducted by two analysts, 
of the same incident analysis and investigation situation. I was analyst A, and lead 
developer of the Systematic Reanalysis Method. Analyst B was another researcher in 
the same department not involved in developing the Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
The same basic Systematic Reanalysis Method procedure (as detailed in Chapter 6) 
was followed in each case. A final joint wrap-up session was then conducted, for the 
two analysts to jointly talk through and agree on their final determinations of the 
constraints and affordances of the ISMP Canada method. This concluding wrap-up 
session was done after each analyst had familiarised themselves with the other’s 
independent analysis. This final part of the study explored the role of the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method in facilitating (possibly adversarial) agreement or disagreement 
between analysts. We briefly summarise these aspects of the study below.  
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First Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis 
Analyst A took around 33 man-hours to analyse the constraints and affordances of the 
ISMP Canada method (using the Systematic Reanalysis Method), with respect to the 
car parking incident investigation. This excluded the time devoted to understanding the 
manual chosen (ISMP Canada 2006), which was done prior to conducting the 
investigation. As developer of the Systematic Reanalysis Method, analyst A 
encountered no problems in applying it. This systematic reanalysis was started around 
one month after the completion of the incident investigation overviewed in Section 
7.2.1. 
Analyst A meaningfully analysed 42 methodological criticisms using the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method. 2 were found to be constrained, 8 strongly afforded, and 32 
weakly afforded by the manual used. A small proportion of other criticisms were 
initially identified by analyst A as not suitable for full comparative analysis (as 
described by Section 6.5). This was because they were: 
 ‘contextually limited’, representing an a priori lack of methodological freedom 
before the investigation even began (cf. Section 6.9), or 
 too vague and broad for useful/practical comparative analysis (see Section 6.7), 
or 
 either subsumed by another critique raised, or duplicating it. 
Second Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis 
As independent analyst, analyst B took around 24½ man-hours to perform his 
systematic reanalysis. This included the time taken for him to understand the ISMP 
Canada (2006) manual, as well as the investigation enacted using it. Both were new to 
analyst B (who was not involved in the investigation or incident situation). This all 
took place substantively after analyst A’s analysis was completed, forming an 
independent replication of the use of the Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
10 methodological criticisms were initially identified by analyst B. All were then 
meaningfully analysed. Analyst B found 8 to be constrained, 1 to be strongly afforded, 
and 1 to be weakly afforded by the manual used. None of these critiques were identical 
to the ones generated by analyst A, though many were closely related. Analyst B chose 
not to do the random sampling step (Section 6.6.2), deeming it unnecessary given the 
relatively small number of criticisms he identified. All other steps of Systematic 
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Reanalysis Method were followed. Some issues related to the usability of the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method were encountered by analyst B (summarised later in 
Section 7.3.4). Analyst B limited his challenges and critiques to the non-healthcare-
specific aspects of the ISMP Canada method. 
The wrap-up session 
A wrap-up session was conducted after the two independent systematic reanalyses. 
This session lasted just under 1 hour. It was used to discuss and agree on the final joint 
assignments regarding the constraints and affordances of the ISMP Canada method. 
The main outcomes of the session are described as part of Appendix C.2. The 
discussions focused on talking through all of the stronger claims of each independent 
data analysis. These claims were the investigative choices and investigative findings 
independently coded as either strongly afforded, or constrained. The two analysts 
talked through their independent findings in turn, clarifying where necessary; and 
jointly discussed whether any of their original claims ought to be changed. 
Due to the very explicit nature of the Systematic Reanalysis Method, both analysts 
agreed that it was unnecessary to go through their weakly afforded assignments. If one 
analyst had already identified such an ambiguously relationship between the chosen 
manual and the incident investigation, this was considered to be enough. These 
originally weakly afforded assessments were already based on close reading of the 
manual. They were therefore unlikely to be transformed into a more definitive 
assessment: of either strongly afforded or constrained by the manual. 
The certainty of some of the initial assessment of affordance and constraint were 
reduced at this point in the overall process: from the stronger assignments of 
constrained or strongly afforded, to a more ambiguous categorisation of weakly 
afforded by the manual embodying the method. One critique was also reassigned from 
constrained, to the converse category of strongly afforded by the manual; this 
particular critique is discussed later as part of Section 7.3.3. 
7.3   Findings and discussions 
Three different roles emerged for the Systematic Reanalysis Method from the study; as 
a means to generate knowledge to: 
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1. help understand where an investigation may be improved with respect to 
the chosen method (Section 7.3.1); 
2. help locate areas of potential ambiguity in the manual used (Section 7.3.2); 
3. increase our confidence in attributing particular investigative enactments 
(including findings) to the chosen method (Section 7.3.3). 
We discuss and illustrate each of these roles in turn, using concrete examples drawn 
from the Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses and wrap-up session. We refer to the 
individual challenges (to investigative method or findings) using the same references 
as given in Huang and Hough et al. (2013c) and Appendix C.2. In the following, 
notation such as {AC1} and {BC1} is used to refer to specific critiques. Critiques 
prefixed with ‘AC’ are ones originally raised by analyst A; similarly, ones prefixed 
with ‘BC’ are ones raised originally by analyst B. 
The walkthroughs of the following sections serve to illustrate the concrete application 
of the Systematic Reanalysis Method by independent analysts. They also demonstrate 
some of the concrete outcomes and implications following from using the method. In 
the following, M, F, G and S denote the investigative Method/procedure, investigative 
Findings, and the General and Specific annotations (cf. Section 6.6.1). ‘Subcriticisms’ 
refined from initially vague critiques (cf. Section 6.7) are indicated by using a decimal 
point, as in {AC1.1} for example. In Section 7.3.1, we start by explicitly referring back 
to particular parts of the Systematic Reanalysis Method presentation (Chapter 6) as we 
go. We then proceed similarly for sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, but omit similar such 
explicit referencing back to Chapter 6 for succinctness. 
7.3.1  Understanding where investigation may be improved  
The use of the Systematic Reanalysis Method helped to uncover areas of possible 
contention in the validity of the investigation done, with respect to the chosen method. 
In particular, the analysis highlighted areas where the chosen method may be 
inadequately followed (i.e., an investigative choice or finding found to be constrained). 
The argument here is that if one person strongly doubts the validity of part of the 
investigation – based on careful and close scrutiny of the chosen method – other 
investigation stakeholders could reasonably have similar doubts. 
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In contrast, the strongly afforded and weakly afforded assignments (of the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method) effectively refer to where the practice is found to be of adequate 
validity – with respect to the particular manual used. 
In an on-going investigation, it may be sensible to improve the credibility of the 
investigative process, by addressing the issues raised by these constrained aspects 
where possible. In the final wrap-up session, we explicitly discussed each of the 
constrained part of the investigation with potential improvements in mind. Our 
discussions identified how the investigation could be further improved, with respect to 
the manual used and within the practicalities of the particular investigative situation. 
Without the detailed and evidenced approach of the Systematic Reanalysis Method, 
contentions about the validity of investigation practice may have been reduced to less 
demonstrable differences in opinion in the wrap-up session. Unsubstantiated 
differences in opinion can be difficult to resolve, especially given the diverse 
perceptions of the nature, role, and purposes of incident investigation (cf. Stoop and 
Roed-Larsen 2009, Roed-Larsen and Stoop 2012, and also the various practical 
challenges identified as part of Section 5.4). The Systematic Reanalysis Method is not 
intended to be a tool for deriving ‘objective knowledge’. In comparison with a simple 
eyeball assessment however, it offers an evidence-based alternative for assessing and 
improving the validity of an investigation according to its chosen method(s). 
A concrete example relates to the part of the investigation described in {AC46}. This 
criticism was initially identified by analyst A, from reading a part of the account of the 
investigation which stated: 
“Information from Figures 8 and 9 were not included in the consolidated 
‘causal-tree’ ” [Appendix C.1, a-38] 
These two figures show two sub-branches of the developing root cause tree, which 
were ‘accidentally discovered’ as part of the investigation. These sub-branches 
explored why the signage used in the car park was perceived to be confusing and hard 
to see (Appendix C.1, Figure 8), and why the ‘conditions and terms’ for using the car 
park was dense and hard to see for the user (Appendix C.1, Figure 9). These are 
reproduced in figures 7.2 and 7.3: 
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Figure 7.2: Reasons for confusing and hard to see signage. 
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Figure 7.3: Reasons for dense and hard to see conditions and terms. 
In particular, analyst A wanted to know whether such ‘additional sub-branches’ ought 
to have been included in the overall root cause tree or not. This overall root cause tree 
(Figure 7.1) was a kind of compilation tree – which brought together multiple ‘sub-
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branches’ of a similar form to those shown in Figures 7.2 and 7.3. The initial freely 
constructed critique (Section 6.3) was therefore the following: 
“Should incidental findings be included in the consolidated ‘final’ tree?” 
This led to the following ‘normalised’ critique (using the templates from Section 6.4): 
The investigative choice of not including the ‘accidental’ investigative 
findings as either ‘incidental findings’, or as part of the consolidated overall 
causal understanding of the incident was invalid. 
(bold highlights denote the generic phrase templates) 
Analyst A found this critique to be about investigative procedure, potentially affecting 
the validity of a relatively small part of the incident investigation. It was therefore 
annotated with M and S (Method/procedure, Specific), to denote these analyst 
judgements (Section 6.6.1). 
After comparing against the entirety of the chosen manual (Section 6.5), analyst A was 
unable to find clear guidance on how to distinguish between ‘direct causes’ or 
‘incidental’ ones. A single place in the manual suggested that any issues of relevance 
ought to be documented for facilitating later response. Analyst A took a broadly 
inclusive interpretation of this guidance, finding that the investigative choice – of not 
intending to include the ‘accidental investigative findings’ shown in Figures 7.2 and 
7.3 – was constrained by the manual used. According to the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method definitions, such constrained choices/findings are those where the 
investigation enacted is unambiguously contradicted by the manual (Section 6.5). This 
implied that the ‘accidental’ findings shown in figures 7.2 and 7.3 ought to be included, 
as part of the final tree of causes identified during the investigation (Figure 7.1). 
Through the joint wrap-up session, both Systematic Reanalysis Method analysts 
agreed that it would be sensible to include all investigative findings as a minimum – at 
least as part of the ‘incidental findings’ part of the formal reporting of an investigation 
using the ISMP Canada method. 
Another example from analyst B was {BC1}. This critique was initially identified by 
noting that the investigation did not apparently use, or attempt to adapt, the initial 
decision tree presented in the manual (Figure 7.4). The initial freely constructed 
criticism (Section 6.3) was about why such a decision tree was not used to check the 
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broad applicability of the ISMP Canada method, to the incident situation investigated 
in this study. 
 
Figure 7.4: Incident decision tree. Reproduced from ISMP Canada (2006, Figure 2) 
with permission. 
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This led to the following ‘normalised’ critique, using the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method phrase templates (Section 6.4): 
The investigative choice of not including a proper justification for the use of 
RCA, for example through the decision tree method, was invalid. 
(here RCA refers to the ISMP Canada method) 
Analyst B found this critique to be about investigative procedure. The decision tree in 
Figure 7.4 ought to have been used early on, if at all, in the course of doing the 
incident investigation. This decision tree helps the ISMP Canada method user to 
decide whether ‘systemic Root Cause Analysis’ should be conducted at all (i.e., the 
‘System failure – review system’ box/decision-path shown on the right hand side of 
Figure 7.4). The investigative choice to not to have used it therefore potentially affects 
the fundamental validity of the entire incident investigation. This criticism was 
therefore annotated with M and G (Method/procedure, General; as detailed in Section 
6.6.1). 
After comparison against the entirety of the manual used (Section 6.5), analyst B 
found that at the very least, an equivalent decision tree could be adapted for the current 
incident investigation, with relatively few problems. He therefore concluded that the 
particular choice made in this particular investigation – to not properly justify using 
the ISMP Canada method for the incident investigation – was constrained by the 
ISMP Canada method (i.e., ‘restricted’ by the manual). Through the joint wrap-up 
session, both analysts agreed that it would be sensible to revisit the decision tree 
shown in Figure 7.4 (which is part of the ISMP Canada method). This would provide a 
retrospective sanity check of whether the chosen method was indeed sufficiently 
applicable for use in the current incident investigation (with obvious caveats relating to 
the minor medical-specific aspects of the decision tree). 
By the end of the wrap-up session, few parts of the incident investigation remained as 
constrained by the ISMP Canada method. Other examples included the fact that no 
‘incidental findings’ were found {AC43}, the emphasis on attributing blame 
predominantly to the equipment involved in the parking system {BC5}, and the fact 
that not all participants were interviewed {BC6}. In the role of incident investigator, 
analyst A had endeavoured to faithfully enact the domain-independent parts of the 
ISMP Canada method; for example through doing an equivalent ‘car-parking’ 
literature search to inform the incident analysis and investigation (Appendix C.1, 
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Section 2.4). Such efforts may in part explain the relatively small number of 
constrained parts of the investigation remaining (2 identified by analyst A; 3 identified 
by analyst B), as well as the relatively few critiques independently identified by 
analyst B in total (n=10). 
Each part of the investigation found to be constrained by the ISMP Canada method 
could be improved upon in principle. In helping to demonstrate how each of these 
parts were constrained by the chosen method, the Systematic Reanalysis Method has 
helped to identify specific areas in which the adequacy of investigation may be further 
strengthened.  
7.3.2  Locating potential ambiguity in investigative method 
The Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses also highlighted places where the ISMP 
Canada manual potentially offers ambiguous guidance for supporting incident 
investigation. Each weakly afforded investigative choice or finding exemplifies such a 
situation. This is in contrast to where particular choices or findings were found to be 
constrained or strongly afforded by the manual, indicating where the investigative 
guidance was interpretable with more certainty. 
The Systematic Reanalysis Method assumes that if an individual analyst finds the 
guidance of a method somewhat unclear (based on careful systematic examination and 
consideration of its manual), then others attempting to practise the same method could 
encounter similar interpretative difficulties. In the nascent area of patient safety (Jorm 
and White 2009, Wachter 2010), the kind of interpretative ambiguities we go on to 
discuss below may be plausibly encountered by practicing investigators; some of 
whom may be novices in operationalising RCA based ideas. Given that patient safety 
investigators may sometimes operate largely alone (Clinical Human Factors Group 
2012), they may not have ready access to ‘method experts’ to clarify ambiguities in the 
method presentation and description. Each area of interpretative ambiguity identified 
through systematic reanalysis may be jointly discussed in principle – between the 
designers of the ISMP Canada method, and its potential users (e.g., patient safety 
incident investigators, incident analysis researchers, incident investigation researchers 
etc.). This may aid in improving the communicational functionality of the method’s 
manual (e.g., ISMP Canada 2006). Such discussions may also help to determine the 
extent to which the kinds of interpretative ambiguities we go on to discuss do in fact 
need to be addressed (or not), and if so how this may best be done. 
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Interpretative ambiguities around the literature reviewing part of incident 
investigation 
Through Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis, we identified potential ambiguities 
around the suggested nature, scoping, and usage of the ‘RCA literature review’. This 
review is of literature relating to the incident being investigated, and has some broad 
similarities to the underlying rationale for narrative literature reviews like the one 
presented in Chapter 2. Like the narrative literature review, the nature and extent of 
this ‘incident literature review’ – done as part of an incident investigation – may 
significantly contribute towards what investigation findings are obtained. Depending 
on the actual nature of the review conducted, investigators may be sensitised in 
different ways, and possibly identify different contributory factors as part of their 
subsequent analysis. It is therefore important that there is clarity around the guidance 
for this part of the ISMP Canada method. 
An example from the Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses relates to appropriate 
time-frames for conducting such literature reviews {AC26}. This criticism was 
initially identified by noting the half-day or so spent on this part of the incident 
investigation. 
The initial freely constructed criticism led to the following ‘normalised’ critique: 
The investigative choice of spending only half a day or so on the literature 
search part of the investigation was invalid. 
This critique was found by the Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst to be about the 
investigative procedure, and of only minor potential effect on the validity of the 
investigation as done. This choice was therefore annotated with M and S 
(Method/procedure, Specific). 
After comparing against the entirety of the manual used, the analyst found that there 
was no guidance about expected timeframes. A uniform time-frame for this kind of 
context-specific review is perhaps unreasonable to expect as part of method design. 
However, the lack of any guidance about possible time-frames could leave an 
investigator trying to follow the manual very unsure about the adequacy of this part of 
their investigation. The analyst therefore judged this investigative choice to be weakly 
afforded by the manual used, due to underspecification by the ISMP Canada method. 
Additional related examples around reviewing the literature during ‘systemic RCA’ 
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may be found in Appendix C.2 (see {AC22, AC23, AC25, AC26, AC27, AC30, 
BC7}). 
 
Interpretative ambiguities around growing the tree of causes 
In principle, the generation and exploration of the ‘root causes tree’ (e.g., Figure 7.1, 
7.2) is a core part of RCA based incident investigation. However, our reanalysis 
identified considerable potential ambiguities, around both how this tree ought to be 
grown, and how it ought to be bounded (using the ISMP Canada method). We discuss 
an example of ambiguity in guiding the growth of this tree here; and then discuss an 
example of ambiguity in the bounding of such trees next. 
The first example relates to understanding the validity of having sub-branches of a 
root-cause tree with only ‘1 member’ {AC47}. The nature of these sub-branches may 
have a significant impact on the particular findings of an investigation, and the 
subsequent responses. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 provide examples of this ‘1 member’ 
situation. For Figure 7.2, the “A1 wasn’t familiar with this carpark” cause is the only 
member of the Human factors (training) sub-branch. By contrast, the 
Environment/equipment sub-branch in Figure 7.2 has 4 members. For the ISMP 
Canada method, six major ‘triggering categories’ are proposed for supporting the 
causal analysis. These are the six shown in both Figure 7.2 and Figure 7.3. This led to 
the following normalised critique being proposed: 
The investigative findings obtained of having no more than one 
contributing factor in each triggering category (for some steps of the RCA) 
were invalid. 
The analyst found this critique to be of only minor effect on the potential validity of 
the investigation enacted, and annotated it with F and S (Findings, Specific). 
After comparing against the entirety of the manual used, the analyst found no guidance 
about the number of such sub-branches to expect, in developing the contributory 
causes. Relatedly, the manual also gave no indication of whether finding no 
contributory factors in a triggering category is valid. The underspecification of the 
chosen method observed here, again, may leave its user unsure about the adequacy of 
the causal inference part of their investigation. Based on Systematic Reanalysis 
Method analysis, the analyst judged the ‘1 member’ type of investigative findings to be 
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weakly afforded by the manual. Additional related examples around the growing of a 
root cause tree may be found in Appendix C.2 ({AC32, AC33.1, AC34, AC37, AC39, 
AC40, AC47, AC48}). 
 
Interpretative ambiguities around bounding the tree of causes 
Ambiguity was also found in the means of bounding the development of the ‘root 
causes tree’. This relates to the general, and practical issue of ‘stopping-rules’ in 
designing methods for investigative analysis. 
{AC42} provides an example, about whether an investigator ought to stop further 
exploration of contributory factors when a stopping rule was perceived to be fulfilled. 
The initial criticism led to the following ‘normalised’ critique: 
The investigative choice to assume that the ‘correct’ RCA-based procedure 
was to curtail investigation of ‘more-latent’ causes as soon as a stopping 
rule is satisfied was invalid. 
The analyst found this criticism to be about investigative procedure, and of potentially 
significant effect on the validity of the investigation. It was therefore annotated with M 
and G (Method/procedure, General). 
3 parts of the ISMP Canada method were found to be interpretable as operational 
‘stopping rules’ – to guide the growth and bounding of a tree of causes: 
1. The first rule is based on a simple heuristic estimate of the likely 
recurrence of similar incidents after intervening on a candidate ‘root cause’ 
factor (Figure 7.5). 
2. The second rule consists of a set of three criteria (ISMP Canada 2006, 
p27), about: 
a. whether the investigator(s) have any more questions, or 
b. whether there is no more incident knowledge, or  
c. whether the issues raised are perceived to be beyond the scope of 
the incident investigation. 
3. The third rule is a simple heuristic based on substantive team consensus 
and agreement (ISMP Canada 2006, p28). 
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Figure 7.5: A simple heuristic estimate of the likely recurrence of similar incidents. 
Graphic reproduced from ISMP Canada (2006, Figure 7) with permission. 
Such rules seem reasonable. They are however subject to a wide range of reasonable 
interpretations. This embedded source of subjectivity, in method design, may partially 
explain why such ‘causal chain’ aspects are perceived by some safety researchers as 
too arbitrary and subjective (e.g., Leveson 2011). The reanalysis found no clear 
guidance for prioritising between these stopping rules, and whether these rules are 
globally applicable throughout the whole process of growing of the tree of causes. 
Both were quite practical concerns during the incident investigation done, having a 
concrete impact on the extent, and nature of the investigative analysis. The third 
stopping rule – of substantive team consensus – may also be difficult to simultaneously 
satisfy alongside the others; for example if potential disagreements arise about the 
extent to which the first or second stopping rules are satisfied. The investigative choice 
to curtail investigation into ‘more-latent’ causes, as soon as a stopping rule is satisfied, 
was found to be weakly afforded by the chosen manual. 
Here, the Systematic Reanalysis Method helped to elucidate aspects of the charge of 
‘subjectivity’ claimed by researchers such as Leveson (2004). Through semi-structured 
analysis, the new method has facilitated deeper insight into the where’s and how’s of 
such potential subjectivity. Like Johnson et al. (2012), we do not regard this 
subjectivity as either inherently ‘good’ or ‘bad’, since analysis methods must be used 
by ‘subjects’ to have any value at all (e.g., incident analysts from diverse academic or 
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practitioner backgrounds). The suggestion here is that the nature and extent of the 
interpretative subjectivity inherent to incident analysis methods and process should be 
ideally at the level, and specific places intended by the method designers. Additional 
related examples around the bounding of a tree of causes may be found in Appendix 
C.2 ({AC33.2, AC33.3, AC36, AC42}). 
7.3.3  Warranting the link between the chosen method and actual investigation 
A third role for the Systematic Reanalysis Method relates to the scientific assessment 
of incident analysis methods. Their assessment and evaluation is often done through 
comparative discussion, drawing on the outputs obtained using them (e.g., Herrera and 
Woltjer 2010, Salmon et al. 2012). However, an issue not yet explicitly tackled is that 
of attribution. This concerns understanding and demonstrating the extent to which 
actual investigative actions or findings are in fact attributable to the method.  
The Systematic Reanalysis Method was originally developed as a means to generate 
explicit warrants – to evidence the connection between the theory of the method (such 
as ISMP Canada (2006)) and its attempted practice (e.g., Appendix C.1). The 
Systematic Reanalysis Method does not provide a conclusive solution; but it can 
increase or decrease our confidence in the nature, and degree of attribution warranted – 
between the theory of the method and its practice. The rest of this section aims to show 
that it is possible to demonstrate the attribution of particular parts of incident 
investigation to the chosen method – using the Systematic Reanalysis Method. Ideally 
this will be done in an incrementally more objective way, as we go on to explain. 
Through repeated examination, assessment, and critical discussion using the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method, we can come to an increasingly more objective 
understanding of which parts of the investigation are strongly afforded by the method 
being scrutinised. This generates detailed understanding of where a method can 
provide strong encouragement for particular investigative actions or findings. Each of 
the strongly afforded judgements represent an evidenced empirical attribution: from 
the theoretical abstractions of a method, to its practical enactment. Repeated such 
grounded judgements increase our confidence in the intersubjective validity of findings 
from the qualitative data analysis. This is similar to the rationale underlying the valid 
analysis of qualitative data from Anderson et al. (2013), or Kitson et al. (2013), for 
example.  
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Like other qualitative data analysis methods (e.g., Braun and Clarke (2006)), the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method provides a focused instrument for priming the 
intersubjective reasoning and sense-making process of the data analysts. In the case of 
the current study, the systematic reanalyses helped to structure the initial challenges 
made of an incident investigation as done (Section 6.4). It also encouraged detailed 
comparative analysis: between the primary evidence of the manual and its attempted 
practice. When independent systematic reanalysts keep giving the same strongly 
afforded assignments, the corresponding part of the investigation being scrutinised is 
shown to be strongly attributed to the chosen method. Each ‘repeated’ analysis will 
extend and refine the existing body of reasoned insight into the same primary data set. 
For the Systematic Reanalysis Method, the body of analytical knowledge generated is 
in the form of all of the prior reanalyses done, together with outcomes from any critical 
discussion between the independent reanalysts (as shown in Appendix C.2 for 
example). 
In our study, the two independent reanalyses (by analyst A and B) start to build up this 
body of analytical knowledge. To increase or decrease our confidence in the nature, 
and degree of attribution warranted between: 
 the particular theory of method embodied by ISMP Canada (2006),  
 and its enactment as part of actual investigation practice (e.g., Appendix 
C.1). 
An example that illustrates how the Systematic Reanalysis Method can be 
constructively used in this kind of intersubjective role is from analyst B {BC9}. The 
original critique noted the lack of an entry in the ‘failed barriers’ triggering category, 
as part of the investigative hypotheses developed initially (see Figure 7.6). Here, the 
incident investigator did not come up with any safety barriers that failed, when perhaps 
the chosen method required this. Analyst B challenged this situation, with the 
following normalised critique (simplified here): 
The investigative choice of not positing any possible failures of safety 
barriers in the cause diagram was invalid. 
Analyst B found this critique to be about the investigative procedure, and potentially 
affecting the validity of a relatively small part of the incident investigation. It was 
therefore annotated with M and S (Method/procedure, Specific). 
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Figure 7.6: An Ishikawa diagram overview of the initial ‘major causes’ identified from 
the investigative analysis (Appendix C.1, Figure 3). The safety barriers analyst B is 
referring to is the ‘(Failed) barriers’ heading in the figure. 
After careful scrutiny, analyst B found an explanatory example from the manual 
demonstrating the concrete use of this ‘failed barriers’ category, in the form of ISMP 
Canada (2006, Figure 8). Based on this supporting evidence, the analyst identified the 
investigative choice – of not initially positing any possible failures of safety barriers – 
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to be constrained by the manual used. This suggested that this part of the causal 
analysis should be improved upon. 
As part of the discussions during the joint wrap-up session, analyst A pointed out that 
this ‘failed barrier’ category had in fact been used in developing some of the 
investigative hypotheses developed here. Upon further discussion and consideration, 
alongside explicit references back to the manual used, both the analysts found the idea 
of such ‘safety barriers’ to be only vaguely defined by the manual used. This led to a 
revised assessment of the part of the incident investigation being scrutinised. Both 
analysts agreed that the assessment regarding this part of the investigation should be 
revised: as strongly afforded by ISMP Canada (2006) instead. 
In the example above, analyst B’s initial judgement was subsequently revised, as part 
of the formation of inter-analyst judgement and consensus. In such a fashion, the 
various final assessments by the end of the wrap-up session are arguably more 
objective, than either of the independent analytical judgements made initially by each 
analyst. In this particular case, the two analysts came to a joint conclusion. The joint 
conclusion was that the lack of safety barriers in one part of the causal analysis (Figure 
7.6) was perhaps more reflective of the nature of the ‘system’ under investigation; and 
did not reflect a clear flaw in enacting the chosen method. Here, the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method supported a process of intersubjective reasoning, sense-making, 
and reflection; to enable a more considered, complete, and revised state of analytical 
understanding upon the completion of the wrap-up discussions. 
Many other parts of the incident investigation were also found to be strongly afforded 
by the ISMP Canada method, by both Systematic Reanalysis Method analysts. These 
investigative choices and findings include:  
 basing the core steps of the investigation primarily on a limited section of the 
manual {AC3}; 
 using a flow-diagram and a supporting narrative for forming and 
consolidating the initial understanding of the incident {AC13}; 
 using ‘call-out’ boxes in the ‘final understanding’ flow-diagram identified 
during the investigation {AC28.1}; 
 using the Ishikawa diagram to represent the causal relations in the analysis 
(e.g., Figure 7.6), rather than an alternative tree-format suggested as part of 
the ISMP Canada method {AC31}; 
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 interpreting the second of the three stopping rules discussed earlier in 
Section 7.3.2 as an inclusive-OR {AC35};  
 using only photographic and documentary evidence to support the 
investigation {AC49}; and 
 finding one of the principal causes of the incident as being beyond the scope 
of the analysis/investigation enacted (i.e., not further analysing the 
“confusing and hard to see signage” sub-branch shown in Figure 7.6) 
{BC10}.  
Analyses using the Systematic Reanalysis Method identified all of these parts of the 
investigation to be strongly attributable to the chosen ISMP Canada method (i.e., 
strongly afforded by it). Together with the other two assessments of constrained and 
weak afforded by the chosen method (Section 6.5), we have shown how the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method can provide a way to explicitly warrant the link 
between the chosen method and its practice in actual investigation.  
7.3.4  Initial feedback on the usability of the Systematic Reanalysis Method 
Analyst B was a new user of the Systematic Reanalysis Method, but was not involved 
in its creation. He was therefore able to provide informal feedback on its usability, 
from an independent perspective. 
He found its pipelined and systematic approach relatively easy to follow, and helpful 
for supporting a gradually deeper and thorough understanding of the chosen manual. 
He also found this research method helpful, in showing how the investigation may 
have diverged ‘outside’ the space of methodological constraints described by the 
manual. In particular, both the distinction between the procedure and outputs of 
investigation (e.g., Section 6.3), and the suggested demarcation between the general 
and specific methodological criticisms (Section 6.6.1) were found to be easy and clear 
to use. 
Some difficulties were caused by the ‘double-negative’ aspect of the initial Systematic 
Reanalysis Method presentation however, since it applies the notions of constraint 
and affordance to the part of the investigation being critiqued, not to the 
methodological criticism itself (encapsulating the investigative choices or findings 
being critiqued). This issue has since being acted upon, as part of the minor update of 
the Systematic Reanalysis Method presented in Chapter 6. 
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Analyst B also suggested the inclusion of illustrative examples, to help improve the 
clarity of presentation of the Systematic Reanalysis Method. Examples were also 
suggested as potentially helpful, to further highlight the fact that criticisms about both 
‘investigative commissions’ (things that were done/found), and ‘investigative 
omissions’ (things not done/found) are equally valid aspects to challenge for a 
Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst. This suggested clarification has since been 
incorporated, to further clarify the presentation of the Systematic Reanalysis Method in 
Chapter 6 (see Section 6.3). The current study generated many concrete examples for 
illustrative and explanatory purposes, whose full details can be found in Huang and 
Hough et al. (2013c).  
7.4   Study limitations 
The first limitation of the study relates to the scoping of the incident investigation 
conducted (analysed using the Systematic Reanalysis Method). The incident 
investigation process related mainly (but not exclusively) to incident data collection 
and analysis; the latter parts of designing and selecting remedial responses was not 
really possible in the current research study (cf. Lundberg et al. 2010). This was due to 
situational limitations relating to the particular incident situation, and the constrained 
resources available for the small scale incident investigation. It was unlikely that the 
national car management company involved in this incident situation would have 
readily participated in collaborative redesign of the car park or associated procedures, 
to better support its users to remember to display their proof of purchase after parking. 
Further research could therefore focus on the use of Systematic Reanalysis Method to 
analyse the relationship between: 
1) the methodological and theoretical aspects of a manual for guiding design 
and selection of remedial responses, and 
2) the actual enactment of this design and selection as part of a real incident 
investigation. 
The second limitation relates to the fact that the ISMP Canada method (enacted in the 
study) was originally designed for the patient safety domain. The implicit argument of 
this chapter is that the generic parts of the ISMP Canada method are sufficiently 
generic to be readily transferable – to the given non patient safety incident situation. 
The ISMP Canada method itself transfers basic RCA principles from outside of patient 
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safety. We focused on only the domain-independent aspects of the ISMP Canada 
method for the current study. Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis of an account of 
patient safety incident investigation would generate insight, into how the domain-
dependent aspects of the ISMP Canada method constrain or affords aspects of 
investigative practice. Detailed chronological descriptions of the conduct of patient 
safety incident investigations – at a level of detail comparable to that given in 
Appendix C.1 – are to the best of the author’s knowledge not yet publically available. 
Given the increasing emphasis on more transparent management of patient care and 
safety however (cf. UK Department of Health 2013), such data limitations impeding 
safety research in the area will hopefully be reduced in the near future. 
A third limitation of the current study is in the fact that only two researchers have so 
far applied the Systematic Reanalysis Method in practice. Such users are within its 
intended scope. But future research could explore the extent to which the Systematic 
Reanalysis Method does in fact open up the potential for demonstrable validity 
judgements to other safety stakeholders not included in the current study, through 
investigating the benefits and drawbacks of Systematic Reanalysis Method use with 
patient safety managers, professional incident investigators etc. This is not to say that 
all safety stakeholders would necessarily want to scrutinise the enactments of methods 
in detail in the manner of the current study, however. 
7.5   Conclusions 
This chapter has presented an exploratory study of the Systematic Reanalysis Method. 
Two independent data analyses were conducted using it, to characterise the 
investigative enactment of a systemic incident analysis method. The Systematic 
Reanalysis Method characterises parts of an investigation as constrained, strongly 
afforded, or weakly afforded by the chosen method. By using it, we have gained 
insight into how the abstract, tangible representation of the ISMP Canada method 
(ISMP Canada 2006) relates to its enactment as part of incident investigation practice.  
Through exploring its use in practice, the study shows that the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method can: 
 help an analyst understand where incident investigation may be improved 
with respect to the chosen method (Section 7.3.1), 
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 help an analyst locate areas of potential ambiguity in investigative method 
(Section 7.3.2), and 
 facilitate explicitly evidenced and warranted links to be made between the 
chosen method and its actual enactment (Section 7.3.3) 
Through such knowledge generating roles, the Systematic Reanalysis Method helps to 
extend an evidenced, explicit bridge: from the abstractions proposed by theoretical 
research into the systemic analysis of incidents, to incident analysis in practice. The 
resulting analysis outputs may be used to support the work of method designers: by 
systematically informing our understanding of the extent to which systemic incident 
analysis methods are in fact being used as intended in practice, and help identify where 
methodological difficulties can and do arise. For stakeholders more interested in 
quality assuring incident analyses (e.g., as part of incident investigation, cf. Benner 
and Rimson 2012), the Systematic Reanalysis Method offers a way to systematically 
demonstrate the extent to which an incident investigation is adequate – with respect to 
the chosen analysis method(s). These concerns are addressed through researching the 
constraints and affordances of a systemic incident analysis method. Both aspects are 
important for researchers, practitioners, or researcher-practitioners to consider, as part 
of further research and development of methods of doing systemic incident analysis. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusions and Future work 
 
This chapter: 
 Briefly summarises the work of the thesis, conducted to meet the project 
aims and objectives set out in Chapter 1 
 States the main conclusions from the theoretical and empirical work of the 
thesis  
 Explains how the developments of the thesis advances existing related 
research reviewed in Chapter 2 
 Provides indicative discussion and recommendations for future research 
following on from the current work 
8.1   Summary 
Based on the literature review conducted in Chapter 2, two main project aims were set 
out. The first aim was to develop and demonstrate a new method, to offset the 
misleading dominant illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ during incident 
situations. This conceptual illusion was shown to be present in the field of systemic 
incident analysis, through a critical review of the relevant methodological literature 
(Section 2.3). In meeting this first aim, a new method of systemic incident analysis 
was developed based on Distributed Cognition precepts. It is called the Information 
Safety Method, and the first of two new methods of analysis developed in this PhD 
project. 
A controlled empirical study was conducted to validate the Information Safety Method. 
Using Branford’s (2007) validation criterion, we sought to find out whether this new 
method does what it is designed to do. The basic finding from the study was that the 
Information Safety Method can indeed do what it is designed to do. The method is 
designed to support analysis of how natural information systems emerge – through 
identifying the natural systems of information representation and information 
representation coordination shared during an incident situation. This follows through 
on the promise of Distributed Cognition based safety explanations recognised earlier 
(e.g., by Busby and Hughes 2003, and Sweeney 2009), for explaining problems of 
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communication during incident situations. Through doing so, we provide a new 
method for conducting systemic incident analysis. 
The second main aim of the project was to start to bridge the gap between systemic 
incident analysis methods in theory, and their use in practice. Such efforts need to be 
attempted, for the various systemic incident analysis research innovations to be taken 
up in safety practice. We first conducted in-depth interviews with practicing incident 
investigators working in patient safety. This helped us better understand the significant 
concepts driving their analysis and investigation practice. Concepts of how natural 
information systems form, along with the concepts of the mainstream systemic 
incident analysis methods, were both absent from the interview data. This suggests a 
possible niche for these systemic methods, to enrich the analytical insights gained from 
the incident investigators’ practice. To better understand how the theory of systemic 
methods relates to their actual practice, we developed a new method of empirical 
analysis, for critically examining the move: 
1) from systemic incident analysis methods in theory,  
2) into their practical utilisation as part of the complex process of real incident 
investigation.  
This second new method of analysis is called the Systematic Reanalysis Method. It 
was used as part of an exploratory empirical study, conducted to understand how the 
theory moved into practice, for an established method of systemic incident analysis 
(ISMP Canada 2006). The study showed that the Systematic Reanalysis Method can be 
applied in practice productively. The study also identified a number of substantive 
methodological challenges, in using in the established method of systemic incident 
analysis in practice. 
8.2   Original contributions 
Through meeting the two main project aims, we have made several contributions to the 
theory and practice of systemic incident analysis. They are presented below. 
8.2.1  Development of a new method of systemic incident analysis (to meet Aim A: 
Objectives 1 and 2) 
Through the literature review of Chapter 2, we showed that a misleading view of 
‘objective information transmission’ is currently present, and dominant in the field of 
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systemic incident analysis. This view seems to be sustained by all three of the major 
methods of systemic incident analysis reviewed (AcciMap, CAST, and FRAM). These 
existing methods adopt the ‘information as object’ view, which is a misconception in 
explaining how people naturally communicate during incident situations (cf. Lakoff 
and Johnson 2003). This motivated Aim A of the PhD project: to develop an 
alternative means of explaining how information flows through representations and 
their propagation during incident situations. 
To offset the misleading illusion of ‘objective information transmission’ during 
incident situations, we turned to the theory of Distributed Cognition. Based on the 
Distributed Cognition worldview, we developed a new method of systemic incident 
analysis in Chapter 3. This new method is called the Information Safety Method. It 
builds on the Distributed Cognition focus on propagation of representation states, to 
provide a method of systemic incident analysis. It allows us to analyse how 
information ‘flow’ during incident situations is constitutive, of the systemic formation 
of distributed cognitive systems. The systemic analysis is conducted through 
identifying the interactive, emergent, and naturally fallible acts of communicative 
representation during incident situations. This development represents a step forward 
for research into understanding information ‘flow’ as part of systemic incident analysis. 
The new method also represents an advance in theory, through codifying Distributed 
Cognition ideas for the purposes of systemic incident analysis.  
For the Information Safety Method, communication during incident situations is 
understood as a direct function of the communication context, irrespective of the 
degree of success or failure in attempting communication. The method embodies a 
strong interpretation of Distributed Cognition concepts (cf. Pea 1993). The method 
design incorporates a disbelief of the possibility of cognition residing solely in people, 
as well as a disbelief of the flow of objective information between people in 
communicating (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). Instead, the incident analyst is prompted 
to assess for correct representation, and consistent coordination of representation 
states during incident situations. The new method also seeks to improve the likelihood 
of actual learning from incidents, through treating incident analysis as a distributed 
cognitive process of ongoing incident analyst and data triangulation (cf. Rothbauer 
2008). This triangulation is done mainly through associating and scoping of the safety 
functions, across the information trajectories identified from different incident 
situations. 
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Through initial validation of the Information Safety Method, in Chapter 4, we found 
that the new method of systemic incident analysis can do what it is designed to do. In 
providing a distributed cognitive mode of incident analysis, the new method enabled:  
 learning about the nature of fragilities in the natural information 
representation co-ordination systems developing during incident situations; 
 active learning through understanding systemic causes potentially effecting 
information coordination and representation, to support the active sharing of 
knowledge from analysis of individual incident situations. Such sharing was 
conducted via a distributed learning process, of ongoing incident analyst 
and data triangulation; 
The method was applied to five real, diverse incident situations here. This showed that 
the Information Safety Method can be used in practice, at least in a research context. 
Original safety implications were also identified through this work, going beyond the 
insights from the prior incident analysis (as reported). This indicates the potential for 
new insights to be gained on incident situations, through systemic analysis using the 
Information Safety Method. 
8.2.2  Understanding the practice of patient safety incident analysis during 
incident investigation (to meet Aim B: Objective 3) 
As part of our contribution towards broader efforts at bridging the gap between 
systemic incident analysis research and practice (Aim B), further empirical data and 
insight was sought regarding professional incident analysis and investigation practice. 
A novel research question was raised in Chapter 5: of “What are the significant 
concepts for patient safety incident investigators in their investigative practice?” An 
initial answer to this question was obtained through conducting in-depth interviews, 
with two out of the three incident investigators responsible for directing patient safety 
incident investigation at a large United Kingdom Foundation Trust. 
The research question provided a novel focus on the significant concepts driving their 
incident investigation practice. The review in Chapter 2 indicated the nascent nature of 
patient safety incident analysis and investigation practice; which was further confirmed 
by the answers from the interview data obtained here. The interview study also 
confirmed that Braun and Clarke’s (2006) version of thematic analysis can be used to 
productively interrogate interview data: in order to understand the conceptual 
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motivations driving patient safety incident investigation practice. The five themes of 
the qualitative analysis are contributed to the field, to embody the significant concepts 
driving these investigators’ practice. A grounded, ‘fact-based’ search is crucial to their 
incident investigations, to determine the root cause of what went wrong to cause 
significant patient harm (Themes A, B, C). This analysis rationale is however 
tempered by the substantive time, resource, and knowledge limitations of an 
investigative situation (Theme D), as well as the investigators’ naturally humanistic 
approach to incident investigation and reporting (Theme E). Additional answers from 
other patient safety incident investigators and organisations would give an idea of the 
extent to which these initial insights transfer. 
The evidence from patient safety research suggests that systemic analysis of incident 
situations seems to be as yet only partially embraced, in practice (Chapter 2). Our new 
interview data and study supports this view, indicating that the idea that incidents 
occur due to many causes seems to be accepted only in part, in practice. The focus in 
practice seems to be on an ultimate root cause for the incident, in this case. This style 
of monocausal explanation has been rejected as viable by contemporary safety 
scientists as far back as 1995 (Stoop 1995). This further confirms the existence of a 
research/practice gap (Underwood 2013), in the specific case of patient safety incident 
investigation. Through providing a deeper descriptive understanding of the dominant 
incident analysis rationale at a large United Kingdom Foundation Trust, we have 
contributed towards greater understanding of the analysis approach of practitioners, in 
the particular context of patient safety incident investigation. This additional evidence 
further reinforces the need stated previously, to find ways to start bridging the gap 
between systemic incident analysis research and practice.  
8.2.3  Development of the Systematic Reanalysis Method (to meet Aim B: 
Objectives 4 and 5) 
Another contribution towards broader efforts at bridging the gap between systemic 
incident analysis research and practice (Aim B) was presented in chapters 6 and 7. 
Here, we sought to more clearly understand what is happening as systemic incident 
analysis theory becomes practice. We sought to enable focused and detailed empirical 
analysis of this part of the process of incident investigation. A new research method 
was developed for this purpose, called the Systematic Reanalysis Method. This 
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second new method of analysis provides a way to understand and explicitly research 
how systemic incident analysis methods are utilised in practice, in detail (Chapter 6).  
Through examining the detailed relationship between the theory and practice of the 
method, we can identify its constraints and affordances, when it is utilised as part of 
real incident investigation in practice. Such analysis may improve our understanding of 
how particular systemic incident analysis methods supported particular incident 
investigations. This would support systematic and detailed understanding of the 
strengths and limitations of these methods. 
Through two independent analysis using the new research method, three distinct 
knowledge generating roles emerged for it in Chapter 7. In particular, we found that 
the Systematic Reanalysis Method can be used to: 
a) help the analyst understand where the conducted incident investigation 
may be improved, with respect to the guidance of the chosen method, 
b) help the analyst locate areas of potential ambiguity in the presentation of 
the method, and  
c) help increase our confidence in linking particular parts of the investigation 
conducted, to the chosen method, through empirical confirmation or 
refutation of each potential link. These three potential links are in terms of 
the strong or weak affordance of the theory of method on its practice, or 
how the theory of method constrains its practice. 
In particular, the findings from the Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses indicate 
that many challenges arise in the move: from the theory embodied by a simple 
systemic incident analysis method (ISMP Canada 2006), into its practice as part of 
incident investigation (see Appendix C.2 for a full list of the specific challenges 
discovered). Such results could potentially be used to improve the method, or its 
tangible guidance to support the conduct of incident analysis and/or investigation. In 
conducting the work of Chapter 7, both the study experiences and findings provided 
further support to the information only as a consequence of interaction assumption 
underpinning the Information Safety Method (Section 3.3.3), as well as the empirical 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2. The practice of systemic incident analysis seems to be 
a highly interpretative qualitative enterprise, rather than an ‘objective’ one. 
Chapter 8 
201 
 
8.3   Recommendations for future work 
Based on the experience gained of method design, analysis practice, and related 
research into methods of systemic incident analysis, we now go on to detail some 
recommendations for further work. 
8.3.1  Progression from the Information Safety Method related work 
 A new method of systemic incident analysis has been now developed, to 
counterbalance against the pervasive and dominant influence of the illusion of 
‘objective information transmission’ during incident situations. However, further 
work is needed to understand how the Information Safety Method can be adapted 
for use in a professional practice setting. Following on from the validation study of 
Chapter 4, a natural next step would be to attempt analysis of other incident 
situations, as part of small scale patient safety incident investigations for example. 
This would enable better understanding, of some of the practical challenges arising 
from using the Information Safety Method in practice.  
 It would also be useful to compare the Information Safety Method with other 
methods of incident analysis (using the same incident situation). Due to the nature 
of systemic incident analysis, any comparison of such methods may lead to 
insights which are new relative to the outputs from another; alternatively, the 
analytical outputs from a method could also lend mutual support to that of another. 
Both kinds of empirical findings would be of interest to investigators considering 
the actual scope and nature of individual systemic incident analysis methods. Like 
the comparative research of Salmon et al. (2012), and Underwood and Waterson 
(2014) for example, a related further work could be to compare the extent to which 
the Information Safety Method generates new insights and recommendations, when 
directly compared with the existing major methods of systemic analysis reviewed 
in Chapter 2.   
8.3.2  Progression from the interview study on how patient safety incident 
investigators analyse and investigate incident situations 
 A key limitation of the interview study, imposed by resource constraints, was the 
limited data on analysis practice during patient safety incident investigation. An 
opportunity therefore exists to conduct further interviews with incident 
investigators from other healthcare organisations, to gain more complete 
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understanding of the significant concepts of incident analysis practice. The basic 
research design of Chapter 5 could be adapted or extended for this purpose. 
8.3.3  Progression from the Systematic Reanalysis Method related work 
 Now that the Systematic Reanalysis Method has been independently trialed by two 
researchers, it would be useful to further explore the use of this research method 
with others interested in detailed empirical examination of the move from theory 
into practice. For example, further work could use the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method to research the details, of how remedial responses to incident situations 
were designed and selected using a systemic incident analysis method.  
 Another direction of further work could adapt the basic research process of Chapter 
7, to study the move from theory into practice for the Information Safety Method 
(developed in Chapter 3). This would generate further empirical knowledge, to 
support further methodological development of the new method of systemic 
incident analysis. If conducted in an appropriate study setting, such work could 
give further insight into the strengths and weakness of the Information Safety 
Method beyond the academic research context. 
 Given the highly detailed empirical examination of practice encouraged through 
the Systematic Reanalysis Method, feedback is also needed from professional 
practitioners of incident analysis and investigation. This would enable better 
understanding of the extent to which such close empirical scrutiny of their 
professional practice and findings would be acceptable and workable, in the face of 
the complexities and other considerations of larger-scale incident investigation 
situations for example. 
In conclusion, we have contributed towards two areas of systemic incident analysis 
related research. The first set of contributions make inroads, into counterbalancing 
against the view of ‘objective information transmission’ present in the field. Through 
providing a less misleading method of analysing how human communication naturally 
occurs during incident situations, we open up a new strand of systemic incident 
analysis research. The initial steps in this direction were taken in chapters 3 and 4. 
Further work in this direction may result in a more productive way of thinking about 
and responding to situations of human misunderstanding and miscommunication 
during incident situations. 
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The second set of contributions make inroads into developing bridges between the 
systemic incident analysis research and practitioner communities. Many complex 
challenges remain to be addressed here, in order to reduce the extent of the current gap 
between the two communities. From the perspective of practice, we contributed a 
small study and insights to enrich our understanding of professional patient safety 
incident analysis and investigation (Chapter 5). To more clearly understand what is 
happening during the transitional process of practicing systemic incident analysis, we 
contributed both research method and insights to the empirical scrutiny of this part of 
the incident investigation situation (chapters 6, 7). Further work on reducing the extent 
of the current research-practice gap is urgently needed, to enable increased impact of 
research in the field to positive effect actual safety practice. This would increase our 
chances of keeping future generations safe and sound, through critical and reflective 
analysis of the various systemic factors helping to structure past and future incident 
situations. 
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Appendix A.1: One of the investigation reports used as a 
source of incident data 
 
Report for the 3rd incident involving a late diagnosis of Acute Kidney Injury. Numbers 
such as “3.3” are the custom annotations used to facilitate precise (cross)referencing in 
developing Information Safety Method investigative hypotheses during the study. 
 
  
1. Introduction 
On 28th July 2013 Mr K developed acute kidney injury (AKI) following surgery for a 
fractured humerus, and required admission to critical care for treatment with 
haemofiltration.  This report investigates the care and treatment that Mr K received 
from the medical and nursing teams to learn any lessons that might help to prevent 
any further incidents of this nature and to help improve the reporting and investigation 
of similar serious events in the future. 
 
2. Acknowledgements to the patient 
2.1 
Acknowledgments 
Hospital A is committed to being open, honest, transparent, and candid.  Being open 
involves apologising in a prompt and meaningful way, and fully explaining what 
happened when an incident has caused harm to a patient.  This investigation report 
aims to demonstrate this commitment.  
 
2.2 
Involvement of MK. 
The designated family liaison lead was Dr NP, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon.  An 
explanation and apology was given and provided in writing on 30th August 2013.   
 
It is the sincere hope of the independent investigation team that this investigation 
process has addressed all of the issues that Mr K may have sought to have examined 
and explained. 
 
3. Terms of reference  
3.1 
The terms of reference for this investigation were set by the Patient Safety Manager in 
conjunction with the supporting clinical lead. 
 
1.  To examine: 
 the reasonability and suitability of the care and treatment provided to Mr K at the 
time of the incident, in view of his history and assessed health care needs; 
 the extent to which care and treatment complied with statutory obligations, 
relevant best practice guidance, and local operational policies; 
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 the adequacy of risk assessments and care pathways that were undertaken to 
support Mr K’s care planning;  
 whether the right information was available to the right people at the right time, 
and whether this was used effectively to meet the Mr K’s needs; and 
 
 
3.2 
2. To identify: 
• the facts as can be reasonably determined, i.e. what happened, to whom, when, 
where, how and why; 
• recommendations / learning points for improving individual practice, or local and 
organisational systems and services; and 
• any action taken by services since the incident occurred to address any shortfalls. 
 
3.3 
3. To make: 
• realistic recommendations for action to address the learning points to improve 
systems and services and use this information to significantly reduce the likelihood 
of future harm to other service users. 
3.4 
4. To report findings and recommendations to: 
 Mr K by sharing the completed report; 
 the Trust Board  
 the clinical team/s involved in the incident, so that learning and action can be 
undertaken to prevent similar incidents happening again; and 
 the Commissioners of the service/s in which the incident took place.  
 
 
4. The investigation team 
REDACTED 
  
5. Information and evidence gathered  
5.1 
As part of this investigation, a range of evidence and information has been reviewed. 
These include: patient records; interviews with staff; electronic results system; and 
two witness statements.  
The following people were interviewed as part of this investigation. They have been 
identified only by their designation and an identifying letter / number as appropriate. 
 
5.2 
Date Identifying letter/ number and designation and workplace of 
individuals interviewed 
3rd December 
2013 
SN SG 
27th 
November 
2013 
Dr AJ, telephone interview 
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5.3 
Best practice 
The following policies and guidelines were used to benchmark practice: 
 Minimum Standard of Observations Policy; and 
 Trust Guidelines on Fluid Balance monitoring 
 
6. Investigation methodology 
This investigation used a tabular timeline to review events in Mr K’s journey up to the 
point he was admitted to critical care. Also used was the “5 whys” as a root cause 
analysis tool.    
The incident decision tree was also applied to promote a fair investigation process 
and inform the recommendations.  This is a framework to decide whether systems 
failures, or individual acts or omissions were the cause of contributing factors in the 
incident.   
 
7. Background and chronology of events 
7.1 
Mr MK was admitted to Hospital A on 18th July 2013 at 13.04pm, following a fall at 
home. , He fell approximately 8-10 feet from ladders, whilst cleaning his caravan roof, 
onto his left shoulder and elbow.  
 
7.2 
On arrival at Hospital A, Mr K was reviewed by the Emergency Department’s (ED) 
medical team. His past medical history was taken, and a clinical examination was 
undertaken and documented. Mr K was known to have type 2 diabetes, treated 
hypertension (high blood pressure), ischaemic heart disease, and he also had a 
permanent pacemaker in situ (model number: Medtronic Sensia NWR7339475 RT 
Vent lead 4074 Medtronic 4074).  
 
7.3 
The initial clinical examination recorded that MK had not had any loss of 
consciousness following his fall, and had no amnesia  or neurological symptoms. His  
left arm, onto which he fell, was noted to be pink and well perfused. Mr K was referred 
to the orthopaedic team on call and x-rays of his left arm were requested. 
 
7.4 
Whist in the ED it was noted that Mr K’s blood pressure (BP) was low at 84/66, given 
that he had treated hypertension.  An intravenous (IV) cannula was inserted and 
500mls of normal saline was prescribed and given which increased his BP transiently. 
Mr K was also prescribed and given analgesia (medication given for pain) which 
reduced his pain with good effect. At the same time blood samples were obtained and 
sent to the laboratory for urea and electrolytes, clotting and full blood count. The 
investigation has noted that Mr K’s blood results were normal on admission to 
Hospital A and showed no signs of renal impairment.  
 
 
7.5 
Mr K went to the radiology department for the x-ray of his left humerus and left 
shoulder at 14:53 and returned back to the ED.  Mr K’s BP was noted to have 
decreased again therefore more IV fluids were prescribed and administered and the 
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next dose of his morphine was delayed in case this was contributing to his 
hypotension (low BP).  
 
7.6 
Mr K was seen by the orthopaedic team at 17:00 and he was diagnosed with a 
complex fracture of the elbow and shoulder. A back-slab plaster was applied in the ED 
and the decision was made to admit Mr K for surgical repair of his fractures when BP 
had responded to IV fluid. 
 
7.7 
Mr K’s BP increased to 107/60 and the decision was made to admit Mr K to ward A2, 
the plastic surgery ward, as there were no orthopaedic beds available at time of his 
admission. A2 is a plastic surgery ward which has orthopaedic patients on a regular 
basis. Mr K was to be kept nil by mouth (NBM) from 02:00 am as it was planned for 
surgery to be undertaken the following day. 
 
7.8 
On Friday 19th July 2013 Mr K was reviewed on Mr R’s ward round (Mr R is a 
consultant orthopaedic surgeon). The plan was made to check Mr K’s pacemaker, to 
arrange a CT scan of the left shoulder, to transfer Mr K to the orthopaedic ward when 
a bed was available, and possibly for theatre on 20th July.  Mr K was also reviewed by 
Dr A (consultant orthopaedic geriatrician) who was asked to review Mr K in regards to 
his hypotension since admission. Following this review,  the plan was made to 
undertake additional blood tests, reduce Mr K’s anti hypertensive medication 
(medication for high blood pressure) and to commence lying and standing BP 
measurements. The investigation has not been able to identify if lying and standing 
BP was undertaken as the observation charts and fluid balance charts for the pre 
operative period are not within the medical records and have not been located.  
 
7.9 
On 19th July 2013  Mr K was advised that he would not be having surgery that day, so 
he could now eat. The sliding scale insulin regimen that he had been on was 
discontinued and his MEWS was 1. (Modified Early Warning Score: a score used to 
assess if a patient is starting to show early signs of deterioration).  Mr K was 
experiencing a significant amount of pain and described this as being 8/10 in severity 
(10 being the worst pain he had ever had). Mr K was reviewed by the medical team 
and his analgesia medication was increased.  Mr K’s nursing records at the time note 
that Mr K was passing urine, although he was not on a fluid balance chart at the time.  
 
7.10 
On Saturday 20th July 2013 Mr K was reviewed by the orthopaedic SHO, who advised 
that his injuries would need be reviewed by an upper limb specialist surgeon and that 
the surgical procedure to repair the fracture would not take place over the weekend.  
 
7.11 
Mr K was reviewed again on the 21st and 22nd July 2013 by the orthopaedic team.  As 
Mr K’s injuries to the elbow and shoulder were so significant he required the input of a 
specialist elbow and shoulder surgeon, Mr P. The plan was made that Mr K would be 
put onto Mr P’ theatre list. The trauma coordinator advised Mr K that his surgery was 
planned for Thursday 25th July 2013.  
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7.12 
On Monday 22nd July 2013, Mr K had a CT scan of his shoulder: at this point Mr K’s 
renal function was still within normal limits according to his blood results.  
 
7.13 
On Tuesday 23rd July 2013, Mr K was transferred to ward A3, the orthopaedic ward 
for continuing care. On the Wednesday 24th July 2013, Mr K mentioned that he had 
not had his bowels opened for 2 days. Laxatives were prescribed and given.  
 
7.14 
Mr K was transferred to the acute theatre at approximately 08:00am for surgery under 
the care of Mr P, consultant orthopaedic surgeon. From review of the anaesthetic 
charts, the surgery commenced at 08:55am and lasted until 12:55pm. During this time 
it was documented by Dr C, consultant anaesthetist, that Mr K received 2 litres of IV 
fluid, which included 500mls of Gelofusine. Mr K’s BP was recorded throughout and 
noted to be around 90 / 60 mm/Hg.  
 
7.15 
Mr K arrived in the recovery area following surgery at 13:40 where it was recorded 
that he was hypotensive with a BP of 80/48. 500mls of Gelofusine was administered 
and Mr K’s BP increased. Mr K was transferred back to ward A3. There is no 
documentation to record if Mr K passed any urine whilst in the theatre or recovery 
unit, nor is there a time recorded when Mr K left the department.  
 
7.16 
Mr K was received back onto ward A3, where it is recorded in the nursing notes that 
his MEWS was 0 (this is a normal MEWs). A patient controlled analgesia (PCA) pump 
containing morphine was attached to a cannula in Mr K’s arm and was working well.  
Mr K had a unit of blood going through another cannula and was to receive a further 
unit of blood that evening. Mr K had his fluid balance recorded from his return from 
theatre: this should record all fluid on a fluid chart for a 24 hour period. From 16:00 to 
00:00 there was only 55 mls of urine documented that Mr K had passed.  Mr K did not 
have a urinary catheter in situ.  
 
7.17 
The following morning (Friday 26th July 2013) there is a documented entry in the 
nursing notes at 06:00 which records that Mr K has had acute pain in his arm and that 
the on call SHO has reviewed him. There is no entry in the medical notes from the 
doctor to reflect this review nor is there any mention in the nursing notes of who the 
doctor was. The nursing notes also state that Mr K had “urine output only 350mls up 
to now, push oral fluids, doctor happy, just keep on top of pain”. There is no 
documented action taken on the low urine output.  
 
7.18 
Mr K was reviewed on the ward round later that morning by Mr P, the operating 
surgeon. The medical plan documented in the notes at the ward round was to request 
a review by the acute pain team, x-ray of left shoulder, blood tests and for Mr K to 
return to theatre the following day for the next part of the planned surgery which would 
involve an open reduction, internal fixation of left proximal humerus.  
 
7.19 
The acute pain team anaesthetist reviewed MK at 10.30 am: the anaesthetist who 
reviewed Mr K altered some of Mr K’s existing pain medication and prescribed some 
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additional pain relieving medications called Gabapentin and Tramadol. Both these 
new medications can accumulate in the blood in renal impairment and/ or failure. 
There was no documentation to identify if Mr K’s poor urine output or fluid balance 
was noted at this review. 
 
7.20 
The nursing notes written at 14:00 record that Mr K was passing urine “not great 
amount”, only 250mls passed from 7am to 14:00pm. There is no documentation which 
could be found during this investigation that these concerns were escalated to the 
medical team. SN R who was caring for Mr K during that shift has been interviewed as 
part of this retrospective review, she recalled that she did not think that Mr K was in 
acute renal failure but thought it was acute urinary retention. 
 
7.21 
SN G took over care of Mr K on the late shift and accessed his blood results at 17:10 
that day on the electronic results system. Those blood results identified that Mr K’s 
renal function had deteriorated with an increase in both his urea and creatanine (urea 
and creatanine are chemicals in the blood which rise in the presence of acute kidney 
injury). There was also a decrease in his eGRF rate (eGFR is Glomerular Filtration 
Rate, which is a derived value and it provides an estimate of kidney function and 
reduces in the presence of AKI). There is no evidence that the deterioration in these 
results were acted upon or handed over to nursing or medical staff. Mr K passed urine 
once on that shift, but this was an unknown amount as he used the toilet. 
7.22 
During the nightshift 26th-27Th July it is recorded in the nursing records that Mr K had 
large vomit at 1:00am (not recorded on fluid chart). There is no urine output recorded 
for the entire night shift, and urine output not mentioned in the nursing documentation 
of the nightshift. 
 
7.23 
Mr K was escorted to theatre at 10:45am the morning of 27th July 2013. There is no 
evidence that could be found during this review that the anaesthetist was aware of Mr 
K’s poor urine output or deteriorating blood results. The anaesthetic record from the 
operation states that Mr K’s oxygen saturations and BP were persistently low during 
the procedure.  
 
7.24 
From review of the anaesthetic chart it appears that Mr K’s BP was rarely above 100 
systolic throughout the procedure. During the surgery Mr K required 2 units of saline 
(no volume recorded), 750 mls of Gelofusine and 2 units of blood. In addition, 
metaraminol (a vasoconstrictor medication which increases blood pressure 
transiently) was given at frequent periods throughout the surgery. The fact that Mr K 
was hypotensive may have indicated that he was also hypovolaemic (depleted fluid 
volume), although this is difficult to say with certainty.  
 
7.25 
Initially following the surgery Mr K was transferred to theatre recovery (an area that 
patients go to after their operation to be closely observed before going back to the 
ward). Mr K was reviewed by an anaesthetist, Dr H, at 17.20 as he was experiencing 
a lot of pain (8/10 on the pain scale). The anaesthetist had a discussion with Mr K and 
planned for him to have an interscalene block (this involves injecting local anaesthetic 
to the nerve supply to the shoulder area to provide instant pain relief). The block was 
administered successfully and provided rapid pain relief as evidenced by Mr K’s pain 
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score which went down to 0/10. Dr H also advised to administer regular analgesia on 
the ward even if Mr K was not experiencing pain; the medications were Tramadol, 
Gabapentin and Paracetamol.  
 
7.26 
Mr K’s BP on leaving the recovery area was 92 systolic, which is lower than his 
normal BP.  Mr K arrived back on the ward at 18:00 where no urine documented to 
have been passed for 24 hours by midnight that night.   
 
7.27 
The nursing documentation at 20:30 reflects that Mr K has not passed urine (since 
18:00 the previous night) and also not had his bowels open for 6 days. There is no 
documented evidence of this information being escalated to medical team nor handed 
over to the nursing staff taking over Mr K’s care for the nightshift. 
 
7.28 
On Sunday 28th July 2013 at 04:10, the nursing notes record that Mr K’s observations 
had been recorded 2 hourly, and that his MEWS was 0.  A statement from the nurse 
caring for Mr K that night records that he was offered a bottle numerous times 
overnight as he had not yet passed urine post operatively. The statement also records 
that the on call SHO (AJ) visited ward in early hours of the morning. Dr AJ was 
informed that Mr K had no urine output, but it is recorded that she had no concerns as 
Mr K did not have a palpable bladder and was comfortable: she advised to continue to 
monitor Mr K’s fluid balance.  
 
7.29 
At 08.30am on 28th July 2013, Mr K was seen on the ward round by Mr P and his 
junior Dr S. The entry in Mr K’s medical notes states that Mr K is “day 1 post-op, left 
shoulder plating”, that he is comfortable and “nil new”: there is no evidence that blood 
results, fluid charts or observation charts were viewed as part of this ward round.  
 
7.30 
The nursing notes at 11:30am record that Mr K’s surgical drain was removed and that 
his observations were stable. It was also recorded that he had not passed urine. At 
12:00 a bladder scan was undertaken by SN: there was no urine in Mr K’s bladder 
visible on this scan. A further bladder scan was undertaken at 18:00, and again there 
was no urine seen in Mr K’s bladder. There is no documented escalation of this 
finding by the SN.  
 
7.31 
SN VG came onto the night shift and handover from day team included that Mr K had 
not passed urine. This was escalated to the on call SHO AJ who had attended the 
ward the night before. An entry in the medical notes at 23:17 record that “MK has 
struggled to pass urine all day and that his blood results are deranged”. The plan was 
made to repeat blood tests urgently, insert a catheter (with Gentomycin cover), 
monitor urine output hourly and give IV fluids.  
 
7.32 
On Monday 29th July 2013, Mr K’s blood results were checked by Dr AJ and they 
showed a worsening degree of renal function. This was escalated to the senior doctor, 
Dr M who then escalated his concerns to intensive care, who arranged for Mr K’s 
admission to HDU (high dependency unit) for renal replacement therapy as Mr K’s 
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kidneys had stopped functioning.  Mr K received 3 days of renal replacement therapy 
and was discharged from critical care on 1st August 2013.  
 
7.33 
Mr K was discharged from Hospital A on 16th August: he no longer requires renal 
replacement therapy but is monitored as an outpatient by the renal team.  
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8. Tabular timeline 
 
Date Key clinical/ other contacts and events Source 
18/07/13 
13.04pm 
Mr MK was admitted to Hospital A as an emergency following a fall from a caravan roof whilst attempting 
to clean it. Suspected fracture of the left humerus. Mr K was in pain and given 10mg morphine.  
Note that Mr K has low BP 84/62mmhg (usually 130/70 on ramipril 2.5mg+ diltiazem 180mg). Given IV 
fluid. Also note that Mr MK has a past medical history of hypertension and type 2 diabetes. 
Note: Both type 2 diabetes and hypertension can increase the risk of developing renal impairment.  
ED Notes 
19/07/13 
09.00 
 
Ward round Mr R, plan made to: order a pacemaker check and order a CT of Mr K’s left shoulder.  Mr K 
may possibly go to theatre tomorrow. Aim for nil by mouth from 02.00.  
 
Medical notes 
 
19/07/2013 
12.10 
 
Note ongoing low BP, no observation charts available to review for this part of Mr K’s admission. Vacant 
episode on return from bathroom, 
Reduction in ramapril /diltiazem (drug used to treat high blood pressure). 
 
Note: Mr K is reported to be having periods of hypotension, where he is normally hypertensive.  
Medical notes 
 
20/07/2013 
08.58 
 
On call SHO review of Mr K, who advises Mr K’s operation to be discussed with an upper limb surgeon and 
this will happen during the week not weekend. 
Medical notes 
 
22/07/2013 Mr MK  has a CT scan 
 
Medical notes 
 
23/07/13 
19.15 
Mr K transferred to A3 from A2, MEWS 0, bowels not opened Day 2, documented in the nursing records 
that Mr K is passing urine with no problems. 
 
Medical notes 
 
25/07/13 
03:00 
No diet from 03.00 and no water till 06.00 in preparation for theatre. Medical notes 
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25/07/2013 
08:35 
Mr K goes to theatre for open reduction of distal humerus. 1500mls of crystalloid and 500mls of colloid 
given during surgery.  
 
Note Mr K hypotensive post operatively in recovery and required another 500mls colloid. No 
documentation that Mr K passed any urine during the time he was in surgery. 
 
Anaesthetic 
chart 
25/07/2013 
15:30 
approximately 
Mr K returns back to ward A3. On fluid balance chart, no observation chart able to be located. Fluid chart 
started at 16:00. 55mls of urine passed from 16:00 up to 00:00.  
 
Although Mr KK is not catheterised at this point, this should have triggered a response as urine 
output did equate to 0.5mls / kg/hour, as would be expected in an adult. This should have been 
escalated.  
 
Fluid balance did not include all fluids given in theatre therefore not accurate. If all fluids given in 
fluid included then balance at end of 25th July would have been 3445 mls positive.  
 
Medical notes 
and Fluid 
balance charts 
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26/07/2013 
 
 
Urine output and fluid input monitored overnight. Entry in the nursing notes at 06:00 reflect that “urine 
output only 350mls up to now, push oral fluids, doctor happy, just keep on top of pain”. There is no 
documentation from the medical staff to reflect this. The ward round conducted by Mr P, plan included 
check x-ray and bloods. Plan for proximal humerus repair on 27th July 2013.  
 
Reviewed by anaesthetist at 10.30 from acute pain team as Mr K in pain from surgery and injury. Neither 
Mr K’s fluid balance nor poor urine output noted at this review. Gabapentin added for pain relief.  
 
Nursing notes written at 2pm record that passing urine “not great amount”, only 250mls passed from 7am 
to 14:00pm. No documentation of escalation of concerns to the medical team. SN R reported at interview 
that she didn’t think Mr K was in acute renal failure, thought it was post op retention. 
 
The staff nurse that provided care for Mr K on the late shift accessed his blood results at 17:10: there is no 
evidence that the deterioration in these were acted upon or handed over.  Mr K passed urine once on that 
shift, and this was an unknown amount as he used the toilet. 
 
Nursing notes at 19:00 records “passing urine”. 
There is no documentation that Mr K passed anymore urine that night.  
 
There is no mention in the records that Mr K’s fluid balance was reviewed at this ward round. 
Bloods only viewed on this day by Staff Nurse, no documentation of escalation of these to the 
medical staff.  
The blood results demonstrated a sharp rise in Mr K’s urea and creatanine and his GFR (glomerular 
filtration rate) has decreased to 28 from 60 on admission. This GFR result and deterioration in renal 
function was not identified. 
Gabapentin that was prescribed for pain relief is known to be nephrotoxic and should be reduced 
in patients who have renal impairment.  
Medical notes, 
nursing notes 
and electronic 
results system, 
staff interviews 
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27/07/2013 Note in nursing records at 1:00 that Mr K has had large vomit (not recorded on fluid chart). No urine output 
recorded for the entire night shift, and urine output not mentioned.  
 
Mr K is escorted to theatre at 10:45. Anaesthetic record states that Mr K saturations and BP persistently 
low during procedure. BP rarely above 100 systolic throughout. 2 units of saline given (no volume 
recorded), 750 mls of Gelofusine given, 2 units of blood given. In addition metaraminol (a vasoconstrictor 
medication which increases blood pressure) was given at frequent periods throughout the surgery. Mr K’s 
BP on leaving the recovery area was 92 systolic, he arrived back on the ward at 18:00. No urine 
documented to have been passed for 24 hours at midnight.   
 
Nursing notes reflect that Mr K not passed urine and not had bowels open for 6 days. No documented 
evidence of escalation to medical team. 
 
Fluid balance for the day states no urine output and fluid given in theatre is not included. 
 
No escalation to medical staff 
 
Medial notes, 
nursing notes 
and fluid 
balance. 
28/07/2013 
Night shift 
Nursing cardex notes that Mr K’s observations recorded 2 hourly, his MEWs was 0. Nursing statement 
records that Mr K was offered a bottle numerous times overnight as he had not yet passed urine post 
operatively, also records that SHO visited ward in early hours of the morning. Doctor was informed of no 
urine output, no concerns from SHO as Mr K did not have a palpable bladder, advised to continue to 
monitor.  
 
Medics happened to visit ward, where issues re urine discussed, NPU (not passed urine) had not 
been escalated as a call by NS. 
No documented review by medics.  
Failure to recognise AKI by both Medic and SN. 
Medical notes, 
Staff statement 
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28/07/2013 
day 
Mr K seen on Mr P ward round at 08:30am. Noted that “day 1 post op, comfortable, nil new”. No evidence 
that blood results, fluid chart or observations were reviewed by medics. 
 
Nursing notes at 11:30 record that drain out, observations stable, Not passed urine. At 12:00 bladder scan 
undertaken by SN. No urine in bladder. No documented recognition that this may be AKI, or escalation to 
medics. Although in interview SN recalls trying to contact the medical team (SHO and Registrar) who were 
busy in the ED with trauma calls. Bladder scan repeated  at 18:00, no urine in bladder. No documented 
escalation. 
 
No documentation that this was been escalated to medical team. 
No escalation to Consultant given that other medics were busy. 
Medical notes, 
Staff statement 
28/07/2013 SN VG came onto the night shift and handover from day team included that MK had not passed urine. This 
was escalated to the on call SHO who had attended the ward the night before.  
 
Entry in the medical notes at 23:17 record that Mr K has struggled to pass urine all day and that his blood 
results are deranged. 
 
Plan was made to repeat blood tests, insert a catheter (with Gentomycin cover), monitor urine output 
hourly and give IV fluids.  
Note gentamycin is contraindicated in renal failure. 
Medical notes, 
Staff statement 
29/7/2013 Mr K’s blood results show further deterioration in renal function: urea is 36.6, creatinine is 635 and 
potassium is 7.4. MK has only passed 40mls since catheter inserted. 
 
Mr K’s case was referred to medics on call, who advised critical care. MK was admitted to critical care 
where he had to undergo renal replacement therapy.  Mr K was discharged from Hospital A on 16/8/2013 
 
Medical notes, 
Staff statement 
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9. Lessons learned 
9a. Good practice findings 
Once acute renal injury is recognised the management plan is detailed and timely. 
 
9b. Findings requiring improvement 
9b.1 
Cause of renal impairment in MK 
As part of this investigation it has not been possible to identify when exactly Mr K 
developed acute kidney injury (AKI) or what caused this. It is likely that with an earlier 
diagnosis Mr K’s AKI may have been treated with IV fluids and discontinuation of 
antihypertensive and nephrotoxic drugs. However the following may have been 
contributory to the incident: 
 
9b.2 
 Mr K had predisposing risk factors  
On admission to Hospital A, Mr K had normal eGFR and kidney function on blood 
tests. Mr K was known to have both type 2 diabetes and hypertension when he 
was admitted to Hospital A. Both conditions can predispose patients to renal 
(kidney) impairment and therefore a greater awareness and closer monitoring of 
his renal functions should have been employed during his admission.   
 
Mr K also had a permanent pacemaker device in situ and which meant that he 
would not have an increased heart rate (tachycardia) in periods of dehydration as 
his heart rate was controlled by the pacemaker. 
 
9b.3 
 Mr K had several periods of hypotension 
Mr K was noted to have treated hypertension and was on medication for this on 
admission to Hospital A (Ramipril and Diltiazem).  Mr K was noted to normally 
have a blood pressure that was 130-140 /80. However from the point at which Mr 
K was admitted to Hospital A, and at several periods in the pre- and peri-operative 
phase, he had periods of hypotension It is difficult to say retrospectively whether 
the hypotension was due to hypovolaemia or something else. It is also difficult to 
say how long these periods lasted for with absolute accuracy as the observations 
charts up to and including the 29th July have not been able to be found.  
 
From the documentation reviewed as part of this investigation, it is apparent that 
Mr K’s antihypertensive drugs were reduced but still continued despite the periods 
of low blood pressure. It is also evident that during his operations Mr K required 
additional fluid and drugs to raise his BP (Metaraminol).  
 
In a patient who is normally hypertensive and who has periods of hypotension, it is 
important that this is recognised and acted upon. This is because the kidneys in a 
patient who is normally hypertensive are used to functioning with a higher than 
normal blood pressure, therefore a drop in blood pressure can reduce the blood 
flow to the kidneys making the patient more susceptible to acute kidney injury.  
 
This investigation has concluded that these periods of hypotension during Mr K’s 
pre-and peri- operative periods could have been contributory to Mr K’s 
development of acute kidney injury although it is impossible to say with certainty. 
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9b.4 
 Incorrect fluid balance 
As part of the review into Mr K’s care, the fluid balance charts have been reviewed 
and scrutinised for accuracy and completeness. Although there are some 
examples of good practice when reviewing Mr K’s charts from the 25th 29th July, 
this is not consistant for each day that is was recorded. 
 
The fluid balance charts that were completed on the days that Mr K went to 
theatre do not record any of the additional fluid that Mr K was given during 
surgery. The lack of this documentation could be significant, as had this 
information been included it would have identified that on both operation days that 
Mr K was in a positive fluid balance, even counting an insensible loss of 500mls. 
An insensible loss means how much fluid a person may lose through normal body 
functions this is on average 500mls. Had the fluid charts been recorded accurately 
they would have identified that at the end of the first operation day (25th July) Mr K 
was positive 3445 mls, and the 2nd operation day (27th) he was 2120 mls positive, 
but with little urine output. The fact that Mr K had this much additional fluid and yet 
still was borderline oliguric for 2 days (oliguria is defined as an adult who patient 
passes less than 400mls of urine in 24 hours), and anuric on the 27th July (no 
urine passed in 24 hours) which should have alerted medical and nursing staff to 
take appropriate action.  
 
9b.5 
 Use of nephrotoxic agents 
Based on review of the medical notes, drug kardex’s and blood results; Mr K was 
receiving medications that could have exacerbated his acute kidney injury 
(nephrotoxic). Mr K was prescribed Gabapentin for treatment of his acute pain, 
and this drug should be used in caution and with a reduced dose in patients that 
have kidney impairment.   
 
Gentomycin (an antibiotic) was given as a stat dose to cover the insertion of his 
urinary catheter once it was known that Mr K was in acute kidney failure. Whilst 
this single dose of Gentomycin was unlikely to have had a significant effect upon 
Mr K’s kidneys, an alternative should have been considered. 
 
Recognition of Mr K’s Acute Kidney Injury 
 
9b.6 
Failure to act on oliguria / anuria by nursing and medical staff  
In the early hours of 28th July 2013, Mr K had had no urine output documented 
since 18:00 on 26th July (36 hours). The nursing staff were concerned by this but 
did not bleep the medical team to review, they offered Mr K a urinary bottle 
numerous times through the night but Mr K was unable to pass urine. They did 
discuss this with the SHO on call, Dr AJ who happened to be visiting the ward in 
the early hours of the morning.   
 
9b.7 
There is no documentation in medical notes to evidence that a clinical examination 
took place when Dr AJ visited the ward, but the nurse caring for Mr K that night 
recalls in her statement and in the nursing notes that the doctor was not 
concerned as Mr K was comfortable and had “no palpable bladder” (the bladder is 
able to be felt on clinical examination if it has large volume of urine contained 
within it). The doctor advised to continue to monitor Mr K. There is no evidence 
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that there was any other escalation to medical staff that night shift despite Mr K 
passing no urine. The SHO’s instructions were handed over to the day nursing 
team, who thought that Mr K was in urinary retention post surgery. At this point 
given that there was a possibility that Mr K was in retention there should have 
been a consideration to insert a urinary catheter to alleviate the retention and also 
to monitor the urine output.  
 
9b.8 
Mr K was reviewed by the Consultant Orthopaedic surgeon the following morning, 
where it was noted that he was comfortable and there was “nil new”. There is no 
evidence in the medical notes that this review noted that Mr K had been anuric for 
many hours at the time of this review. 
 
9b.9 
During the day of 28th July 2013 Mr K was cared for by SN G the nurse who had 
accessed Mr K’s abnormal blood results on the 26th July, it was documented 
regularly on the fluid balance chart “NPU” (not passed urine). At 12 midday a 
bladder scan was undertaken by SN G. A bladder scan is an ultrasound scan 
which allows the scanner to estimate how much urine is within the bladder. The 
bladder scan identified that Mr K had no urine in his bladder, this was repeated at 
18:00 where there was still no urine seen within the bladder.  
 
9b.10 
The nursing staff were under the impression that as Mr K had no pain and no 
urine in the bladder, that he was still in urinary retention post surgery. However 
from review of the notes and fluid balance charts it is likely that this assumption 
was incorrect, as urinary retention is usually accompanied by pain, discomfort and 
over distension of the bladder as urine builds up within it; Mr K had none of these 
symptoms. The fact that Mr K had no pain, no palpable bladder, no urine in the 
bladder and abnormal blood results should have alerted the staff to the fact that 
Mr K was not producing urine as he was in acute kidney failure not post surgery 
retention.   
 
9b.11 
During the day of the 28th July SN G attempted to contact the orthopaedic SHO 
and registrar on call who were providing cover for the wards to inform them that 
Mr K had yet to pass urine. The content of the calls were not able to be recalled in 
detail by SN G at interview but she relayed information to alert the doctors that Mr 
K was in retention but was comfortable with no urine in the bladder on scanning. 
During staff interviews the SN was unable to recall how many times she contacted 
the SHO and registrar about Mr K, but stated that they were busy all day with 
trauma calls and in theatre and were unable to come to the ward. There was no 
escalation of concerns by the nursing staff or medical on call staff to the 
consultant during the day on 28th July.  
 
9b.12 
There is guidance on actions to follow if a patient has much lower urine volumes 
than expected and these are found on the back of the fluid balance chart and in 
the MEWs escalation policy. Although there were some attempts made to escalate 
concerns, these were not escalated above registrar level. The content of what 
information was handed over to medical staff is also key in this case, as the 
message from the nursing staff was that Mr K was in retention, but comfortable, 
however if the information that Mr K had not passed urine for over 36 hours in 
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addition to his deterioration of blood results been highlighted it may have 
prompted different action.  
 
9b.13 
 Failure to act on abnormal blood results 
Mr K had blood taken on the 26th July which was the day following his first 
operation and the day prior to his second operation. The blood tests taken on this 
day were available on the electronic reporting system, from 15:10. The blood tests 
were abnormal and identified that Mr K’s kidney function was deteriorating (Mr K’s 
kidney function was normal on admission to Hospital A).  
 
From the audit trail on the electronic results system only 1 person viewed Mr K’s 
blood results on 26th July at 17:00, this was SN G. There is no documentation that 
these results were communicated to the medical team or handed over to other 
members of the nursing team. No other member of staff reviewed those blood 
results until 28th July at 22:32, when Dr AJ was reviewing Mr K prior to his 
admission to critical care.  
 
This represents both an omission in the communication of deteriorating / abnormal 
results and lack of review of results by different members of the medical team 
including the anaesthetic staff, both of which may have contributed to the delay in 
diagnosis of Mr K’s acute kidney injury. It has not been possible to interview the 
anaesthetic consultant who anaesthetised Mr K during his operation on 27th July 
2013 as he is no longer employed by the Trust.   
 
9b.14 
 Quality of documentation  
As part of this investigation the medical and nursing notes have been reviewed. 
From the review of the medical and nursing notes there are some examples of 
excellent documentation, with clear, detailed, legible entries and signatures. 
However this is not consistant throughout Mr K’s notes.  
 
Most notably the investigation has been unable to locate Mr K’s observations 
charts from admission to Hospital A until his admission to the critical care unit. 
This has led to difficulties in the retrospective investigation as not all of Mr K’s 
relevant documentation has been reviewed.  
 
9b.15 
 Ward rounds  
Mr K was reviewed by the operating consultant on both post operative days 26th 
July and 28th July. Following the first operation there is an entry that records that 
Mr K is comfortable and that his arm was neuro vascularly intact (this means that 
Mr K has no loss in sensation, feeling or circulation following his operation), that 
Mr K’s observations are stable, and that bloods were to be checked. There is no 
record that the doctor requesting these bloods came back to review the results of 
these blood tests. This was a missed opportunity as the results of these blood test 
identified that Mr K’s kidneys were failing.  
 
On the 28th July 2013 the operating consultant conducted another ward round with 
another doctor (whose designation is not recorded in the notes). This review of Mr 
K stated that Mr K was “post operation, day 1, left shoulder plating, comfortable, 
nil new”. There is no evidence that Mr K was examined or his observation or fluids 
charts were reviewed. This represents a missed opportunity to identify Mr K’s 
acute kidney injury, as at this point Mr K’s had not passed urine for 36 hours.  
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During the weekend the orthopaedic consultant is expected to conduct a meeting 
from 8am, where all trauma patients are discussed. Following this meeting the 
consultants review the ward based patients who are pre operative and post 
operative. The consultant is then required to be present in the theatre for the pre 
operative safety checks prior to their list commencing from 9am. This leaves little 
time for the consultant to have a physical presence on the ward. Therefore the 
SHO on call should return to the ward to follow up on instructions and plans made 
during the ward round. It is clear that on 28th July 2013 this did not occur as the 
SHO had to attend ED. It has not been possible to investigate this further as part 
of this review as the SHO was a locum doctor who no longer works at Hospital A. 
 
     Management of Mr K’s Acute Kidney Injury 
 
9b.16 
Once Mr K’s acute kidney injury was identified on the night of the 28th July 2013 the 
initial management and referral to critical care was on the whole to be commended. 
Mr K was admitted to the critical unit where he underwent renal replacement 
therapy for several days. Mr K renal function recovered with the assistance of the 
treatment provided. 
 
9c. Missed opportunities 
There were missed opportunities: 
 
9c.1 
To recognise that Mr K was at risk of renal impairment with his pre existing conditions 
of type 2 diabetes and hypertension.  
 
9c.2 
To identify that Mr K had several periods of hypotension which may have contributed 
to the development of AKI; these may not have been treated as robustly as they could 
have. The periods of hypotension could have been related to hypovolaemia or may 
cardiac in origin. 
9c.3 
To review Mr K’s blood results that identified that his kidneys were failing. 
 
9c.4 
To not escalate Mr K’s abnormal blood results when electronic results accessed by 
nursing staff on 26th July. 
 
9c.5 
By assuming that Mr K was suffering with acute urinary retention despite having no 
pain, no distended bladder and no urine in the bladder on scan. Had Mr K been 
suffering with acute urinary retention medical staff should have considered insertion of 
a urinary catheter.  
 
9c.6 
To complete accurate recording of fluid balance which may have delayed the 
diagnosis of acute kidney injury. 
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9c.7 
On Sunday 28th July when nurses raised concerns to the SHO and Registrar about Mr 
K’s urine output, both doctors were unable to come to the wad as they were in theatre 
and the ED. Concerns were not escalated to the consultant on call.  
 
9c.8 
To identify the signs and symptoms of acute kidney injury. 
 
9c.9 
By no follow of blood results that were requested on the ward round and limited 
mention of Mr K’s observations and fluid balance. 
 
9c.10 
By Mr K receiving nephrotoxic drugs despite deteriorating blood results.  
 
 
10. Conclusion 
10a. Actions or omissions which contributed to the incident 
Based on the facts gathered as part of the investigation and the / missed opportunities 
outlined above, it is the conclusion of the investigation team that the following actions 
or omissions contributed to the incident: 
 
The incorrect attribution of Mr K’s lack of urine output was due to acute urinary 
retention by both medical and nursing staff.  
 
Incorrect and incomplete fluid balance charts which may have delayed the diagnosis 
of AKI 
 
Failure to recognise that Mr K had several episodes of hypotension during the pre and 
peri operative period, this may have been due to hypovolaemia.  
 
10b. Actions or omissions which caused the incident – avoidable harm 
Based on the facts gathered as part of the investigation and the lessons learned/ 
findings requiring improvement/ missed opportunities outlined above, it is the 
conclusion of the investigation team that the following actions or omissions caused the 
incident and resulted in avoidable harm: 
 
There was a failure of the medical and nursing staff caring for Mr K to identify the 
signs of acute kidney injury which led to a delayed diagnosis. 
 
Administration of nephrotoxic drugs to Mr K when he already had signs of AKI 
 
11. Recommendations and actions to be taken 
The recommendations that the investigating team has concluded as a result of this 
investigation, to address the findings of the incident identified above, are: 
 
 This report and its findings will be shared with Mr K and his family 
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 This report and the learning from this will be shared with the medical and 
nursing staff involved in the incident, but also to the wider orthopaedic team to 
ensure learning.  
 
 The escalation of clinical concern by the nursing staff should be escalated 
higher if there is inadequate response by the reviewing doctor. This should 
include contacting critical care outreach for advice within the scope of their 
hours.   
 
 The process for patient review and initiation of recommended treatments 
during the ward round to be reviewed 
 
 The Trust should implement the recommendations contained within NICE 
guidance CG 169, AKI: prevention, detection and management of AKI as a 
priority. http://publications.nice.org.uk/acute-kidney-injury-cg169 
 Review of medical staffing on the weekend for orthopaedics to ensure that 
every patient has a review.  
 Matron and Governance lead to meet with staff involved with this incident to 
ensure that any deficiencies in knowledge are addressed.  
 Development of a guideline to ensure that high risk patients are reviewed daily 
by the ortho geriatric team.  
 
 
END OF THIS APPENDIX 
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Appendix A.2: Textual parts of the recording scheme used to record the investigative hypotheses 
developed using the Information Safety Method 
 
This appendix illustrates the textual recording scheme used for the main study reported in Chapter 4. This scheme was mostly developed through both 
a pilot Information Safety Method analysis before the main study, in addition to additional experience gained from two other preliminary analyses 
conducted using the Information Safety Method (Huang et al. 2014a). Tables A.2.1, A.2.2 and A.2.3 illustrate how the developing Information Safety 
Method investigative hypotheses were recorded using the textual recording scheme, with example entries from analysis of the 1st incident (involving 
a wrong drug), 4th incident (involving a late detection of lung cancer), and 5th incident situations (involving a late detection of patient physiological 
deterioration) respectively (cf. Table 4.1 in the thesis body). A custom cross-referencing scheme was used for the entries under the ‘Specific data 
sources’ column in the three tables of this appendix. These entries referred to both particular parts from the corresponding incident investigation 
reports, as well as other background material consulted as part of the incident analysis process. 
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Schemes used to record each link of the ‘information trajectories’ identified through Information Safety Method analysis 
Table A.2.1: Scheme for recording the information trajectories identified using the Information Safety Method. 
Link identified 
(including selected counterfactual ones, marked 
with CF) 
Brief summary/description Specific data sources Additional comments 
From this participant: To this participant: 
Dispensing technician 
(Mr E) 
Pharmacy computer 
system 
Mr E correctly enters drug identity 
information into the pharmacy 
computer system. 
[2: 13. 14. TT13-3] Technically there are ‘multiple’ 
drug identity information flows 
here. 
Chest x-ray image 
report (an electronic 
document filed on the 
25th July 2012) 
Paper copy of chest x-
ray image report (for 
faxing) 
A paper copy of the electronic 
version of Mr G’s chest x-ray image 
report is made; in preparation for 
faxing to Mr H, ENT consultant. 
[20: 46. 59.] Here we assume that a traditional 
paper-based fax machine was 
used to fax a copy of Mr G’s chest 
x-ray image report. 
The on-duty Max Fac 
SHO 
A member of the 
outreach team 
The on-duty Max Fac SHO ‘escalates’ 
Mrs R’s BP-reading/MEWS to the 
outreach team. 
Sun-BP1, Sat-MEWS1, Sat-
MEWS2, Sat-MEWS3, Sun-
MEWS2 *. 
There did not seem to have been 
escalation of patient care 
information to the outreach team 
in this incident (e.g. see [26: 1.5 
1.6 2.5.5]). 
 
CF 
* In analysing the 5th incident situation, multiple ‘sub’ information trajectories were identified, to be associated with the same information 
representation (e.g., for the Blood Pressure, or Modified Early Warning Score information representations). To cope with the further logistical 
overhead introduced by this unforeseen study complication, the additional recording scheme below (Table A.2.2) was devised during the main study 
reported in Chapter 4. This addition helped with management and recording of the association between the Information Safety Method investigative 
hypotheses, and the incident data and other background material. Entries for the 2nd blood pressure reading on Sunday (Sun-BP2), and the 2nd 
Modified Early Warning Score on Sunday (Sun-MEWS2) are presented as illustrative examples in Table A.2.2. 
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Table A.2.2: An addition extension to the recording scheme shown in Table A.2.1. 
Sub 
information 
trajectory 
identifier 
BP/MEWS 
reading 
Time at which 
the BP/MEWS 
reading was 
taken 
(24hr format) 
Specific data sources Corresponding PowerPoint 
slide visualisation 
Additional comments 
Sun-BP2 BP: 80 
systolic 
Between 06.30 
and 14.00 
[1.6 TT25-1 TT26-1 TT27-1 
TT26-3 TT26-6] 
Slide 2 Cross-referenced 1.6 with all the entries in 
the [26: TT26] row, to determine that a 
Max Fac registrar took/recorded Mrs R’s BP 
here. 
Sun-MEWS2 MEWS: 3 06.30 [1.6  2.5.4  TT25-3 TT26-3 
TT26-6] 
Slide 9 We assume that the Max Fac registrar 
(working on the Sunday morning) did not 
re-take Mrs R’s MEWS, and simply read-off 
the last MEWS reading taken at 6.30. 
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Scheme used to record each of the ‘safety function’ investigative hypotheses 
Two examples are given here to illustrate how the safety functions were recorded during the main study (Chapter 4). The first entry is safety function 
26, giving an example of a ‘newly identified’ safety function, identified through Information Safety Method analysis of the second incident situation. 
The second entry is safety function 30, giving an example of where an ‘old’ safety function’s scope was successfully extended to a new Information 
Safety Method incident analysis – based on new incident data. This second entry is from analysis of the 5th incident situation, showing the way in 
which the scope of safety function 30 (originally identified through Information Safety Method analysis of the 2nd incident situation) was then 
extended: as a factor deemed to be relevant to the analysis of the 5th incident situation. 
Table A.2.3: Scheme for recording the safety functions identified. 
Safety function 
identified 
(briefly) 
More elaborate 
description and 
explanation 
Specific safety function assignment and scoping 
(i.e., ‘instantiating’ the abstract safety function 
descriptions, see Section 4.3.4) 
Specific 
data 
sources 
Additional comments 
26: Provide a fluid 
challenge to each 
sucker. 
This is another one of four 
standard checks that are 
expected to be undertaken 
– to ensure that the 
direction of a particular 
sucker is both correct and 
safe. This check did not 
seem to have been done by 
trainee perfusionist NS in 
this incident. 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, 
which can increase the probability of correct 
direction-of-blue-pump-tubing information 
representation in all the pump tubing related non-
human participants (e.g., the Pump-side part of the 
blue tubing; Blue tubing for 3rd sucker (cannulated 
within the heart); and Blue tubing for 3rd sucker (in 
the saline receptacle) participants. 
[7:  2.2.1 
TT7-6  
TT27-3] 
We assume that this check was 
basically an ‘offline wet test’ – 
intended to be done at time of 
setting-up the perfusion 
equipment, and substantively 
before the ‘live wet test’ at the 
operating table (i.e., safety 
function 27). 
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30: (Perceived) 
surgeon/doctor 
‘dominance’, over 
‘lower’ parts of the 
medical hierarchy 
(e.g., nurses, junior 
doctors, 
perfusionists etc.). 
This safety function is 
relevant to the current 
analyses. 
Like in [10], this acts as a consistency-reducing safety 
function here, which can reduce the probability of 
consistent information flow between two interacting 
human participants – where the ‘receiving 
participant’ is ‘higher’ in terms of their perceived 
‘clinical seniority’. 
[26: 2.5.6  
4.2.4  5.4  
TT35-6; 10] 
To avoid visual clutter, here we 
do not exhaustively visualise all 
counterfactual consistency-links, 
like was done for [8: Slides 4/5]. 
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Appendix A.3: The 8 ‘seed safety functions’ used as a 
starting point for the Information Safety Method analysis 
reported in Chapter 4 
 
(Adapted from Huang et al. 2014a, supplementary paper) 
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1. Introduction 
This appendix reconstructs the ‘final’ line of reasoning taken by the first author, in 
constructing conceptual models of incidents using a prototypical version of the 
Information Safety Method. The Information Safety Method was used to help 
understand and reframe incident data, drawn from the investigation reports for two 
independent incidents. This document is based on notes taken as part of the 
Information Safety Method analyses done between late May and early July 2012. 
These earlier notes include other less certain lines of reasoning not presented here. 
The first of the two incidents analysed involved an overdose of Fluorouracil [1], and 
the other involved an injection of Vincristine via the wrong route of administration [2]. 
Inline citations to the two reports are used throughout this document, to explicitly link 
the reasoning described to incident data from the reports. The specific references 
presented are indicative rather than exhaustive. 
 
 
2. Information Safety Method analysis of the 
Fluorouracil incident situation 
2.1 The information representation selected 
We selected the rate of infusion (for the Fluorouracil drug) information representation 
for Information Safety Method analysis. This was the information representation 
eventually (wrongly) given to the patient. The reasoning by which the Information 
Safety Method analysis of the incident was derived is detailed below. Section 2.2 
describes the reasoning leading to the information flows identified, and Section 2.3 
describes the reasoning leading to the safety functions identified. 
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2.2 The information flows identified 
Starting with the patient, the initial ‘upstream’ participant subsequently identified was 
the infusion pump [1, p13], and nurse RN #1 programmed and initiated the infusion [1, 
p13]. The rate of infusion information used by nurse RN #1 was informed both by her 
reading of the pharmacy label [1, p13], as well as by the confirmation from nurse RN 
#2 [1, p13]. Both nurses signed off on the handwritten medication administration 
record (MAR) [1, p13]. RN #1 also electronically signed for the total dose of drug to 
give on the computer [1, p13]. We do not know whether either of the nurses did, or did 
not in fact use the handwritten MAR to inform them specifically of the rate of infusion 
information. We do not know whether this rate information was available as part of the 
electronic signing off done by nurse RN #1. We do not know whether nurse RN #2 
was primarily responsible for the infusion given to the patient. Nurse RN #2 did a 
passing check only at the request of RN #1 [1, p13]. Nurse RN #2 clearly had to have 
obtained information about the rate of infusion from somewhere in order to be able to 
do this checking. Here we assumed that the handwritten MAR was used to inform 
nurse RN #2’s knowledge of the correct rate (prior to her signing off on it). It was 
unclear to us where the information in the handwritten MAR came from. This therefore 
formed one stopping point for analysing the flow of information, due to a perceived 
lack of further clear incident knowledge. Since RN #1 seemed to have used the 
pharmacy label to inform her knowledge of the rate of infusion, it was unnecessary for 
us to make a similar assumption of RN #1 also using the handwritten MAR to gain 
knowledge of the rate information. 
We found insufficient incident data to fully and clearly trace back the flow of rate of 
infusion information – from the pharmacy label to its source and ‘creator’. It was also 
unclear who prescribed the chemotherapy order used in the first place. The 
chemotherapy order was entered into the pharmacy information system by a 
pharmacy technician [1, p12-13]. We assumed that the rate of infusion information 
was included as part of this order. Pharmacists were also involved in this part of the 
information flow, but it was unclear whether multiple pharmacists were involved, and 
how their involvement related to the rate of infusion information specifically [1, p12-13]. 
The pharmacy technician clearly transcribed the rate information from somewhere 
else into the pharmacy information system. In this case a computerized prescriber 
order entry (CPOE) system seemed to exist separately from the pharmacy information 
system. The CPOE system was used to inform the pharmacy staff as to what must be 
entered into the pharmacy information system [1, p33]. We conjectured that the 
pharmacy label was generated by the pharmacy information system. Figure 1 shows 
the Information Safety Method based information flows identified. 
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Figure 1: An Information Safety Method analysis of the flows of rate of infusion 
information. 
2.3 The safety functions identified 
Three safety functions were identified and reified with a degree of confidence from 
analysing the incident data in the report. These are detailed below. Figure 2 shows 
how these safety functions were perceived to relate to the flow of rate of infusion 
information. 
Safety function 1: Low index of suspicion for unusual rate of infusion for new nurse 
We know that nurse RN #1 was new to the day care unit where the patient was being 
cared for. This was the first time RN #1 administered a 4-day Fluorouracil infusion [1, 
p18]. The rate of infusion calculated was apparently not so unusual for other similar 
infusions in the clinic [1, p18]. The report holistically summarised these contributory 
factors, as resulting in a ‘low index of suspicion’ regarding the high infusion rate 
calculated. A reported consequence of RN #1’s relative unfamiliarity with the work-
setting and particular administration protocol used, was that no subsequent mental 
approximation of the calculated rate was done [1, p18]. 
We interpreted RN #1’s low index of suspicion, as an aspect of the interaction context 
which reduced the probability of a correct rate of infusion information representation 
being in both RN #1’s head, as well as in the infusion pump itself. This contextual 
aspect was perceived to reduce RN #1’s chances of timely self-detection and 
correction, upon calculating an incorrect rate of infusion. This contextual aspect was 
also perceived to reduce the chances that RN #1 would detect any wrong rate values 
whilst programming the infusion pump (and therefore reducing the chances of a 
correct rate existing in the pump). RN #2 was apparently a ‘trouble shooter’ [1, p16]. 
This suggested that this ‘low index of suspicion’ safety function was unlikely to be 
applicable to RN #2 also, due to her relative familiarity and experience with the work-
setting and administration protocol used at the time of the incident. This safety 
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function may potentially apply to all such ‘new’ nurses, in a position similar to RN #1 at 
the time of this incident. 
Safety function 2: Complex workload and multitasking for nurses 
Nurses in the day care unit where the patient was being cared for were expected to 
deal with complex workloads, and often multitask between different parts of this 
workload simultaneously [1, p20]. In this situation, information (such as the rate of 
infusion) may potentially be communicated both to and from such nurses 
inconsistently (through misreading/mishearing for example). The additional cognitive 
load that may be induced through routinely needing to simultaneously manage the 
individual subtasks of these complex workloads, also reduces the chances for 
information representations to remain correct within the nurses’ heads (through an 
increased chance of forgetting for example). 
This contextual aspect of the system was interpreted by us as reducing the probability 
of the rate of infusion information being consistently transmitted either to or from the 
nursing staff involved in this incident (i.e., RN #1 and RN #2). This aspect was also 
interpreted as reducing the probability of the rate of infusion information remaining 
correct in these nurses’ heads. 
Safety function 3: Fallible human transcription 
As part of the events leading up to the incident, the report notes that human 
transcription of information affords the potential for errors to inadvertently occur [1, 
p33]. In this particular case a mistranscription of the volume of Fluorouracil to be 
infused apparently occurred as part of the drug preparation activities in the pharmacy 
part of the work-system (although it is unclear precisely how this particular 
mistranscription occurred) [1, p33]. ‘Fallible human transcription’ was conjectured as 
an aspect of the work-context that was readily applicable in a general way, as it is 
clearly in general unrealistic to expect human transcription to occur routinely with 
100% accuracy. This contextual aspect was assumed to reduce the probability of the 
rate of infusion information being consistently transmitted either to or from any human 
participants in such a system. The patient did not ‘transcribe’ information, due to being 
the passive destination for the rate information, so was not included in the functional 
scope of this particular safety function. 
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Figure 2: An Information Safety Method analysis of the safety functions 
effecting the flow of the rate of infusion information representation in the 
Fluorouracil incident situation. The numbered circles correspond to how the 
safety functions identified relate to the flows shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
3. Information Safety Method analysis of the 
Vincristine incident situation 
3.1 The information representation selected 
We selected the route of administration (for the Vincristine drug) information 
representation for Information Safety Method analysis. This was the information 
representation eventually (wrongly) given to the patient. The reasoning by which the 
Information Safety Method analysis was derived is detailed below. Section 3.2 
describes the reasoning leading to the information flows identified, and Section 3.3 
describes the reasoning leading to the safety functions identified. 
3.2 The information flows identified 
Starting with the patient, the initial ‘upstream’ participant subsequently identified was 
Dr Morton, who administered the Vincristine intrathecally (i.e., via the spine) to the 
patient (Mr Jowett) [2, p29]. A number of other participants may have facilitated the 
route of administration information used by Dr Morton. Dr Mulhem confirmed this route 
information for the drug with Dr Morton [2, p29]. Dr Morton also consulted the patient’s 
prescription chart [2, p29]. Route of administration information was included on the 
labelling affixed to the syringes used [2, Plate 1, p4]. We assumed that Dr Morton 
read from this syringe label before administering the Vincristine. Nurse Vallance also 
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reportedly remarked to Dr Morton earlier about the (intrathecal) route of drug 
administration for the patient [2, p26]. Dr Musuka wrote out the patient’s prescription 
chart [2, p24] (it was unclear who the original prescriber of the patient’s chemotherapy 
treatment was). Dr Mulhem consulted the prescription chart [2, p28]. Dr Mulhem also 
read from the syringe label prior to handing the syringe to Dr Morton [2, p28]. We 
assumed that when Dr Mulhem took the packet containing the syringe with the 
Vincristine drug from Nurse Vallance [2, p27] he also looked at the syringe packaging 
label. The pharmacy database was used to generate both the syringe label, as well as 
the syringe packaging label [2, p13]. 
 
Figure 3: An Information Safety Method analysis of the flows of route of administration 
information. 
 
3.3 The safety functions identified 
Five safety functions were identified and reified with a degree of confidence from 
analysing the incident data in the report. These are detailed below. Figures 4 and 5 
show how these safety functions were perceived to relate to the flow of route of 
administration information. Respectively without, and with the effects of safety function 
3, originally identified through analysing the Fluorouracil incident. 
Safety function 4: Constraints on the pharmacy database 
The report states that the pharmacy database was constrained, such that only the 
three drugs used for intrathecal chemotherapy could be labelled for intrathecal use [2, 
p13]. Since the pharmacy database automatically generates both the syringe, and 
syringe packaging labels [2, p13], this aspect of the work-system was interpreted as a 
safety function that helps to preserve the consistency of the route of administration 
information – between its representation in the pharmacy database, and the two types 
of labels generated. Further specific details about how this constraint was achieved is 
not provided by the report, though a relatively strong enforcement mechanism is 
implied for preserving the consistency of route of administration information at this 
point in the overall flow. 
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Safety function 5: Physical and temporal separation of the packaging and 
supply of drugs to the wards 
The intrathecal and non-intrathecal drugs (prepared in the Sterile Production Unit) are 
physically and temporally separated [2, p16], to help ensure that the route of 
administration displayed on both the syringe, and syringe packaging labels would 
always correctly reflect the intended route of administering the drugs prepared. This 
separation minimises the chances of inadvertent mix-ups between the labelling of 
drugs intended for different routes, and was interpreted as a safety function which 
increases the probability that the route of administration information displayed on 
these two types of labels would be correct. 
Safety function 6: Physically bi-compatible syringe connection 
Syringes containing intravenous drugs such as Vincristine may also be successfully 
connected to the spinal needles intended only for intrathecal administration [2, p14]. 
This physical bi-compatibility and indiscrimination is interpreted here as a safety 
function, which reduces the probability of the route of administration ‘given’ to the 
patient at the point of drug delivery being correct. 
Safety function 7: Avoiding compromising patient care 
In this incident, drugs intended for administration via different routes were in fact sent 
to the ward at the same time, to avoid compromising patient care [2, p36]; thus 
directly contradicting the temporal aspect of the normative temporal-spatial separation 
protocol of safety function 5. This was a ‘workaround’ employed by the pharmacy staff, 
who may have had to prepare the drugs on shorter notice than usual. Conditions 
existing at the time of the incident may have indirectly exerted pressure, to send these 
intrathecal and non-intrathecal drugs at the same time. In particular, we know that: 
1) The patient’s treatment information had not been entered into the ward manager’s 
chemotherapy diary. As a result, the patient’s chemotherapy had not, as was normal 
practice, been ordered in advance [2, p10]; 
2) The patient missed his planned appointment to see Dr Musuka on the morning of 
the 4th January 2001, and did not notify Ward E17 of his intention to arrive that 
afternoon [2, p10]. 
This ‘workaround’ directly negated the intended purpose of the normative temporal-
spatial separation protocol, as described in safety function 5; thus representing an 
aspect of the system which increased the probability that inadvertent mix-ups between 
the labelling of drugs intended for different routes may occur. 
Safety function 8: Lack of a rigorous checking procedure for the doctors 
While the nurses had an explicit protocol to follow for checking the correctness of the 
route of administration information, the doctors did not [2, p35]. This lack of formalised 
checking procedure for the doctors, was interpreted as an aspect of the system that 
reduced the probability that the route information representation in the doctors’ heads 
would be correct (i.e., they are less likely to self-correct). Dr Musuka was excluded 
from the functional scope of this safety function, because he was not directly involved 
in the drug delivery process. 
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Figure 4: An Information Safety Method analysis of the safety functions effecting 
the flow of the route of administration information representation in the 
Vincristine incident situation. The numbered circles correspond to how the 
safety functions identified relate to the flows shown in Figure 3. 
 
3.4 Generalising from the safety functions of the Fluorouracil 
incident situation 
As part of the identification of safety functions, here, the three safety functions 
identified from Information Safety Method analysis of the Fluorouracil incident 
situation were considered in turn – for their applicability to the Vincristine incident 
situation. The three safety functions were: 
- Low index of suspicion for unusual rate of infusion for new nurse (safety function 1), 
- Complex workload and multitasking for nurses (safety function 2), 
- Fallible human transcription (safety function 3). 
From reading the Vincristine investigation report it was unclear to us the extent to 
which safety functions 1 and 2 were generalisable to the Vincristine incident situation. 
There were insufficient contextual details for a clear judgement of the applicability of 
these two safety functions, about infusions and nurses respectively. We judged safety 
function 3 to be sufficiently generic to be applicable to this Vincristine incident also. 
The analysis results which include safety function 3 (Figure 5) was considered to be 
the ‘final’ Information Safety Method analysis of the Vincristine incident situation. 
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Figure 5: An Information Safety Method analysis of the safety functions effecting the 
flow of the route of administration information representation in the Vincristine incident 
situation. This figure includes the generalisation of safety function 3 from Section 2.3. 
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Appendix A.4: Additional examples from the study reported 
in Chapter 4 
 
Analysis of an incident situation involving a wrong drug being dispensed (1st 
incident situation analysed in the study) 
In this incident situation, a patient (Mr P) was receiving ongoing medication to help 
manage Hepatitis C. As part of his treatment, the drug Ribavirin was prescribed; 
however the drug Boceprevir was dispensed in error instead. Both these drugs are used 
for treating Hepatitis C, but Ribavirin is the more standard medication option. As per 
standard practice, the drug dispensed was checked by both a pharmacist and an 
‘accuracy checker’, before being given to the patient. During this dispensing and 
checking process, no-one realised that the wrong drug was dispensed; this error was 
later identified by the patient, who was concerned about the fact that his medication 
looked different. After contacting the outpatient clinic to seek advice, the patient 
brought the erroneous prescription in. He was subsequently put onto the correct 
(intended) original treatment regimen (involving the use of Ribavirin). 
Figure A.4.1, Table A.4.1, and Table A.4.2 together show extracts from the full 
Information Safety Method investigative hypotheses developed. The hypotheses were 
in this case about how drug identity representations were coordinated during this 
incident, and also show the scoping of the various ‘safety function’ hypotheses 
relevant to correct representation, and consistent coordination of drug identity across 
the participants of this representation coordination system. 
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Figure A.4.1: Graphical part of the final Information Safety Method investigative 
hypotheses generated, showing both the information trajectory, and the safety function 
scoping relating to drug identity.  
  
KEY
= a coordination of (drug identity) information 
representation between two participants
+
-
= functional scope of 
safety functions on the 
information coordinations
= a human 
participant
= a non-human 
participant
= an information coordination which did 
not apparently happen
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Table A.4.1: Corresponding textual representation of the information trajectory shown 
in Figure A.4.1 (corresponding to each arrow in the figure, alphabetically ordered) 
Links in the information 
trajectory 
(selected ‘inconsistent information 
flows’ are marked with CF) 
The interaction(s) leading to the 
propagation and transformation of DRUG 
IDENTITY representation 
(the two participants in each interactive ‘flow’ are 
indicated in bold) 
Accuracy checker (Ms F) 
  to Mr P 
Mr P assumed that the drugs he was given were 
right, after being checked by the accuracy checker 
(Ms F). 
Capsule pack (Ribavirin) 
  to Dispensing technician (Mr E) CF 
Mr E obtained (and looked at) the Ribavirin 
capsule pack dispensed from the ‘robot’. 
Dispensing ‘robot’ 
  to Capsule pack (Ribavirin)        CF 
The dispensing ‘robot’ automatically dispenses the 
correct Ribavirin capsule pack. 
Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
  to Pharmacy computer system 
Mr E correctly enters drug identity information into 
the pharmacy computer system. 
Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
  to Tablets (Boceprevir) 
Mr E puts Boceprevir tablets into the tablet box 
labelled for Ribavirin. 
Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
  to Tablet box (with Ribavirin label) 
Mr E attached the Ribavirin label onto the tablet 
box. 
Drug label 
  to Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
Mr E read the Ribavirin drug label before 
attaching it to the tablet box for the drug. 
Mr P’s drug prescription 
  to Accuracy checker (Ms F) 
The accuracy checker (Ms F) looked at Mr P’s 
original drug prescription. 
Mr P’s drug prescription 
  to Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
Mr E correctly read the drug identity information on 
Mr P’s drug prescription. 
Pharmacy computer system 
  to Dispensing ‘robot’ 
This ‘robot’ is linked to the pharmacy computer 
system, and dispenses automatically, based on the 
information entered into the pharmacy computer 
system. 
Pharmacy computer system 
  to Drug label 
Pharmacy computer system automatically 
produces the drug label based on the prescription 
entered into it. 
Tablets (Boceprevir) 
  to Mr P 
Mr P notices that his tablets looked different, and 
did not like the new colour of what he thought was 
Ribavirin. 
Tablet box (with Ribavirin label) 
  to Accuracy checker (Ms F) 
The accuracy checker (Ms F) looked at the label on 
the tablet box. 
Tablet capsule pack (Boceprevir) 
  to Dispensing technician (Mr E) 
Mr E obtained (and looked at) the Boceprevir 
capsule pack from out of the fridge in the 
dispensary, on the ‘stores’ side of the ‘robot’. 
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Table A.4.2: Textual representation of an illustrative selection of safety functions 
(corresponding to the numerical identifiers shown in Figure A.4.1). 
Safety function 
‘newly identified’ [I], 
or extended [E] 
More elaborate description and explanation 
(positive safety function to information trajectory 
associations are highlighted with [+], and negative ones with 
a [-]) 
9: Clinical checking of 
patient prescriptions by a 
pharmacist. 
[I] 
 
 
This clinical checking “involves firstly checking the patient’s 
allergy status to confirm the patient is not allergic to the 
medication prescribed. Next, the dose, frequency, route and 
length of treatment are reviewed” (quoted from the original 
incident investigation report) 
During this process, the checking pharmacist may 
serendipitously detect the wrong drug being used (e.g., if the 
drug is intuited to be particularly unusual for some reason?) 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of correct drug identity information 
representation in Mr P’s drug prescription. 
10: Automation of 
information transfer and 
coordination. 
[I] 
The connection between the pharmacy computer system, and 
dispensing ‘robot’ is automatic; The generation of the drug 
label, and medication dispensation is also automatic. 
Ideally, this safety function helps to ensure that the drugs 
dispensed, and enclosing packaging mutually match. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a consistency-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of consistent drug identity information 
flow between the following pairs of interacting participants: 
Pharmacy computer system -> Drug label; Pharmacy computer 
system -> Dispensing ‘robot’; Dispensing ‘robot’ -> Capsule 
pack (Ribavirin) (CF). 
This is also a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of a correct drug identity information 
representation: in both Tablets (Boceprevir), and Tablet box 
(with Ribavirin label). Through reducing the chance of 
inconsistencies being introduced, between the drug and its 
packaging – as occurred in this incident. 
11: Patient Question and 
Answer session, on 
conclusion of prescription 
delivery. 
[I] 
At the end of the prescription delivery process, the patient has a 
short interaction with one of the pharmacy staff (assumed to be 
Accuracy checker Ms F). This provides an opportunity for 
serendipitous error detection – in the case that the wrong drug 
was prescribed or dispensed. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of a correct drug identity information 
representation in/through the following four participants: 
Tablets (Boceprevir); Tablet box (with Ribavirin label); Mr P; 
Accuracy checker (Ms F). 
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13: ‘Accepted’ 
workaround in response 
to possible ‘robot 
dispensing’ delays. 
[I] 
Periodically throughout a working-day, delays of up to 30-40 
minutes could happen for the ‘robot’ that automatically 
dispenses the required drug. The workaround of obtaining the 
required drug from a different source rather than this robot, 
‘overrides’ the intended consistent flow of drug identity 
information: from the pharmacy computer system, to the drugs 
dispensed. Thus the drugs are more likely to not be the right 
one, and places more reliance on the subsequent information 
trajectory participants to ensure its correctness. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a correctness-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of correct drug identity information 
representation through the Tablets (Boceprevir) participant. 
16: Substantive work-
experience of pharmacy 
staff. 
[I] 
The two pharmacy staff involved in this incident were both quite 
experienced. This may help them serendipitously catch errors. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of correct drug identity information 
representation in the pharmacy staff. 
19: Worrying about non-
routine task to be done 
after the checking 
session. 
[I] 
For the first time, the accuracy checker (Ms F) was tasked with 
contacting some interview candidates, after doing the checking 
session. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a correctness-reducing safety function; in this case 
reducing the probability of correct drug identity information 
representation in Ms F. It also can reduce the probability of 
consistent information flow both to, and from Ms F; thus acting 
as a consistency-reducing safety function on the information 
flows directly relating to the accuracy checking process. 
21: The ‘fallible human’ 
assumption. 
[I] 
This is a suggested assumption of contemporary academic safety 
thinking; that it is unreasonable to expect 100% perfection from 
people all the time, and that occasionally people probably will 
make mistakes. (This safety function was identified in part as a 
response to reading in the corresponding report about completed 
‘additional training’ requests for both Mr E and Ms F) 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This safety function negatively affects all human participants of 
this incident (including the patient Mr P); and the information 
flows to, and from them. 
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22: Patient’s tacit 
knowledge of their 
‘routine’ medication. 
[I] 
As a patient gets familiar with their ongoing medication, they 
may develop expectations of what their drugs should look, and 
feel like. In this case, Mr P noticed that his ‘Ribavirin drugs’ 
looked different. 
In identifying this safety function, we assume that Mr P’s 
subsequent discussion with clinicians eventually led to 
identifying that the wrong drug was in fact given. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can 
increase the probability of a correct drug identity information 
representation in Mr P’s head, as well as make sure that Tablets 
(Boceprevir) are/were indeed right (in this incident this turned 
out not to be the case). 
Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analyses prior 
to this current study 
(3, see Appendix A.3 for original) 
3: Fallible human 
transcription. 
[E] 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
Under similar semantics as described in Appendix A.3, this is a 
consistency-reducing safety function, which effects information 
flows either to, or from any human participants of an incident. 
Because Mr P is more of an ‘active’ participant in this incident, 
he is also included within the scope of this safety function, in the 
Information Safety Method analysis here. 
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Analysis of an incident situation involving the wrong ‘direction of venting’ during 
heart transplant (2nd incident situation analysed) 
This incident situation was during a heart transplant operation for Mr G, the patient. As 
part of the first part of such an operation, a cannula is inserted into the heart – to drain 
or ‘vent’ any blood or air out of the heart before it is removed. This cannula is attached 
to a larger perfusion circuit, which takes over the circulatory function of the heart and 
lung during the transplant. In this case, the cannula blew blood/air into the heart; this 
was incorrect, and the cannula should have been draining instead. The patient suffered 
a stroke shortly after this operation. Although it is not clear whether the ‘blowing’ of 
the cannula during this operation was contributory to the stroke suffered, the hospital 
would like to prevent such ‘wrong direction’ errors from reoccurring in the future. For 
this reason, this episode was declared a Serious Untoward Incident, and an 
investigation subsequently conducted in response. For the Information Safety Method 
investigative hypotheses shown below, the direction-of-(blue)-pump-tubing refers to 
the direction of flow of liquid/air along this particular cannula – both before and after 
its connection with the perfusion circuit and insertion into the patient’s heart. 
Figure A.4.2, Table A.4.3, and Table A.4.4 together show extracts from the full 
Information Safety Method investigative hypotheses developed. The hypotheses were 
in this case about how direction-of-blue-pump-tubing representations were 
coordinated during this incident, and also show the scoping of the various ‘safety 
function’ hypotheses relevant to correct representation, and consistent coordination of 
direction-of-blue-pump-tubing across the participants of this representation 
coordination system. 
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Figure A.4.2: Graphical part of the final Information Safety Method investigative 
hypotheses generated, showing both the information trajectory, and the safety function 
scoping relating to the direction-of-blue-pump-tubing. 
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Table A.4.3: Corresponding textual representation of the information trajectory shown 
in Figure A.4.2 (corresponding to each arrow in the figure, alphabetically ordered) 
Links in the information trajectory 
(selected ‘inconsistent information 
flows’ are marked with CF) 
The interaction(s) leading to the 
propagation and transformation of 
DIRECTION-OF-BLUE-PUMP-
TUBING representation 
(the two participants in each interactive 
‘flow’ are indicated in bold) 
Blue tubing for 3rd sucker 
(cannulated within the heart) 
  to Surgeon 
     (leading the heart transplant operation) 
On opening the heart up to relieve the 
increasing pressure within it, the surgeon 
discovers that the cannulated blue tubing 
appears to be blowing, when it ought to be 
sucking. 
(This is the point at which the surgery team 
discovered that the pump tubing was inserted in 
the wrong direction) 
Blue tubing for 3rd sucker 
(in the saline receptacle) 
  to Scrub nurse LB                              CF 
Ideally, scrub nurse LB ought to have carried 
out the wet test also for the blue pump tubing. 
In the case of this incident this did not 
apparently happen. 
Blue tubing for 3rd sucker 
(in the saline receptacle) 
  to Trainee perfusionist NS                 CF 
Ideally, trainee perfusionist NS ought to have 
had a clear line of sight during the wet-testing 
of the blue tubing (within the saline 
receptacle). In the case of this incident this 
visual check did not apparently happen. 
Perfusionist ES 
  to Trainee perfusionist NS                 CF 
Before this heart transplant operation, 
perfusionist ES set up only the core 
oxygenator and circuit; ES then handed over to 
trainee perfusionist NS. We do not know 
whether information specifically about the 
direction-of-tubing for the blue sucker/tubing 
was explicitly discussed as part of this 
handover. It is important for this tubing-
direction to be correct, given its role in 
cannulating any blood or air out of, and not into 
the heart as part of the transplant operation. 
Pump-side part of the blue tubing 
(part of the heart lung bypass machine) 
  to Blue tubing for 3rd sucker 
      (cannulated within the heart) 
The blue tubing is inserted into the heart, in 
anticipation of its imminent use in the heart 
transplant operation. 
Pump-side part of the blue tubing 
(part of the heart lung bypass machine) 
  to Blue tubing for 3rd sucker 
      (in the saline receptacle) 
Trainee perfusionist NS makes a physical 
connection between the blue tubing handed to 
her (by the scrub nurse), and the connection at 
the pump in the heart lung bypass machine. 
This physical connection allows potential 
inference about the direction of the tubing in 
the pump, without necessarily looking at the 
pump itself (through the ‘wet test’ using saline 
for example).  
Pump-side part of the blue tubing 
(part of the heart lung bypass machine) 
  to Supervising perfusionist CP 
Supervising perfusionist CP inspects the 
perfusion circuit which is set up (this circuit 
includes the pump-side part of the blue 
tubing). 
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Scrub nurse LB 
  to Supervising perfusionist CP 
CP assumed that the direction of the blue 
tubing had been ‘wet checked’, based on 
overhearing LB’s confirmation with trainee 
perfusionist NS about the wet test. 
Scrub nurse LB 
  to Trainee perfusionist NS 
Scrub nurse LB verbally confirmed that 
(some?) suckers were ‘wet tested’; trainee 
perfusionist NS seems to have assumed that 
the blue sucker/tubing was successfully ‘wet 
tested’ – which would indirectly signify that the 
blue sucker was in the correct direction. 
Trainee perfusionist NS 
  to Pump-side part of the blue tubing 
      (part of the heart lung bypass machine) 
Trainee perfusionist NS sets-up the blue ‘3rd’ 
sucker tubing for the pump (which is part of 
the heart lung bypass machine). 
Trainee perfusionist NS 
  to Supervising perfusionist CP 
Supervising perfusionist CP confirmed that 
everything is ok with trainee perfusionist NS. 
(CF) 5 other selected ‘inconsistent information flows’ were additionally included as part of 
this Information Safety Method analysis (the double-headed dotted arrows in Figure A.4.2). 
These flows were between the Surgeon (leading the heart transplant operation), and all of 
the other members of the ‘live’ surgery team included in Figure A.4.2. Perfusionist ES was 
involved only with surgery preparation, and not part of this ‘live’ team, and thus discounted 
from these selected flows. 
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Table A.4.4: Textual representation of an illustrative selection of safety functions 
(corresponding to the numerical identifiers shown in Figure A.4.2). 
Safety function 
‘newly 
identified’ [I], or 
extended [E] 
More elaborate description and explanation 
(positive safety function to information trajectory associations are 
highlighted with [+], and negative ones with a [-]) 
26: Provide a fluid 
challenge to each 
sucker. 
[I] 
This is one of four key standard checks that are expected to be 
undertaken before the perfusion tubing/suckers are used ‘live’ with a 
patient. With the main aim to ensure that the direction of flow is both 
correct and safe. 
This check did not seem to have been done by trainee perfusionist 
NS in this incident. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can increase 
the probability of correct direction-of-blue-pump-tubing 
information representation in all the pump tubing related non-human 
participants (e.g., the Pump-side part of the blue tubing; Blue tubing 
for 3rd sucker (cannulated within the heart); and Blue tubing for 3rd 
sucker (in the saline receptacle) participants. 
29:  Busy and high-
pressured working-
environment (e.g., in 
the ‘live’ operation 
room). 
[I] 
On this occasion, a large number of people were concurrently 
working in the operating room. In this incident a member of the 
surgical team happened to physically be in the way, preventing a 
visual confirmation of the ‘wet test’ check. In addition, the scrub 
nurse was dealing with requests from the surgeons to pass 
equipment, concurrently with her perfusion circuit checking duties. 
This kind of very busy/high-pressured working-environment could 
negatively effect non-flows of information, which may otherwise 
have taken place; it could also lead to inadvertent information 
misrepresentation by each of the people involved. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce the 
probability of consistent flow of direction-of-blue-pump-tubing 
information between two interacting participants where at least one is 
human. In principle, this safety function can affect the consistency of 
all links of the information trajectory which are within the ‘live’ 
operation room at the time of the heart transplant operation (i.e. the 
interactions shown in the bottom half of Figure 5.2). 
This is also a correctness-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of correct information representation in each of the 
interacting human participants, during the ‘live’ part of this 
transplant operation. 
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30: (Perceived) 
surgeon/doctor 
‘dominance’, over 
‘lower’ parts of the 
medical hierarchy 
(e.g., nurses, junior 
doctors, 
perfusionists etc.). 
[I] 
Rightly or wrongly, some of the more junior medical staff may be 
reluctant to disrupt the cultural norm of hierarchical ‘dominance’: 
from ‘higher’ members (e.g., senior doctors, surgeons etc.). The 
consequent reluctance for these ‘junior’ members to speak up, could 
prevent the creation of helpful information flows to provide safety 
redundancy. Beyond the scope of this specific incident (i.e., in other 
work-contexts), this safety function could also generally reduce the 
chance of existing information flows (between staff from different 
parts of the medical hierarchy) being recreated in the future. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce the 
probability of consistent information (i.e., ‘break’ the information 
flow) to, or from ‘more junior’ participants concurrently working 
with ‘more senior’ medical staff (i.e., the surgeon). Perfusionist ES 
did not directly work with more senior colleagues in this case, so is 
excluded from the scope of this safety function. 
 
Additional comments 
In this case the analyst decided to treat the supervising perfusionist 
CP as a ‘more junior’ member of the medical hierarchy. This 
interpretation may or may not be appropriate and ‘accurate’, and 
could be further clarified in principle. 
33: Surgeon’s 
medical 
knowledge/expertise, 
with respect to the 
expected physical 
behaviour of the 
heart – after ‘vent 
suction’ has 
commenced. 
[I] 
As happened in this incident, the physical behaviour of the heart may 
contravene the physical behaviour expected by the surgeon. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety function 
definitions  [+] 
This is a correctness-enhancing safety function, which can increase 
the probability of correct direction-of-blue-pump-tubing 
information representation, in each of the tubing-related non-human 
participants in this incident; Here the surgeon’s medical 
knowledge/expertise (serendipitously?) helped to trigger a ‘safety-
preserving’ query. 
 
Additional comments 
In this case, this safety function seemed to only have been partially 
effective, where the level of ‘blowing’ – thought to be sucking – was 
in fact briefly increased, before the wrong-tubing-direction error was 
then detected/realised). 
Although intuitively probable, similar correctness-enhancing safety 
functions were not identified in this Information Safety Method 
analysis for the other medical staff involved. This was because the 
corresponding incident investigation report did not seem to document 
any obvious ‘observed’ indications of the positive effects of their 
expertise – with respect to the direction-of-blue-pump-tubing 
information representation. 
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Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis prior 
to this current study 
(2, 3, 8, see Appendix A.3 for original) 
2: Complex workload 
and multitasking for 
nurses. 
[E] 
Given the role of a scrub nurse, scrub nurse LB is also likely to 
have had a complex workload, and be required to multitask in this 
incident. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a correctness and consistency-reducing safety function here. 
Similar to the incident context from which this safety function was 
originally identified, here this safety function could affect scrub 
nurse LB, and information flows to and from her. 
 
Additional comments 
This safety function is related to, but not identical to safety function 
29. 
3: Fallible human 
transcription. 
[E] 
This safety function is judged to be relevant to the current incident 
analysis, and is partly subsumed under safety function 21 (see 
Table 5.3). 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, effecting 
information flows both to, and from each human participant in the 
current incident. 
8: Lack of a rigorous 
checking procedure 
for the doctors. 
[E] 
As a whole, the material presented in the corresponding incident 
investigation report suggest that whilst perfusionists have a number 
of mandatory checks to follow (e.g., safety functions 25, 26 and 
27), no similar such rigorous checking procedures were in place for 
the surgeon leading this operation. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a correctness-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of correct direction-of-blue-pump-tubing 
information representation in the surgeon leading the heart 
transplant operation. 
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Analysis of an incident situation involving a late diagnosis of Acute Kidney Injury 
(3rd incident situation analysed) 
In this incident situation, a patient (Mr K) was admitted to the hospital following a fall 
from a caravan roof whilst attempting to clean it. On entry to the hospital, the patient 
was initially treated for a bone fracture. During the time spent in hospital, he 
subsequently developed Acute Kidney Injury (AKI). This condition was eventually 
picked up, on the night of the 28th July, 2013, and the patient underwent renal 
replacement therapy for several days in response. In conducting an investigation into 
this incident situation, the hypothesis was that the detection of the patient’s AKI 
condition, and subsequent (appropriate) response could have perhaps occurred earlier. 
Figure A.4.3, Table A.4.5, and Table A.4.6 together show extracts from the full 
Information Safety Method investigative hypotheses developed. The hypotheses were 
in this case about how both the Creatinine-level and Glomerular Filtration Rate 
representations were coordinated during this incident situation. They also show the 
scoping of each safety function as relevant to correct representation or consistent 
coordination (of Creatinine-level or Glomerular Filtration Rate) across the 
participants of the representation coordination system. In the case of this particular 
incident analysis, the same set of investigative hypotheses were identified for both 
Creatinine-level and Glomerular Filtration Rate; both were part of Mr K’s blood test 
results (of the 26th) (depicted using the same figure of Figure A.4.3). 
Abbreviations and acronyms used in interpreting the incident situation 
AKI – Acute Kidney Injury 
MEWS – Modified Early Warning Score (this is a useful approximate indicator for 
detecting patient physiological deterioration, e.g., see Gardner-Thorpe et al. 2006) 
SHO – Senior House Officer 
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Figure A.4.3: Graphical part of the final Information Safety Method investigative 
hypotheses generated, showing the information trajectory, and the safety function 
scoping (for both Creatinine-level, and Glomerular Filtration Rate). 
 
 
Table A.4.5: Corresponding textual representation of the information trajectory shown 
in Figure A.4.3 (corresponding to each arrow in the figure, alphabetically ordered).  
Links in the information 
trajectory 
(selected ‘inconsistent 
information flows’ are marked 
with CF) 
The interaction(s) leading to the propagation 
and transformation of CREATININE-
LEVEL and GLOMERULAR FILTRATION 
RATE representations 
(the two participants in each interactive ‘flow’ are 
indicated in bold) 
Lab interactions? (no data) 
to Mr K’s blood test results 
    (of the 26th) 
Based on the incident data available, there was no 
clear answer to the ‘upstream mapping’ question (e.g. 
Section 4.3.2) of: 
 
“Where did the Creatinine-level information ‘in’ Mr 
K’s blood test results (stored in the electronic results 
system) come from?” 
 
Both Glomerular Filtration Rate, and Creatinine-level 
information was represented as part of the same set of 
blood test results in this incident. These blood test 
results were ordered by the operating surgeon 
responsible for a surgery (on the 25th) to deal with Mr 
K’s ‘initial illness’ of a bone fracture. These test 
results were stored and accessed via the ‘electronic 
results system’ at the Trust. 
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Mr K’s blood test results (of the 
26th) 
to A medical staff with specialist 
nephrology knowledge        CF 
A medical staff who is particularly familiar with 
nephrology-related issues reviews Mr K’s blood 
test results. 
Acute Kidney Injury (AKI) is not a medical situation 
which is currently well-defined, and there is as yet no 
‘gold standard’ for its diagnosis (National 
Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome and Death 
2009, p11; National Clinical Guideline Centre 2013, 
p11). Consequently, it is probably reasonable to only 
expect medical staff with at least a nephrology 
specialism to be particularly sensitive to recognising 
and acting on symptoms that may be indicative of 
Acute Kidney Injury (i.e., Creatinine-level, and/or 
Glomerular Filtration Rate information, see Stevens 
et al. 2006 for more detailed explanation). It is unclear 
from the corresponding investigation report whether 
SN G or Dr AJ was particularly sensitive, by training, 
to issues of nephrology. 
Mr K’s blood test results (of the 
26th) 
  to Dr AJ 
Dr AJ was the on call SHO, who had visited the ward 
earlier (where Mr K was) in the early hours of 28th 
July. Her review of Mr K’s blood test results took 
place on a subsequent visit later this day, at around 
22.32. This was due to another clinical staff’s 
‘escalation’, on finding out that Mr K had not passed 
urine for a substantive amount of time. 
Mr K’s blood test results (of the 
26th) 
  to SN G 
SN G reviewed Mr K’s blood test results. Based on 
the incident understanding obtained, these blood test 
results did not propagate any further through this part 
of the work-system, beyond SN G. 
SN G 
to A medical staff with specialist 
nephrology knowledge            CF 
SN G informs a medical staff who is particularly 
familiar with nephrology related issues, about Mr 
K’s blood test results. Such a person is most qualified 
to appropriately act on Creatinine-level, and/or 
Glomerular Filtration Rate information. 
The motivation for stating this ‘inconsistent 
information flow’ was similar as for the other 
‘inconsistent information flow’ entry in row 2 of this 
table. 
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Table A.4.6: Textual representation of an illustrative selection of safety functions 
(corresponding to the numerical identifiers shown in Figure A.4.3).  
Safety function 
‘newly identified’ [I], 
or extended [E] 
More elaborate description and explanation 
(positive safety function to information trajectory 
associations are highlighted with [+], and negative ones with 
a [-]) 
34: Lack of routine focus 
on propagation of 
creatinine-level and 
Glomerular Filtration 
Rate information through 
the work-system (these 
are two related key 
indicators of Acute 
Kidney Injury (Stevens et 
al. 2006, National 
Clinical Guideline Centre 
2013). 
[I] 
The MEWS and observation charts are (related) routine aids to 
support monitoring of the physiological status of a patient. The 
two relevant organisational policies both encourage routine 
recording of a number of physiological parameters. However, 
neither the creatinine-level nor Glomerular Filtration Rate 
information are required to be routinely recorded as one of these 
physiological parameters. This reduces the likelihood that blood 
tests results – such as Mr K’s routine ones (of the 26th) – would 
be routinely examined/reviewed by medical staff. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of consistent information flow: from Mr K’s 
blood test results (of the 26th), to all medical staff involved in 
this incident. 
 
Additional comments 
Given the central importance of both the creatinine-level and 
Glomerular Filtration Rate information in supporting early 
diagnosis of Acute Kidney Injury; perhaps it would be helpful to 
include either, or both of these physiological parameters as part 
of routine patient monitoring and charting, in cases where the 
relevant blood test results are already available? 
35: The substantively 
different nature of the 
original illness requiring 
entry to the hospital. 
[I] 
Mr K’s ‘original’ injury, on entry to hospital, was an 
orthopaedic one (i.e. a bone fracture). On face-value, this has 
little to do with Acute Kidney Failure, which is known to have 
relatively ‘hidden symptoms’, compared with more immediately 
obvious internal injuries (such as failure of the heart or lung, for 
more details see National Confidential Enquiry into Patient 
Outcome and Death 2009, p7). The substantively different 
nature of Mr K’s original injury, could reduce the likelihood of 
the relevant information being ‘escalated’ to (other) medical 
staff with appropriate nephrology knowledge – through reducing 
medical staff’s sensitivity to AKI. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function, which can reduce 
the probability of consistent information flow to A medical staff 
with specialist nephrology knowledge, from SN G in the case of 
this incident. 
 
Additional comments 
We assume that SN G is not a nephrology specialist here. 
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Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis prior 
to this current study 
(2, 8, see Appendix A.3 for original) 
2: Complex workload 
and multitasking for 
nurses. 
[E] 
Depending on the workload at particular times of the day, this 
safety function can have a negative effect on the flow of patient 
care information. The degree to which it was relevant in this 
particular case is not clear from the corresponding incident 
investigation report; further investigation would be needed to 
(dis)confirm the investigative hypothesis represented by this 
safety function. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions 
Like in the Information Safety Method analysis through which 
this safety function was originally identified, this consistency-
reducing safety function can effect information flows either to, 
or from the nursing staff identified in this incident analysis (e.g., 
SN G). 
This correctness-reducing safety function can also reduce the 
probability of correct information remaining correct in SN G’s 
head. 
8: Lack of a rigorous 
checking procedure for 
the doctors. 
[E] 
Relating to the point made in part of the corresponding incident 
investigation report, it seems possible that there were also no 
rigorous checking procedure for the doctors in the case of this 
incident (at least with respect to checking the blood test results). 
However, ‘checking’ is used here in a slightly different sense, 
from the Information Safety Method analysis through which this 
safety function was originally identified. Here this safety 
function refers to checking for the existence of creatinine-
level/Glomerular Filtration Rate information (irrespective of 
its ‘correctness’), as opposed to checking for whether the 
particular creatinine-level/Glomerular Filtration Rate 
representation ‘received’ is correct. 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
This is a consistency-reducing safety function here, which can 
reduce the probability of consistent information flow to Dr AJ. 
 
Additional comments 
Further investigation would be needed to (dis)confirm this 
investigative hypothesis. 
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Extending the scope of safety functions from Information Safety Method analysis of the 
1st incident situation (21, see Table A.4.2 for the original identification) 
21: The ‘fallible human’ 
assumption. 
[E] 
This safety function is relevant to this incident. Its effects 
partially overlap with safety function 3 (see Table 4.2). 
 
Operationalising the Information Safety Method safety 
function definitions  [-] 
Similar to for the incident context from which this safety 
function was originally identified, here this safety function also 
negatively affects all human participants of this incident; and the 
information flows to, and from them. 
 
Additional comments 
Like for safety function 3, if Mr K’s blood test results (of the 
26th) were entered by a person, then this safety function extends 
to that link in the information trajectory too. Otherwise this 
safety function does not apply to that link. Like for safety 
function 3, here we again assume that a person transcribed Mr 
K’s blood test results into the ‘electronic results system’. 
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Appendix B.1: A self-contained and anonymised version of 
the interview schedule used to support the interviews 
reported in Chapter 5 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
A graphical overview of the basic plan for each interview 
Research Question addressed 
What are the significant concepts for patient safety incident investigators in their 
investigative practice? 
Each interview is designed to give insight into the interviewee’s (current) investigative 
approach in practice. In the following, [Q] indicates possible questions to be asked. 
Indentation levels indicate different lines of potential questioning/probing. 
Investigative process information is elicited first and foremost through the ‘grand tour’ style 
timeline-annotation (described in Section 2.1); the subsequent bit (Section 2.2, Script-
appendix) will focus non-exclusively, on issues relating to investigative rationale and decision-
making (in the context of the particular incident at the time). 
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1. Introduction (10-15 mins) 
1.1 Prelude 
< briefly exchange pleasantries > 
... Thank you very much for giving up your time to talk with me today. For our discussion 
(today), I’d like to find out a bit more about how patient safety incidents are investigated in 
practice. {As you know, I’ve been working with investigator A to analyse the two incidents 
you kindly provided, using a new analysis approach we’ve developed, in our research as part 
of a patient safety research project}(this part is just for the second interview). As developers 
of our new approach, we unfortunately know very little at the moment, about issues faced by 
investigators such as yourself – in real investigations. Our conversation today will hopefully 
give us more insight into patient safety investigation work. 
(Just before we start, I’d like to just quickly check, that you are still happy for our 
conversation to be recorded) ...... 
...... I also just wanted to say that we will be transcribing our conversation today, as part of 
the research project. But we will make sure to fully anonymise all specific names mentioned 
(of people, institutions etc.) when we transcribe – along the lines of the incident reports 
which you kindly provided for me. 
Also, at any time, if you don’t want to answer particular questions, it is perfectly fine to tell 
me, and for us to move on to other aspects of our conversation. These parts would be edited 
out of our transcripts. 
It’s also fine, if you need to take a bit of time to consider your answers at any point in our 
conversation. 
So, before we get started, are there any quick questions, about today, you’d like to ask? 
...... (pause for answers etc.) 
 
1.2 Transitioning 
[Q] To get us going, could you briefly remind me a bit about your background, and how you 
came to be working as an (patient safety) investigator here? 
 
12
 < Ask about: 
  - length of  investigation experience? 
  - is investigation your main and only job at the moment? > 
 
 
                                                          
 
12
 Throughout this appendix, this kind of progressive indentation towards the right hand side of the 
page is used to indicate alternative ways to further develop the ongoing conversation. 
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[Q] For yourself, what is the principal aim of a Serious Untoward Incident investigation, in a 
few words? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
< note the one or more aims in this space above > 
[Q] Could you tell me about the kind of investigation, or safety training which you have taken 
part in, to support your work? 
[Q] Which aspects (of this training) did you find particularly helpful? 
 How did this help your investigation work? 
[Q]13 As an investigator, how do you see yourself fitting into the ‘big picture’ – in terms of 
your particular role, and contribution to providing safe healthcare for patients? 
[Q] How does your past education and training help with your investigation work? 
[Q] Are there any drawbacks to having this particular background experience (in doing 
investigations)? 
 
 
2. Case(s) walkthrough (approximately 1hr) 
< make available a copy of each of the relevant 2/3 investigation reports at this point > 
... For the rest of our session, I’d like for us to talk through one or two incidents in detail. 
Given that I’m already familiar with the incidents you kindly provided, I thought it would be 
best for us to focus on (one of) those. I have paper copies of each of the reports here – if we 
need to refer to them at any point. Is it alright with you? ... if I carry on noting down a few 
notes as we go through (like I did just now) – to help me remember some points which we 
may come back to later? 
                                                          
 
13
 Optional question; Could come back to this later at wrap-up (in Section 3). 
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Let’s start with ...... 
NOTE TO SELF: 
In this part of the interview, make sure to be sensitive, to potential probing of degree of 
interleaving (or not) – between various parts of the investigative process outlined by the 
interviewee (in Section 2.1). 
In cases where we are discussing at a very low level of descriptive detail, without obvious 
significant insight being gained into investigative process, rationale and decision-making, I 
will just let the thread of (descriptive) conversation fizzle-out naturally; and then move on to 
other discussions. 
Also remember to try to say which part(s) of the investigation is being referred to in the 
discussions – to help in identifying what was being specifically referred to in transcribing the 
audio afterwards. 
 
2.1 Overview of investigation process (10-15 mins? including minor 
descriptive clarifications) 
[Q] In two or three sentences, could you describe for me what was the incident here (in this 
case). 
[Q] Very roughly, how many hours (or days/months) of work do you reckon this 
investigation took? 
[Q] With the aid of annotating on this timeline < referring to Appendix B.2 >, could we talk 
through the major parts of this particular investigation, and the work you did in each part? 
The dates or times don’t have to be very precise, it’s just to help us get a shared 
understanding of roughly what happened when, and in what order - in terms of your 
investigation work for this incident. 
< As account develops, note down decision points for later – in the space below > 
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[Q] Briefly, what were the main challenges14 in conducting this investigation? (simply get 
them to enumerate/state at this point, without getting into details). 
< write down below > 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
< come back to this list later, as part of probing issues of process, rationale, and decision-
making > 
 
 
2.2 More details about specific parts 
- often better to ask about ‘how’ or ‘what informed ...’ questions. 
 
[Q] Could you talk me through how your understanding of this incident developed, as the 
investigation progressed – as we move through each of the parts outlined here? (referring to 
the timeline (i.e. Appendix B.2) being annotated) 
 [Q] What did you use to help you with XXX ? 
--- [For earlier/less-certain parts of the investigation] --- 
[Q] At this point (referring to a particular part), how did you decide what further information 
you needed, to better understand the incident? 
--- [For near-to-end parts of the investigation] --- 
[Q] How did you decide when enough was known about this incident? (to respond 
appropriately to it?) 
[Q] What do you do if there is insufficient information available to support firm conclusions 
(at this point)? 
--- [To elicit knowledge about uncertainties? and how they were dealt with in each part as investigation 
progressed] --- 
[Q] What were your (main?) concerns regarding the investigation at this point? 
 [Q] How was XXX addressed? 
[Q] What additional kind of information could have been helpful at this point? 
                                                          
 
14
 Consider the potential kinds of challenges and my responses here. 
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[Q] Did Root Cause Analysis help at this point? 
 How? Why-not? 
<   In this part, perhaps ask about: 
1. Supporting conceptual-tools/diagrams/documents? And their roles/contributions 
to investigation process? 
2. Focus on rationale/decision information in this part (e.g., how ‘fact collection’? 
how incident analysis and inference?); also see Script-appendix section)  > 
 
 
3. Wrapping up (10-20 mins) 
3.1 Transitioning 
[Q] Having led the investigation of each of these two incidents, do you think either of them 
could happen again? 
[Q] Why? Why not? 
< probe around how their investigation helped to (in principle) prevent future (re)occurrences > 
[Q] You mentioned earlier that the principal aim of a Serious Untoward Incident investigation 
is to XXX (referring to the aim noted earlier in the 1.2 Transitioning section); in (each of) the 
(two) incident(s) we went through today, how was this aim achieved? 
< If rapport is good: How do you think patient safety investigations can be improved ? > 
[Q] What would you consider to be the key criteria, in conducting a high quality 
investigation? 
< If rapport is good: then probe around the degree to which they perceive the 
investigation(s) we’ve just discussed to have satisfied their own stated criteria > 
[Q] In a few words, could you help me understand what it means for something to ‘cause’ 
something else? 
 
 
3.2 Final wrap up 
... thank you very much for having me here today, we’ve covered a lot of ground I think. I’d 
just like to get a few final thoughts before finishing up ... 
[Q] For yourself, is there such a thing as a ‘typical investigation’? 
 < If YES: ask about perceived typical characteristics? 
    If NO: why not? > 
[Q] For yourself, is there such a thing as a ‘typical incident’? 
 < If YES: ask about perceived typical characteristics? 
    If NO: why not ? > 
[Q] In your opinion, does intuition or creativity have a role in your investigative work ? 
 [Q] How?  Why?/Why-not? 
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Finally, is there any significant aspect of the way you approach your investigation work, which 
we’ve not managed to touch on today? 
END OF INTERVIEW 
 
 
A couple of other potentially useful questions (optional) 
[Q] Could you very briefly talk me through a memorable success story from the 
investigations you’ve led ? (probably to be put somewhere in the INTRO of Section 1 ?) 
[Q] From your perspective, how have the investigations done here improved the safety 
of patient-care at this Trust? (probably to be put somewhere in WRAP-UP of Section 3) 
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Script-appendix: Some potential stubs for probes 
‘What’ questions 
What are the benefits of XXX ? 
What are the drawbacks of XXX ? 
What informed ... decision XXX ? 
   the way you XXX ? 
What was your strategy for ... (overcoming some difficult aspect of the investigation) ? 
[Alt.-form] What strategy did you use to XXX ? 
 What alternatives (for doing XXX) did you consider at this point ? 
 [Alt.-form] Were other approaches to XXX possible at this point ? 
 What factors informed the particular choice you made (here) ? 
‘How’ questions 
How did you ...  (do) XXX ? 
  go about XXX ? 
  make decision XXX ? 
  make sense of XXX ? 
How did XXX help – at this point ? (where XXX is an action/choice/decision) 
 Did XXX turn out to be helpful ? 
  How? Why? Why not? 
How do you generally do/decide XXX ? ( A probe for more generalised heuristics, inductively based 
on concrete specifics; this will be used only sparingly, to open up perceived significant generic aspects 
of investigative process, rationale or decision-making) 
How did this part of the investigation influence the other/later parts ? 
[Alt.-form] How did part XXX of this investigation affect the subsequent investigation ? 
‘Why’ questions 
Could you talk me through the reasons for XXX ? (e.g., doing-XXX / deciding this way) 
Prompting for alternatives and elaborations 
In retrospect, would you have done anything differently in how you approached this part ? 
(of the investigation) 
 < If answers YES: probe more into the motivations, reasons etc. for this bit > 
Were there any complications ... (in doing/attempting XXX) ? 
Did you use information from past incidents to help with XXX ? 
< probe into:   what information ?  
            how was it used ? 
            other aspects of rationale, and benefits/drawbacks of using this information ? > 
Could you tell me a bit more about the role of ... (some artefact or conceptual support) ? 
 How did XXX help ? 
 When did you use ... (some artefact or conceptual support) ... in this investigation ? 
  (e.g., throughout entire investigation, parts of it, etc.?) 
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Appendix B.2: The interactive A4 timeline used to support 
each interviewee’s recall of the past 
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Appendix C.1: The ‘systemic Root Cause Analysis’ 
investigation, used as primary data for the conduct of the 
Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses 
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1. Introduction 
[i-1] 
This appendix is based on early notes providing a detailed chronological account of 
how a full system-based understanding of an everyday incident evolved using the 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) investigative approach. The incident investigated was 
one where a car parking space was paid for, but the driver forgot to display the ticket 
showing proof of purchase of a parking space. The incident occurred on Monday 
10/9/2012.  
[i-2] 
The investigation into this incident followed the RCA approach as described in [1]. The 
information presented in this appendix represent the investigative findings of the lead 
investigator (first author), who was also the driver involved in this incident. In this case 
the investigator was operating as both investigator and information-provider, so 
different terminology is used to represent each role throughout this appendix. ‘A1’ 
represents the investigator operating in the role of information-provider, and 
‘investigator’ represents the investigator operating in the role of a novice RCA-user. 
[i-3] 
In this investigation, over 17 man-hours were dedicated specifically to fully evolve a 
satisfactory investigative understanding of the system. On top of this, over 28 
additional hours were spent on reviewing, consolidating and writing up these results to 
ensure a faithful account of the investigative process which took place. No artificial 
time limit was imposed for this process, and the investigator was able to take as much 
time as necessary to do the RCA, until satisfied with the overall investigative 
understanding of the system. 
[i-4] 
This evolving understanding of the system was based on applying steps 1-6 (out of 8) 
of the RCA manual [1, p22], and completed by the end of the 27th day (7/10/2012) 
after the occurrence of the incident (10/9/2012). After completing step 1-6 out of 8, the 
investigator has finished fully understanding all of the potential factors under 
consideration [1, p28] with respect to this incident. The results of steps 7-8 of the RCA 
process prescribed by [1] will be discussed elsewhere, as they consist simply of using 
the existing understanding of the incident from the first six steps to derive a set of 
appropriate responses to improving system safety for the future. 
[i-5] 
The entirety of [1] was used to inform and guide this RCA-based investigation. The 
investigator considered the following sections of [1] to have particularly significantly 
informed, and shaped the way in which this investigation was carried out: 
 
 The main procedural guidance used in facilitating the RCA was described 
in the ‘Root Cause Analysis Process’ section of [1, p22]; 
 An overview of the main purpose and role of RCA (last 2 paragraphs of the 
Preface section [1, p4-5]), as well as some key properties of a thorough 
and credible RCA-based investigation (expressed in the Essentials of Root 
Cause Analysis section [1, p10]) were important broader considerations 
kept in mind throughout the investigation described in this appendix; 
 
 
 278 
 
 The triggering categories recommended in Appendix C of [1] (see [1, p44] 
and [1, p13]) were used to inform how the contributory causal factors and 
root causes leading up to this incident were investigated (step 6 out of 8 
according to [1, p22]). 
[i-6] 
The results from applying steps 1-6 of the Root Cause Analysis [1] are presented in 
section 2 of this appendix, which gives a detailed account of how the understanding of 
the incident evolved in this investigation. Throughout this appendix ‘contributory 
factors’ and ‘contributory causes’ are used interchangeably (in a synonymous way). 
[i-7] 
 
This appendix has been through a series of revisions. All were in the interests of 
reducing unintended communicative ambiguities only. On each revision, particular 
care was taken to not make any semantic changes to the detailed account of the 
evolving actions and findings of the investigation done. 
[i-8] 
 
2. An account of the evolving system-based 
understanding using RCA [1] 
2.1 Gather information 
[1, p23] 
[a-1] 
The first step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to gather some initial 
information. The investigator was the “...one or two key individuals to collect and 
review the information and construct an initial understanding of the event for 
analysis...” [1, p23]. Initial incident information was gathered by the investigator on-
site at the time of finding the parking ticket (on the same day the incident occurred), 
and reflectively consolidated later on that evening. 
 
2.2 Initial understanding 
[1, p23] 
[a-2] 
The second step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to form an initial 
understanding of the incident based on the initial information gathered. The initial 
understanding derived from the information initially gathered is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: An ‘initial understanding’ of the parking incident  
 
[a-3] 
The accompanying narrative prose is provided below: 
 
On Monday the 10th of September, 2012, A1 and friend arrived at a car park near a 
London tube station. A1 parked the car, and then together with A1’s friend got on to 
the tube going into London. At approximately 15.23, a parking attendant spotted the 
car without a valid proof of purchase for parking displayed, and gave a parking ticket 
for this. Later in the day, A1 came back to find the parking ticket stuck on the car. 
 
2.3 Collecting additional information 
[1, p23] 
[a-4] 
The third step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to gather more detailed 
information about the incident, based on the initial understanding obtained as a result 
of the previous steps. To collect further information a return visit was made to the 
incident site [1, p23], and photographic evidence15 was collected and reviewed as part 
of this third step. The review of these photographs supported reflection on the 
contributory causes leading up to the occurrence of this incident - when the proof of 
purchase for the parking space failed to be displayed. [1] suggests that this is done by 
“...exploring such things as possible contributory factors and suggestions for 
preventive measures and barriers...” [1, p24]. The initial question used to help focus 
the collection of additional information was: 
 
‘Why did A1 forget to display the proof of purchase for parking after paying’? 
 
[a-5] 
The investigator felt that on its own, this initial question was too vague to ensure all 
the appropriate information and evidence would necessarily be collected from the 
return visit to the incident-site. In the interests of maximising the productivity of this 
return site-visit, five additional causal hypotheses based on this initial question were 
used to support the collection of additional information. 
                                                          
 
15
 The first author is happy to make this photographic evidence available on request, for the purposes 
of independent scientific usage only and no other purpose. 
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[a-6] 
A1 forgot to display the proof of purchase for parking after paying because ... 
 
For CATEGORY 1: Human factors (communication) 
A1 was not aware of the need to display after paying at the time. 
 
For CATEGORY 2: Human factors (training) 
The two previous car parks used by A1 were under the same management as the one 
used in this incident. As a result, A1 was expecting that the general procedure with 
respect to car parking was probably going to be the same. 
 
For CATEGORY 3: Human factors (fatigue/scheduling) 
A1’s friend was in a bit of a rush to get into London quickly. So A1 was inclined to try 
to get the parking sorted as fast as possible. 
 
For CATEGORY 4: Environment/equipment 
The signage in the car park was far from perfect. In particular, there was only 
incomplete signage coverage of the car park, as well some old signs which were still 
inappropriately there. The writing on all the related ‘don’t-forget-to-display’ signs were 
quite small too. A1 felt that the signage was particularly ineffective given that the car 
park was situated right next to a busy tube station - perhaps the car park management 
ought to have taken into consideration users who may be rushing to get into the 
station quickly. 
 
For CATEGORY 5: Rules/policies/procedure 
There was only one full densely-written sign nearby with the full terms and conditions 
of car park usage. However, the density of the writing on these signs is likely to put 
people off fully reading and digesting these conditions - this was the reason why A1 
did not read this sign in any kind of detail at the time. At the time of parking and 
paying, A1 was thus unaware of both the potential penalty charge amount, and the 
various associated conditions under which this penalty may be given. 
 
 
2.4 Literature review 
[1, p24] 
[a-7] 
The fourth step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to perform a literature 
review, to gain some understanding into the broader context within which this incident 
occurred. For example, relevant protocols and similar cases in the past may be of 
particular relevance in informing the investigative focus and process in this 
investigation. As an everyday incident was investigated, rather than an industrial 
example, there was not much directly relevant case-based literature found to inform 
the investigation of this incident. There were also very few "leading practices or 
evidence-based guidelines relevant to the critical incident" ([1], p24) to help inform 
investigative procedure in the context of this everyday scenario. The most relevant 
and useful resources found were ones such as [2], [3], and [4]. 
[a-8] 
[2, 3, 4] resulted from a Google search for existing literature of relevance to this case. 
Search phrases used included: 
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- “preventing forgetting to display in future”, 
- “remembering to display parking ticket”, 
- “forgetting to display parking tickets”, 
- “parking fines”, 
- “parking fines what to do if you have paid but forgot to display”. 
[a-9] 
These kinds of search phrases generated a large number of hits from the Google 
search engine. Most results returned were however relatively similar (the last section 
of this appendix shows a representative sample of some of the more relevant results), 
and concentrated predominantly on how to better fight, or appeal against tickets 
issued by a variety of public and private authorities, for a variety of reasons. No 
directly-relevant material was found in the half-day or so used to search on Google for 
results specifically related to cases where ‘a parking space was paid for, but the proof 
of purchase failed to be displayed’. Given the apparent complete lack of relevant 
results at the end of the time spent searching on Google, the investigator judged that 
it wasn’t sensible to spend any more investigation-time attempting to find directly-
relevant literature in the context of this particular investigation. 
 
 
2.5 Timeline and ‘final understanding’ 
[1, p24] 
[a-10] 
The fifth step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to use all the information 
gathered so far (including any relevant information from the literature review described 
in section 2.4) to construct an appropriate final understanding of the incident, this 
forms the basis for exploring the contributory factors and root causes leading up to the 
incident (described in section 2.6 of this appendix). Using the information collected 
from the previous steps, such as the photographic evidence collected in the Collecting 
Additional Information step (see section 2.3 of this appendix), the final understanding 
‘narrative timeline’ is shown in Figure 2 - taking into account also the contributory 
factors identified in the investigation so far [1, p24]. 
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Figure 2: A ‘final understanding’ of the parking incident 
 
[a-11] 
The supporting prose narrative is below: 
On Monday the 10th of September, 2012, A1 and friend arrived at the lower car 
park near a London tube station. There were no terms and conditions displayed 
at the entrance to the car park (i.e., ‘dense and hard to see conditions and terms’), 
but A1 parked inside anyway thinking that everything would be fine. A1 then paid 
the daily parking tariff and got onto the tube into London having paid the 
appropriate amount, but without displaying the proof of purchase. 
 
There were a number of reasons that A1 articulated for forgetting to display the 
paid-for ticket: 
- he was in a rush to help the friend get into London quickly; 
- he was not at the time aware of the need to display the proof of purchase for 
parking; 
- he had previously used two car parks owned/managed by the same company. 
On both times, the parking was not a pay-and-display based one, but one where 
the user of the car park was expected to take the proof of purchase with them. He 
had a preconception that this car park would operate in the same way; 
- The signage regarding/reminding users to pay and display was both slightly 
confusing, and also hard to see (small signs, and signs did not cover all of the car 
park). 
 
In the afternoon, a parking attendant spotted the car without a valid ticket 
displayed whilst out on their rounds. At around 15.23, the attendant wrote out a 
parking ticket for this car. Later that evening, A1 came back to find a parking 
ticket stuck to the car, and was rather unhappy at the whole affair. 
[a-12] 
The investigator felt that it was not necessary to construct a table with specific timings 
of events [1, p25] for this investigation, as the sequence of events leading up to this 
incident was relatively simple. Suffice to say that the final understanding presented 
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here was predominantly based on the investigator/A1 reflecting and recalling the 
relevant events, supported and corroborated by the substantial documents and 
evidence collection resulting from his previous preparation for an appeal against the 
apparently excessive penalty charge of £75 which was levied. This holistic evidence 
base formed the data on which this investigation is founded. 
[a-13] 
The investigator previously found very little directly relevant case-based literature 
relating to conducting a RCA-based investigation into a car parking everyday incident 
(see section 2.4). As such, he judged the literature review step, in this case, to have 
had relatively little practical effect on the subsequent steps and findings of this 
particular investigation. 
 
 
2.6 Determining the ‘contributory factors’ and ‘root causes’ 
[1, p26] 
[a-14] 
The sixth step of the investigative process prescribed by [1] is to use all the 
information gathered so far to explore the possible contributory factors and root 
causes leading up to the incident. The Ishikawa ([1, p27]) diagram was chosen in 
preference to the tree diagram ([1, p27-8]) due to the fact that it provided a much 
more specific and structured representational framework with which to represent the 
evolving system understanding relevant to this incident. The assumption/choice made 
by the investigator here is that the usage of the more structured diagramming 
alternative is likely to produce relatively more, and higher quality investigative results 
for subsequent analysis and discussion. The ‘triggering categories’ used in the 
Ishikawa diagram template provided in [1] draws on Appendix C [1, p44], which 
includes a ‘barriers’ category that is discussed only towards the latter parts of 
Appendix C, but not in the initial sections of Appendix C. 
 
 
2.6.1 An understanding of the major contributory factors 
[a-15] 
Figure 3 presents the initial ‘top-level’ understanding of the causal relations in this 
incident. In this diagram, the contributory causes previously identified in Figure 2 (in 
the grey ‘call-out’ boxes) are re-couched in terms of the system perspective 
encouraged by the Ishikawa diagram template given in [1]. At this point of this 
investigation, the investigator was satisfied that all the relevant major causes were 
identified. 
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Figure 3: An Ishikawa diagram overview of the parking incident 
 
[a-16] 
Table 1 shows the 1-to-1 mapping between the contributory causes identified in 
Figure 2, and the causal-categories used in Figure 3 [1, Appendix C]. 
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Table 1: From the triggering questions ([1], Appendix C) to causes. 
Contributory causes in Figure 2 Causal categories in Figure 3 
Dense and hard to see conditions and 
terms. 
Rules/policies/procedure. 
Wrong pre-expectations due to same 
car-park management. 
Human factors (training). 
In a rush about the parking. Human factors (fatigue/scheduling). 
Confusing and hard to see signage. Environment/equipment. 
A1 was not aware of the need to display 
after paying at the time. 
Human factors (communication). 
None identified at this point. (Failed) barriers. 
 
[a-17] 
From this initial level of incident understanding, the investigator then faithfully carried 
out a RCA-based investigation on the (five) major causal factors leading up to this 
incident, using a ‘breadth-first’ search strategy to systematically explore all the 
contributory causes in turn. The level of procedural guidance for the RCA process 
prescribed by [1] is predominantly more towards the ‘goal-based’ rather than ‘action-
based’ level [5], as such there is not much guidance in [1] at an ‘action-based’ level of 
procedural detail. As such the investigator feels that this part of an investigation based 
on [1] (i.e., this ‘Determining the ‘contributory factors’ and ‘root causes’ step of the 
process prescribed by [1]) may be subject to much variable implementation. 
 
2.6.2 Operationalising the stopping rule prescribed in [1] 
[a-18] 
To sensibly scope the exploration of the more latent causes leading up to an incident, 
a reasonably clear operational understanding of the ‘stopping rule’ to apply is needed. 
[1] prescribes the following for this ‘stopping rule’: 
 
“It is crucial to ask “why” at each level of cause and effect until there are no 
more questions, knowledge becomes limited, or until the issues identified fall 
outside the scope of the RCA” [1, p27]. 
[a-19] 
From carefully deconstructing this stopping-rule, the investigator arrived at a set of 
‘operational stopping criteria’ (see Table 2) to help appropriately scope the 
investigative exploration of the latent causes contributing towards this incident. The 
stopping rule above [1, p27] was interpreted in an inclusive-OR style, where the 
search for root causes along a particular path of the causal tree is terminated if at 
least one of the three judgements on the LHS of Table 2 is deemed to be true. 
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Table 2: Interpreting the prose-based stopping rule in [1] for operational 
usage in this investigation. 
Operational stopping criteria used Stated stopping criteria according 
to [1] 
1) There are no obvious further ‘whys’ to be 
asked with respect to the cause being 
currently considered. 
“there are no more questions”. 
2) Either: 
- It is dubious to the investigator whether 
the current causal conjecture was true 
given the incident knowledge and evidence 
obtained, 
- or there is no evidence at all to suggest or 
support the ‘current’ causal conjecture 
under consideration. 
“knowledge becomes limited” 
3) Either: 
- The investigator is unlikely to be able (or 
sometimes to want) to change or intervene 
with respect to the contributory cause, 
- or the potential causal explanation is no 
longer a ‘benign’ one (i.e., ‘company 
purposely facilitating customers to be 
misled’). 
“the issues identified fall outside the 
scope of the RCA” 
 
 
2.6.3 Continuing the investigation: exhaustively exploration of all the 
contributory factors in a ‘breadth-first’ fashion 
[a-20] 
Figure 4 shows the results of reasoning about why A1 was not aware of the need to 
display after paying at the time. This figure presents the investigative results gained 
from investigating the only contributory cause in the Human factors (communication) 
category in Figure 3. 
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Figure 4: Why was A1 not aware of the need to display? 
 [a-21] 
As an illustration of how the investigator applied the stopping rules, in Figure 4 the 
causal factors regarded as beyond the scope of this investigation were the following, 
where A1 was not aware of the need to display after paying at the time partly 
because: 
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-- A1 was trying to talk with the friend (this cause was beyond scope because 
A1 was unlikely to not want to talk with friends in the car in general); 
-- It was impossible to safely turn the car around within the car park when 
almost full (this cause was beyond scope because the investigator has little 
direct influence on intervening in the management of the car park); 
-- There was an awkward and restrictive entry angle into the car park (this 
cause was beyond scope because the investigator has little direct influence on 
intervening in the management of the car park). 
[a-22] 
These three causes were not investigated any further due to them being deemed as 
beyond the scope of this RCA-based investigation. 
[a-23] 
Also in Figure 4 were two causes already previously considered (in Figure 3), where 
A1 was not aware of the need to display after paying at the time partly because: 
-- A1 was in a rush about the car parking; 
-- A1 had wrong pre-expectations due to the same car-park management. 
 
[a-24] 
Finally the one new ‘latent-cause’ uncovered at this step was: 
-- A1 didn’t see the pay and display signs. 
 
The investigator judged this ‘new’ contributory factor to be reasonable to be also 
included in the ‘failed barriers’ causal-category. In this incident, the existing pay-and-
display signs obviously failed to prevent non-display of the proof of purchase for the 
parking space. 
[a-25] 
An observation made by the investigator at this point in the investigation, was that the 
set of triggering categories used here (from [1, Appendix C]) may conceptually overlap. 
In particular Figure 4 suggests that the ‘failed barrier’ category may perhaps be a 
more abstract conceptual category than the other five - evidenced by the fact that it is 
reasonable here to include “A1 didn’t see the pay and display signs” under both the 
‘Human factors (communication)’ and ‘(Failed) barriers’ sections in this figure. 
[a-26] 
Exploring the causes of the “wrong pre-expectations due to same car-park 
management” contributory factor (in Figure 3) triggered the realisation by the 
investigator that this statement was actually in itself a mini causal statement, as 
opposed to a ‘simple’ contributory factor like the other 4 contributory causes in Figure 
3. Upon realising this fact in the investigation, this ‘composite-factor’ was revised into 
a ‘simple factor’, resulting in the revised top-level causal relations represented in 
Figure 5, where this top-level contributory cause is replaced instead with A1’s “wrong 
expectations of the parking scheme”. 
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Figure 5: Revised Ishikawa diagram overview of the parking incident. 
 [a-27] 
In Figure 5, the “confusing and hard to see signage” and “dense and hard to see 
conditions and terms” both fulfilled operational stopping criteria number 3 (see Table 2 
of this appendix), and were regarded as beyond the capabilities of the investigator to 
intervene upon. Neither of these contributory causes were regarded as within the 
scope of this RCA-based investigation. 
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[a-28] 
The next step was to further investigate this revised “wrong expectations of the 
parking scheme” contributory factor. These wrong expectations were judged to be 
because of the causes shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 6: Why did A1 have wrong expectations of the parking scheme? 
 [a-29] 
 
Here two contributory factors were found to have caused A1 to have had the wrong 
expectations, these were: 
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-- “Wrong pre-expectations due to same car-park management”, and 
-- “Insufficient signage”. 
 
Both these contributory factors were included under multiple causal-categories - in 
this case they were included under 2 causal-categories each. 
[a-30] 
Figure 7 is the investigative results following from exploring the “in a rush about the 
parking” contributory cause in Figure 5. This was found to be because A1’s friend 
needed to get to London fairly quickly. This contributory cause was beyond the scope 
of this RCA due to the fact that this was a more personal reason that the investigator 
was not willing to try to intervene on. 
 
Figure 7: Why was A1 in such a rush? 
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2.6.4 Exploring additional contributory factors beyond the scoping 
prescribed by [1] 
[a-31] 
“The signage was confusing and hard to see” and “dense and hard to see conditions 
and terms” were two contributory causes from Figure 5 that were actually out of scope 
for the stopping rules used in this RCA-based investigation. This was because the 
investigator was unlikely to be able to intervene on these conditions. These two 
contributory factors were however accidentally explored in detail during this 
investigation, and for completeness the results of these investigations are shown in 
Figures 8 and 9. 
 
Figure 8: Reasons for confusing and hard to see signage 
 
 293 
 
 
Figure 9: Reasons for dense and hard to see conditions and terms 
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2.6.5 Continuing the main investigation 
[a-32] 
We now continue from the main investigations described in 2.6.3. Figure 10 
represents the investigation of the only remaining cause to be further explored from 
Figure 4. This was the fact that A1 didn’t see the pay-and-display signs. As all the 
contributory causes in Figure 10 are either ‘beyond scope’ or already investigated, this 
part of the causal-chain was not explored any further. 
 
Figure 10: Why did A1 not see the signs? 
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[a-33] 
Figure 11 presents the results of further exploring the “insufficient signage” issue 
highlighted in Figure 6, leading to contributory causes that were all judged to be out of 
scope. This terminated this part of the search for root causes. 
 
Figure 11: Why was there insufficient signage? 
[a-34] 
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This concluded the investigator’s initial determination of all the relevant contributory 
factors and root causes – all the ‘whys’ were fully explored until the stopping-rule 
prescribed by [1] was fulfilled (i.e., systematically reaching all the ‘leaf nodes’ of the 
causal tree being explored/investigated). There were no incidental findings [1, p28] 
uncovered at this point. 
 
 
2.7 Consolidation using a causal-tree based understanding of 
the incident 
[a-35] 
To re-check and reflect on the validity of the causal reasoning done so far, the 
investigator printed off all of Figures 1-11, laid them all out on the floor, and holistically 
derived a sensible causal tree based on these 11 figures. The resulting entire tree, in 
the style prescribed by [1, p28] is shown in Figure 12. The investigator notes that this 
investigative step is not a step explicitly specified by [1], nevertheless it was carried 
out in the interests of facilitating a high-quality RCA-based investigation of this 
incident. 
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Figure 12: Consolidated full incident understanding in the form of a causal tree 
 
[a-36] 
Figure 12 was produced by simply drawing together all the prior information contained 
in the previous figures representing the evolving system understanding of the RCA-
based investigation. This holistic drawing together of all the causal conjectures in 
Figure 1-11 had the benefit of making sure that the entire causal tree based 
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representation of the system was sensible with respect to the investigative process 
outlined in [1]. 
[a-37] 
In the incident understanding represented by Figure 12, only minor changes from the 
previous figures were deemed necessary, including the following: 
 
1) The “wrong pre-expectations due to same car management” ‘mini-cause’ was 
decomposed into its two component parts of “wrong expectations of the parking 
scheme”, and “same car park management”. 
2) Figure 6 was also ‘heuristically-folded-in’ to Figure 12 – most notably 
incorporating the “insufficient signage” cause into the “confusing and hard to see 
signage” cause in Figure 5 (resulting in “confusing, insufficient and hard to see 
signage” in Figure 12). It was difficult to decide whether the “confusing, 
insufficient and hard to see signage” cause in Figure 12 ought to be within scope 
of this RCA-based investigation or not. This is because a prior appeal by the 
investigator (against the £75 parking penalty charge levied) may be interpreted in 
some sense as an attempt to contribute towards some form of intervention with 
respect to this particular cause, thus suggesting that this signage situation may 
perhaps be partially within the scope and capabilities of the investigator to 
change. 
 
[a-38] 
Information from Figures 8 and 9 were not included in the consolidated ‘causal-tree’ in 
Figure 12, as they were only found by accident due to our inexperience at doing a 
RCA-based investigation according to [1]. The results in both these figures were 
generated from (further) causal exploration that directly leads only from a cause that 
fulfilled the stopping rule prescribed by [1]. This suggests that additional causal 
exploration such as the kind encapsulated in Figures 8 and 9 are in some sense 
‘bonus parts’ of the exploration of the causal-tree that is unlikely to consistently occur 
in all RCA-based investigations. 
[a-39] 
At this point, the investigator judged the evolving incident understanding to be 
complete. Applying steps 1-6 (out of the 8 investigative steps prescribed by [1, p22-
p31]) led to a full system-based understanding of an everyday incident based on an 
investigation using the RCA methodology [1]; Steps 7 and 8 [1, p28-31] consist only of 
re-organising, appropriately communicating, and responding to the findings resulting 
from such an investigation. No further system understanding will be gained from 
applying steps 7 and 8 [1, p28]. 
[a-40] 
This concludes the evolution of a full system-based incident understanding according 
to [1].  
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Appendix C.2: An overview of the outcomes from two 
independent applications of the Systematic Reanalysis 
Method, and the wrap-up session 
 
There are seven columns in the summary table presented in this appendix. Reading 
from the left: 
 The first column states the normalised form (see Section 6.4) of the 
methodological criticism used to analyse the ISMP Canada (2006) manual (the 
original forms are provided instead where this normalisation wasn’t applicable); in 
this first column the Systematic Reanalysis Method ‘phrase templates’ are greyed 
out to help the reader pick out the parts of investigation encapsulated within each 
methodological criticism. 
 The second column denotes ‘contextually limited’ criticisms that relate to a priori 
factors beyond the investigator’s control – implying an a priori lack of 
methodological freedom before the investigation even began. 
 The third column denotes criticisms considered to be too vague to be effectively 
analysed against the manual. 
 The fourth and fifth columns denote the annotations originally assigned by each 
Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst. 
 The sixth column denotes whether the investigative actions or findings contained 
within each methodological criticism was found to be constrained, strongly 
afforded, or weakly afforded by the manual based on the (Systematic Reanalysis 
Method) comparative analyses done. 
 Finally, the seventh column describes any significant findings and changes 
resulting from the wrap-up session discussions – after the two independent 
Systematic Reanalysis Method analyses. 
The greyed out rows in the table denote where methodological criticisms were not 
comparatively analysed due to being contextually limited, too vague to be effectively 
analysed, or being either subsumed by, or effectively duplicating a previously 
analysed criticism. The notion of validity here is with respect to the particular manual 
[1] embodying the investigative method used. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abbreviations used 
The following abbreviations are used in the table. ‘Methodological criticisms’ (e.g., 
Section 6.3) are labelled using references given in curly brackets (e.g., {AC1}, {BC4}). 
Those originally generated by analyst A (the author) are prefixed with AC, and ones 
by analyst B (the independent second Systematic Reanalysis Method analyst) are 
prefixed with BC in indexing each methodological criticism. 
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CL denotes criticisms relating to contextual limitations (‘y’ indicates where this is 
true). 
V denotes criticisms considered too vague for analysis (‘y’ indicates where this 
was assigned). 
M  denotes criticisms that may affect the validity of the investigative procedure. 
F  denotes criticisms that may affect the validity of the investigative findings. 
M/F denotes criticisms that may affect the validity of either/both the investigative 
procedure and/or findings. 
G   denotes general criticisms considered to potentially have a non-local effect on 
the validity of the investigation done. 
S denotes specific criticisms considered to potentially have only a local effect on 
the validity of the investigation done. 
Cstr denotes investigative actions and/or findings found to be invalid with respect to 
the manual used, due to contravening the methodological specification expressed in 
the manual used (i.e., ‘constrained’). 
Waff denotes investigative actions and/or findings found to be neither conclusively 
invalid or valid with respect to the manual used, due to methodological ambiguity (i.e., 
‘weakly afforded’). 
Saff denotes investigative actions and/or findings found to be valid with respect to 
the manual used, due to explicit methodological support for the particular action done 
and/or finding obtained (i.e., ‘strongly afforded’). 
 
References such as [i-5] refer to specific paragraphs in the account of the RCA 
investigation of the car parking incident [2]. [i-5]->[i-6] indicates a range of 
paragraphs between the given labels. Throughout this appendix, the following numeric 
‘paper references’ are used: 
[1] ISMP Canada (2006). Canadian Root Cause Analysis Framework: A tool for 
identifying and addressing the root causes of critical incidents in healthcare. 
(http://www.ismp-canada.org/rca.htm, accessed 28/9/2012) 
[2]  Appendix C.1 
 
Note: The weblink for reference [1] was subsequently updated with a 2012 version of the RCA 
manual. The 2006 version of the manual used for this research may be provided on request. 
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Normalised methodological 
criticism 
CL? 
(y/-) 
V? 
(y/-) 
M, F or 
M/F? 
G or 
S? 
Cstr, Waff or 
Saff ? 
Significant issues from the 
post-analyses wrap-up session 
{AC1} 
The investigative choice of using the 
entirety of [1] to inform and guide the 
investigation was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC2} 
The investigative choice of prioritising 
the following sections of [1] for critically 
guiding the investigation was invalid: 
 
- Root Cause Analysis Process section 
[1, p22]; 
- Preface section [1, p4-5], last two 
paragraphs; 
- Essentials of Root Cause Analysis 
section [1, p10]; 
- The triggering categories from 
Appendix C of ISMP Canada (2006) 
(see [1, p44] and [1, p13]). 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC3} 
The investigative choice of basing the 
core steps of this investigation primarily 
on the Root Cause Analysis Process 
section [1, p22-p31] was invalid. 
- - M G Saff - 
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{AC4} 
The investigative choice of performing 
each of the 8 steps outlined on [1, Figure 
4, p22] as strictly sequential, rather than 
more iteratively was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC5.1/12} 
The investigative choices made at each 
of the six steps accounted for in the 
record of the investigation were invalid. 
- y M S - - 
{AC5.2} 
The investigative findings obtained for 
each of the six steps accounted for in 
the record of the investigation were 
invalid. 
- y F S - - 
{AC6} 
The investigative choice of 
understanding steps 7/8 and 8/8 of the 
process as prescribed in [1, p28-p31] as 
developing no further system-based 
incident understanding was invalid. 
- - M S Saff Our discussion found that the interpretation of the end 
of step 6/8 as the point at which no further system-
based incident understanding will be developed was 
arguably not strongly afforded, since the manual used 
never specifies explicitly where/when investigators 
should stop developing additional understanding. 
Despite the strong implication of the first sentence of 
the Formulate Causal Statements section of the 
manual [1, p28], we erred on the conservative side 
and reassigned this methodological criticism as Waff. 
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{AC7} 
The investigative choice to impose no 
predetermined time limit for completing 
the evolution of a system-based 
understanding of the incident was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC8} 
The investigative choice in terms of 
taking around 45 hours in total for 
completing the evolution of a system-
based understanding of the incident was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC9}  
(Original) Incident participant, RCA 
investigator and information provider are 
same person. 
y - - - - - 
{AC10} 
(Original) Investigating a car-parking 
incident using RCA. 
y - - - - - 
{AC11} 
(Original) Singular evolution of RCA-
based incident understanding. 
y - - - - - 
{AC12} is subsumed under {AC5.1} - - - - - - 
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{AC13} 
The investigative choice of using a flow-
diagram and a supporting narrative for 
forming and consolidating the initial 
understanding of the incident was 
invalid. 
- - M S Saff - 
{AC14} 
The investigative choice of only making 
a single return visit to the incident site for 
the ‘additional information’ step (step 3/8 
of [1, Root Cause Analysis Process 
section]) was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC15} 
(Original) The use of reflective recall as 
primary source of understanding about 
incident. 
y - - - - - 
{AC16} 
The investigative choice of collecting 
only photographic evidence on the return 
site visit was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
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{AC17} 
The investigative choice/finding-obtained 
of using the ‘fact’ below as the starting 
point of the exploration of the 
contributory factors and root causes was 
invalid: 
 
“Why did A1 forget to display the proof of 
purchase for parking after paying”? 
- - M/F G Waff - 
{AC18} 
The investigative choice of using five of 
the triggering categories from [1, 
Appendix C] to support the collection of 
additional information was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC19} 
The investigative choice of not using the 
sixth ‘barriers’ category of the triggering 
categories from [1, Appendix C] to 
support the collection of additional 
information was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC20} 
The investigative choice, where the 
depth and quality of the contributory 
factors in each of the five triggering 
categories used were not explicitly 
checked, was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
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{AC21} 
(Original) Choice of Google-search only 
as a basis for this literature search. 
y - - - - - 
{AC22} 
The investigative choice of carrying out a 
literature search based only on protocol 
and case based literature only was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC23} 
The investigative choice of conducting a 
literature search only for informing 
investigative procedure and the 
subsequent investigative understanding 
was invalid. 
- - M G Saff The review and usage of literature is mentioned also 
as part of the guidance relating to team discussions 
(see [1, p21] and [1, Table 4] for example). As such 
we found that the arguably more restrictive 
interpretation used in the investigation was perhaps 
less strongly afforded than at first thought. This part of 
the investigation was revised as Waff by the manual 
used. 
{AC24} 
The investigative choice of always using 
all prior understanding built up in all of 
the prior steps for each new step in the 
investigation was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
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{AC25} 
The investigative choice of using search 
terms such as the ones listed in the 
record of the investigation was invalid 
(reproduced below for reference): 
 
- “preventing forgetting to display in 
future”, 
- “remembering to display parking ticket”, 
- “forgetting to display parking tickets”, 
- “parking fines”, 
- “parking fines what to do if you have 
paid but forgot to display”. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC26} 
The investigative choice of spending 
only half a day or so on the literature 
search part of the investigation was 
invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC27} 
The investigative choice of stopping the 
literature search after finding a lack of 
apparently relevant results was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC28.1} 
The investigative choice of using ‘call-
out’ boxes in the final understanding 
flow-diagram was invalid. 
- - M S Saff - 
 309 
 
{AC28.2} 
The investigative choice of using only 
the flow-diagram and narrative to 
express the final understanding of the 
incident was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC29} 
The investigative choice to not construct 
an analogous table to [1, Table 5, p25] 
was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC30} 
The investigative choice to do nothing 
further with respect to gaining a broader 
contextual understanding of the incident, 
when there is little apparent literature 
found in the literature search, was 
invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC31} 
The investigative choice to use the 
Ishikawa diagram rather than the tree 
diagram for representing the causal 
relations of the contributory factors in the 
system was invalid. 
- - M G Saff - 
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{AC32} 
The investigative choice to not look for 
any further ‘major causes’ in addition to 
the five causal-conjectures originally 
used to support the collection of 
additional incident information was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC33.1} 
The investigative choice of using only 
intuitive investigator satisfaction for 
appropriately scoping the initial 
exploration of the (most proximal) major 
causes leading up to the incident was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC33.2} 
The investigative choice of using only 
the following stopping rule from [1, p27] 
as a global ‘stopping rule’ was invalid: 
 
“It is crucial to ask “why” at each level of 
cause and effect until there are no more 
questions, 
knowledge becomes limited, or until the 
issues identified fall outside the scope of 
the RCA” ([1, p27]). 
- - M G Waff - 
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{AC33.3/38} 
The investigative choice of using the 
particular interpretation of the following 
stopping rule was invalid: 
 
“It is crucial to ask “why” at each level of 
cause and effect until there are no more 
questions, 
knowledge becomes limited, or until the 
issues identified fall outside the scope of 
the RCA” ([1, p27]). 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC34} 
The investigative choice of interpreting 
the guidelines prescribed by [1] for 
searching for contributory causes as 
similar to breadth-first search was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC35} 
The investigative choice of interpreting 
the following rule in an inclusive-OR 
style was invalid: 
 
“It is crucial to ask “why” at each level of 
cause and effect until there are no more 
questions, 
knowledge becomes limited, or until the 
issues identified fall outside the scope of 
the RCA” ([1, p27]). 
- - M S Saff - 
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{AC36} 
The investigative choice of not using the 
following rule in a holistic way was 
invalid: 
 
“It is crucial to ask “why” at each level of 
cause and effect until there are no more 
questions, 
knowledge becomes limited, or until the 
issues identified fall outside the scope of 
the RCA” ([1, p27]). 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC37} 
The investigative choice of not re-
exploring ‘previously seen’ causes again 
was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC38} was the same criticism as 
{AC33.3} 
- - - - - - 
{AC39} 
The investigative choice to include the 
same contributory factor under multiple 
triggering category headings was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC40/41} 
The investigative choice to slightly 
update the initial level of ‘major causal 
factors’ due to the evolving investigative 
understanding of the incident was 
invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
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{AC42} 
The investigative choice to assume that 
the ‘correct’ RCA-based procedure was 
to curtail investigation of ‘more-latent’ 
causes as soon as a stopping rule is 
satisfied was invalid. 
- - M G Waff - 
{AC43} 
The investigative finding of ‘no incidental 
findings’ was invalid. 
- - F S Cstr We agreed that it would be sensible to make sure to 
include all investigative findings at least as part of the 
‘incidental findings’ part of the RCA. 
{AC44/45} 
The investigative choice of doing a 
‘holistic’ drawing together, consolidation 
and summary step as described in 
Section 2.7 of the record of the 
investigation was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC46} 
The investigative choice of not including 
the ‘accidental’ investigative findings 
(Section 2.6.4 in the record of the 
investigation) as either ‘incidental 
findings’, or as part of the consolidated 
overall causal understanding of the 
incident (in Figure 12, Section 2.7 in the 
record of the investigation) was invalid. 
- - M S Cstr Related to C43. 
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{AC47} 
The investigative findings obtained of 
having no more than one contributing 
factor in each triggering category (for 
some steps of the RCA) were invalid. 
- - F S Waff - 
{AC48} 
The investigative choice of using the 
same set of six triggering categories in 
the Ishikawa-diagram example given at 
[1, Figure 8, p27], for/at all ‘layers’ of the 
RCA-based exploration of contributory 
factors and root causes was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{AC49} 
The investigative choice of using only 
photographic and documentary evidence 
to support a RCA-based investigation 
according to [1] was invalid. 
- - M G Saff - 
 
(Intentionally left blank to separate the two sets of Systematic Reanalysis Method analysis results) 
{BC1} 
The investigative choice of not including 
a proper justification for the use of RCA, 
for example through the decision tree 
method, was invalid. 
- - M G Cstr We agreed that it would be useful to go through the 
decision tree of [1, Figure 2] to gain further confidence 
about whether this investigation is basically within the 
scope of the RCA manual used. 
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{BC2} 
The investigative choice of not including 
the photographic evidence that is 
relevant to the investigation was invalid. 
- - M S Waff - 
{BC3} 
The investigative choice of attributing 
blame to the failure of the incident’s 
main participant’s memory as a starting 
premise to aid gathering further 
information was invalid. 
y - M S Cstr Our discussion found that this methodological criticism 
was one due to the occasional ambiguity in [2] when 
distinguishing between the incident participant role, 
and the investigator role. The manual does 
encourages the investigator to avoid jumping to 
conclusions, so an investigative assumption of a 
failure in the participants memory would clearly be 
constrained by the manual used. 
 
This methodological criticism was changed to Waff 
after analyst A explained that the memory failure was 
the equivalent of ‘interview data’, and did not express 
investigative assumption in this case. The manual 
used provides no explicit guidance on the situation 
where the investigator also participated in the incident 
– which is in fact a contextual limitation of this incident 
investigation. 
 
We agreed that it would be perhaps useful to make 
sure such ambiguities were fully explicitly clarified 
throughout the record of the investigation. 
{BC4} 
The investigative choice/findings-
obtained from not specifying explicitly if 
a piece of critical knowledge was held by 
an affected actor in the incident at the 
time of the incident, was invalid. 
- - M/F S Cstr Changed to Waff for the same reasons as in {BC3}. 
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{BC5} 
The investigative choice/findings-
obtained of attributing blame to 
equipment involved in the parking 
system rather than describe in full the 
reasons participant A1 had difficulty 
reading the signage, was invalid. 
- - M/F S Cstr The manual used encouraged a need to fully explore 
latent factors throughout. Our discussion found that it 
may be useful to try to further explore the reasons why 
participant A1 had difficulty in reading the signage. 
Analyst B suggested perhaps a return site visit, or 
comparison with signage in other car parks, may give 
a deeper understanding than that found so far with 
respect to this part of the investigation. 
{BC6} 
The investigative choice of not 
interviewing all participants was invalid. 
- - M S Cstr Due to a more narrow interpretation of “all staff 
involved in the incident” [1, p23], analyst A (in the role 
of investigator) failed to identify the friend who also 
arrived at the car park as a potential source of 
additional information and verification. We agreed that 
this was something which was now sensible to simply 
accept as a limitation of the investigation. Even if the 
friend was contacted, the intervening time from when 
the incident occurred would render any information 
gained of dubious accuracy. 
{BC7} 
The investigative choice of not 
employing a thorough literature review 
method as suggested in the RCA 
framework manual was invalid. 
- - M S Cstr Our discussion found that the guidance for the specific 
nature and scoping of the literature review was not 
clearly articulated, nor particular imperative. This 
methodological criticism was consequently changed to 
Waff. 
{BC8} 
The investigative choice of not 
constructing an accurate table of timings 
for the events was invalid. 
- - M S Cstr Our discussion found that the guidance relating to the 
construction of an accurate table of timings similar to 
[1, Table 5] was not strongly imperative in the manual 
used. Consequently this methodological criticism was 
changed to Waff instead. Due to the relatively simple 
nature of this incident, we also agreed that a specific 
table of timings would add little value beyond the 
sequential information already presented in [2]. 
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{BC9} 
The investigative choice of not positing 
any possible failures of safety barriers in 
the ‘initial causes’ diagram of [2, Figure 
3] was invalid. 
- - M S Cstr Our discussion found that the notion of ‘safety 
barriers’ was only vaguely defined in the manual used, 
and used in other parts of the RCA done. We also 
found that this particular methodological criticism was 
in fact perhaps more reflective of the nature of the 
system under investigation, rather than identifying a 
flaw in the validity of the investigation process. In 
particular, analyst B conceptualised such barriers as a 
strong physical preventative measure, of which there 
didn’t seem to be any obvious ones in this case. 
Consequently this investigative choice was changed 
to Saff instead, as in light of the discussion, we now 
agreed that the investigation choice made of not 
positing any initial ‘failed safety barriers’ was strongly 
likely given the guidance of the manual used. 
 
Analyst B did suggest that it may however be useful to 
revisit the incident site to verify that no strong physical 
‘safety barriers’ were inadvertently missed. 
{BC10} 
The investigative findings obtained of 
finding one of the principal causes of the 
incident being beyond the scope of an 
RCA investigation given that the scope 
of the system we are investigating is not 
clearly defined, was invalid. 
- - F G Saff - 
 
END OF THIS APPENDIX 
